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ABSTRACT
"LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY" AND STATE BROWNFIELD PROGRAMS
Jaclyn Susan Marie Opp
May 12,2007

Public investment and interest into brownfields has increased markedly in the past
two decades. However, scholarship has not kept pace with this growth. Every state in
the U.S. has created a brownfields program to deal with the presence of these properties
in their state. However, the mechanisms offered in these state programs to facilitate
brownfield remediation and redevelopment has gone untested and underresearched. This
dissertation gathered data on all fifty state brovvnfield programs and the related Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) enforeement and inspection data. The fifty
state data was then supplemented with three state case studies using in-depth interviews
with key participants and policymakers.
The findings of this dissertation demonstrate that a great diversity in mechanisms
to facilitate brownfield remediation and redevellopment exists across these programs. The
findings also illustration a level of disinterest by political officials in the monitoring of
these programs. Furthermore, program officials indicate a significant connection and
responsibility to the entity that gives them the most money- the EPA. Overall, the
diversity across the states, lack of political interest, and influence of individual EPA
Regions offers some insights into the potential for serious unanticipated consequences of
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the movement to protect liability from environmental contamination while offering public
resources to redevelop brownfields. This disseJrtation also finds that the related RCRA
program may offer an indicator for environmental protectiveness of a particular state.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades contaminated land issues have increasingly moved
to the forefront of political, social, and economic debates in the United States and other
western nations (see for example Barnett, 1994;, Bartsch and Wells, 2005; Coleman,
1994; Dente, 1995; Meyer, Williams, and Yount, 1995; and Syms, 2004). Over 150
years of neglect and ignorance has contributed to an environmental crisis. Virtually
every community in the United States is plagued by some form, and some level, of
environmental contamination as a result of past decisions. One environmental problem
that has steadily been increasing in recognition, and in corrective action, is that of
brownfields.
Brownfields are defined by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as, " ...
real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by
the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant"
(US EPA, 2005). Estimates of the number ofbmwnfields are generally accepted to be at
least 450,000 nationwide (U.S. EPA, 2005; NOItheast~Midwest Institute, n.d.). As local
and state governments find themselves under pressure to provide more services to their
constituents with fewer resources, brownfields become both an obstacle and an
opportunity to them. Uremediated brownfields produce few jobs, provide little to no
property tax revenue, and contribute to community blight. Communities that can
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redevelop their brownfields are in the position to reap real benefits- environmental,
social, and economic.
The private sector has been slow in remediating and redeveloping brownfields for
a variety of reasons. Concerns about potential llegal liabilities, perceived and actual
financial costs of cleanup, technical burden of dealing with contamination, the
uncertainties associated with regulatory oversight, and the perceived stigma associated
with brownfields all tend to make greenfields more attractive to prospective developers.
For all ofthese reasons brownfield redevelopffii~nt is an issue in which the private sector
has been unsuccessful in addressing quickly or routinely, even in exceptionally strong
real estate markets. Having recognized both thl! benefits to be had, and the associated
costs of brownfields, governments at all levels have taken a lead role in brownfield
remediation and redevelopment.
The decision to pursue brownfield remediation and redevelopment has been a
political choice that has been made and repeated at all levels of government in the United
States. These political choices almost always entail creating a government program to
deal with the issue. "A program consists of governmental action initiated in order to
secure objectives whose attainment is problematical" (Pressman, 1984, p. xx).
Brownfield properties by virtue of their definition are problems for the local, state, and
federal governments. Much like other political choices made in the twentieth century to
address a perceived problem, administrative agencies are one of the most heavily relied
upon means to achieve the brownfield-related goals of the local, state, and federal
governments (KettI and Fesler, 2005; Rosenbloom and Kravchuk and Rosenbloom,

2005).
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Although the administrative state in the United States has received significant
criticism over the past century, it is still a primary means of carrying out the
government's policy mandates (Huber and Shipan, 2002; KettI et aI, 2005; Rosenbloom
et aI, 2005). A Brownfield program, like any other government program, is faced with
the same problems, constraints, and benefits that the American Administrative State
presents to other areas of government intervention.
As Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis so eloquently stated, "It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country" (New State Ice Co v. Liebmann, 1932). State experiments into
brownfield programs can lend a great deal of information to citizens, government
officials, and scholars. These state programs are largely under-researched and provide a
valuable opportunity to investigate brownfield programs, program implementation,
bureaucratic discretion, and political control of the bureaucracy. The problems that occur
as a result of brownfields are of concern to many different groups of people including
nearby residents and property owners, political officials, and businesses (both those
owning brownfields and those who would benefit from facilitated remediation
opportunities). Given this broad impact that brownfields have on society, understanding
the government's intervention into this area will likely provide a benefit to a diverse and
large group of individuals. To be sure, possessing a deeper, more complex understanding
of the government intervention into brownfield remediation and redevelopment can
enable and foster the pursuit of viable solutions to the problem of brownfields.
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Research Objectives and Significance
Brownfield research has been increasing in the past few years and most
commonly includes descriptive studies, best examples of innovation in redevelopments,
and manuals of resources for prospective developers. Although some research into the
local and state government's role in brownfield remediation and redevelopment has been
conducted over the last two decades the studies are very underdeveloped and the area
remains largely under-researched (See for example, Northeast-Midwest Institute). As
research is conducted it is becoming increasingly clear that across the fifty State
Governments brownfield programs take a varied approach to facilitating remediation and
redevelopment of these properties. Some states have comprehensive resources and
opportunities for local governments and individuals to invest in brownfields, while others
have minimal influence and resources. This variation provides an interesting and unique
opportunity to better understand government intervention into brownfields.
" ... Brandeis viewed the states as laboratories in which the Progressives could
experiment with new solutions to social and economic problems. Those that worked
could be applied nationally; those that failed could be discarded" (Osborne, 1990, p. 2).
Brownfield programs offer a unique opportunity to research and record what the different

laboratories are doing in respect to brownfield programs. By examining fifty unique
programs that are all directed at solving a common problem it will be possible to gain a
deeper understanding of the diversity of the mechanisms for government intervention into
brownfields, details concerning the implementation and administration of these programs
all while providing some insight into the use of public resources. Given the diversity of
issues surrounding brownfield redevelopment and the government programs directed at
addressing them, this dissertation takes an interdisciplinary, multifaceted look at state
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brownfield programs. This research seeks to further the knowledge of what states are
doing in relation to their brownfield programs, how related regulations may impact the
programs, and how the complex relationships between the bureaucracy and political
officials exert control over these programs shaping them into what they are. In order to
effectively understand all of these issues, this dissertation consists of two distinct
research steps-with the second step building on, and stemming from, the first step.
With little up to date data available on these brownfield programs, this research will
require the use of multiple methodologies that are discussed further in Chapter Two.
All Fifty State Programs
The first step of this research deals with the fifty state brownfield programs as a
whole. Utilizing an annual survey (which is currently overdue for an update) conducted
by the EPA this research adds to and expands upon this basic information into state
brownfield programs in order to better understand some of the variations that exist in
state programs across the fifty

u.s. states.

The end product of this data gathering is a

fifty state database that allows for a deeper understanding and analysis of these programs.
In essence the overarching research question in the database of the fifty states is: What
are the fifty laboratories doing about their brownfields? Following from that large
question several related questions are raised. These questions include: How, if at all,
does the regulatory environment of a state influence their brownfield program? What can
the states learn from each other? Are there any commonalities across the fifty states that
are interesting to the quest for remediation and redevelopment of brownfields?
Although the database of the fifty states provides an expansive view of the variety

of programs directed at brownfields-it does not provide a great level of depth on the
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specific day-to-day administration of any of the programs. The complex nature of
intergovernmental relationships is particularly interesting to these programs and requires
a smaller scale examination to untangle that web. In order to further provide the depth
needed to understand the complex nature of these programs a second step of this
dissertation involves three comparative case studies directed at further understanding
these programs. The use of qualitative research enables this dissertation to better
understand the contextual differences that exist in these programs. Drawing upon
theories of political control and bureaucratic discretion, this research analyzes three states
in depth to try and gain a better understanding of the real story of state brownfield
programs. The usage of qualitative methodology to gain insights into these programs is,
alone, a significant contribution to this topic. As will be discussed further in Chapter
Two, these political control theories and bureaucratic discretion theories are concentrated
at the federal level and in the usage of quantitative models-studying far more complex
and interdependent state level provides an opportunity to expand on these theories while,
at the same time, offering policy suggestions for brownfield programs. The basic
research questions in this second step include among others: What are the experiences of
the administrators in these programs? How do state political officials impact and monitor
these programs? How does related regulation impact the operation and administration of
the program? How does the EPA get involved in the administration and implementation
of the programs? In the pursuit of these answers the dissertation is organized in the
following manner.
Chapter Two provides the overarching theories and expectations for this research.
Environmental federalism, regulation, and political control and bureaucratic discretion
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theories are discussed. This chapter provides the theoretical background and expectations
required to understand and appreciate the complexities of the remaining chapters in this
dissertation. Environmental policy and the shifts in relationships is a very complex
subject, which requires an understanding of several pieces of environmental-related
literature. Chapter Two provides the necessary information to understand the complex
context this dissertation is working in. Chapter Three discusses the methodology used to
gather and compile the database. This chapter also outlines the methodology and for the
three case studies. Chapter Four presents the findings of the fifty-state database as well
as the specific rationale for the selection of the three state case studies which emerges
from the findings of the database. Related to Chapter Four is Appendix A and Appendix
B which provides a detailed outline of what is included in the database created. This
database will be placed online at http://cepm.louisville.edu. Chapter Five presents the
findings of the three state case studies. Chapter Six analyzes the data compiled in the
database as well as in the three case studies, offers some policy recommendations, and
concludes the dissertation.
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CHAPTER II
THEORIES AND EXPECTATIONS
"Brownfields are real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which
may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance,
pollutant, or contaminant" (Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields
Revitalization Act, 2002). The presence, or potential presence, of contamination has led
to reluctance to invest in brownfields on the part of many developers. Although, as
pointed out in Chapter One, redeveloping brownfields can reap many rewards, a variety
ofliability, regulatory, and economic concerns prevent more widespread brownfield
redevelopment. The remediation and redevelopment of brownfields has become an area
where policymakers have become very interested. "Policy makers at all levels of
government have sought ways to encourage the redevelopments in order to generate tax
revenues and employment, curb urban sprawl, and remediate contamination that threatens
public health and the environment" (Yount and Meyer, 1999, p. 179). Although it is
recognized that the public sector has taken a keen interest in brownfields, little is known
about the specific processes, successes, and potential lessons of this involvement.
The protection and regulation of the environment is an area where the
fundamental tenets of the American government system are tested and are not always in
concert with each other. Intergovernmental relations in this area pose some interesting
circumstances under which the public brownfield programs operate. The relationships
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that exist across the states, localities, EPA Regions, and national EPA headquarters is a
strong influencer on the outcomes and outputs of certain, particularly environmental,
programs. "Congress cannot control every decision to be made in implementing a public
program ... Every policy contains the ability of implementers to make choices, and those
choices are made by different people in any number of federal or state agencies ... "
(Scheberle, 1997, p. 10-11). Understanding the current and evolving context under which
these programs operate is both necessary and important to an analysis of public
brownfield programs. In order to begin to understand the government's intervention into
the brownfield problem it is necessary to understand the history and context in which this
intervention is working. This chapter of the dissertation will present the related literature
and theories necessary to understand the problem of brownfields and the purpose of this
dissertation. Specifically this chapter will start with an overview of environmental
federalism and regulation highlighting the logic for studying state level programs. This
chapter will then move on to discuss and outline theories concerning the administration
of public programs illustrating the importance of understanding the influencers on
brownfield program implementation; and will conclude with an overview of the current
landscape of brownfield programs in the United States.

Environmental Federalism- So why the states?
The government at all levels in the United States intervenes in areas and issues
considered to create environmental harms. Environmental harms represent a variety of
" ... physical, biological, and chemical threats to human health or the health of the
ecosystems on which we depend ... " (Etsy, 1996, p. 2). These environmental harms
jeopardize social welfare because of both the damage to human health and because
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environmental resources are a fundamental component, or input, to production
processes-be it land, water, or air (Etsy, 1996; Higgs and Close, 2004). Given the
complexities of property rights, externalities, and transaction costs it is generally agreed
upon that some form of public environmental regulation and intervention is necessary to
protect social welfare (Farber, 2005; Higgs et aI, 2004; Rosenbaum, 2005; Welborn,
1998).
With regard to personal liberties and property rights, most processes of production
exhibit very blurry boundaries-something often referred to as spillovers in the literature
(Stewart, 1977)...... the effects of local waste entail both local pollution and some
external effects on other (most likely neighboring) jurisdictions" (Oates, 2001, p. 4). For
example, if property owner A uses his property to dispose of toxic wastes which then
travel to property owner B's property, whose property rights should be upheld? Does
property owner A have the right to dispose on his own personal and private property? Or
does property owner B have the right not to be subjected to the runoff from the
neighboring parcel? "Cross-boundary pollution, like any interstate externality, is a valid
concern in environmental policy" (Adler, 1998, p. 3). These are questions that have been
subject to a number of high-profile and contentious court cases and requires government
intervention to ensure a predictable and fair answer (Demsetz, 1967; Farber, 2005;
Merrill, 1985; Revesz, 1992). Environmental harms tend to be too complex and
complicated to be handled solely in the private market and as such the public sector has
been involved for many years.
Although the public sector has been involved with regulating and controlling

environmental hanns for many years, the level of participation at the different levels of
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government has evolved over time. This changing and shifting roles over environmental
protection and regulation is often referred to as Environmental Federalism. Much like the
overarching arguments and shifts in responsibilities of the varying levels of government
in the United States, Environmental Federalism has undergone similar shifts.
In the earliest years the protection of the environment tended to be highly
decentralized (Percival et aI, 2006; Melosi, 1981; Reitze, 1991). With origins in the
1880s and 1890s many large cities, like New York and Chicago, adopted nuisance laws
to deal with garbage dumping and smoke (Melosi, 1981). It was generally believed that
the protection from environmental harms was a power and duty of the local governments.

It was not until much later that environmental protection became more centralized in
nature.
As problems of pollution crossing political boundaries became more widespread or were recognized as such by evolving scientific analysis - the efforts to protect and
regulate the environment grew more centralized (Stewart, 1977). "Although some states
adopted air and water pollution laws as early as the end of the nineteenth century, state
regulation of environmental problems did not begin in earnest until the post-World War
II industrial boom. The state regulatory efforts of the 1950s and 1960s, however, did
little to stem the flow of pollution, and by the mid-60s, the demand for more centralized
regulation was growing" (Etsy, 1996, p. 16). With Congress' passage of the Clean Air
Act in 1963 and the Clean Water Act in 1965, environmental protection began to move in
a more centralized direction with the federal government taking more responsibility for
the protection and regulation of environmental related issues. These two federal acts

were shortly succeeded by the passages of the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control
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Act of 1972, the 1974 Safe Drinking Water Act, the 1976 Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA), and the 1980 Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).
Many scholars have identified a variety of logical reasons that support a more
centralized approach to environmental protection (see, for example, Etsy, 1996; Higgs et
al, 2004; Oates, 2001; Scheberle, 2005; Stewart, 1977). One most widely touted and
discussed idea is that of the 'race to the bottom' problem associated with a decentralized
approach. Under the 'race to the bottom' premise a decentralized approach to
environmental protection will ultimately fail as a result of the state and local governments
that choose to neglect environmental protection in favor of economic development
(Percival, Schroeder, Miller, and Leape, 2006; Sheldon, 2006).
Although many scholars believe the central government is the most logical place
for environmental regulation and protection, the past several decades has seen a shift to a
more decentralized environmental approach--that is the bulk of environmental protection
and regulation responsibilities have been shifted down to the state level (Stewart, 1977;
Rose-Ackerman, 1995). "Under the Reagan Administration several actions were taken
that moved the responsibility for some environmental management back to the states.
Indeed, one of Reagan's principles was to shift environmental responsibilities back to the
states 'whenever feasible'" (Oates, 2001, p.15). The most recent public involvement into
environmental protection and regulation continues to place the central government behind
the state governments in terms of implementation and administration. "Since 1970,
which marks the beginning of the first significant involvement of the national

government in environmental protection, Congress has designed most federal
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environmental programs so that they could be administered at the state and local levels"
(Sheberle, 1997, pg. 4). In fact, according to the Environmental Council ofthe States
(ECOS), approximately 90% of all federal environmental programs are meant to be
implemented and administered by the state governments (ECOS, 2006). Outside the
normative views about the proper level of environmental regulation and protection, states
have, indeed, become a pivotal and primary actor in the protection and regulation of the
environment making this level of government intervention into brownfields logical to
study. Although environmental protection and regulation takes on many different and
varying types of environmental harms, of particular interest to this research are the laws
and regulations contributing to and influencing brownfields. The Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) are the most salient federal acts for this
purpose.

RCRA and CERCLA
Hazardous substances can be defined as ..... a very large category of chemicals
that exhibit corrosive, ignitive, reactive, or toxic characteristics" (Ringquist, 1993, p. 18).
"Hazardous wastes pose a substantial threat to public health and the environment. When
hazardous wastes are disposed of improperly, they contaminate soil, air, surface water,
and ground water and threaten the well-being of humans and other organisms" (Barnett,
1994, p. 9). Prior to the enactment and implementation of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) in 1976 only air and water were protected from hazardous
disposal (Meyer, Williams, and Yount, 1995). With the passage ofRCRA and the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA), both in 1976, and the Comprehensive Environmental

13

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) in 1980 contamination of land
became an area where regulation intervened.
" ... two federal statutes are most important in regulating the treatment and
disposal of hazardous substances. These include CERCLA and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ... " (Meyer et aI, 1995, p. 60). While RCRA seeks to
ensure hazardous waste is not disposed of improperly-thereby threatening the
environment and human health; the original language of CERCLA sought to deal with
the sites that were abandoned or where the person responsible can not be found or did not
have the capacity to pay for the damages caused. CERCLA was subsequently amended
in 2002 with the passage of the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields
Revitalization Act which worked to shift the focus of CERCLA away from only
orphaned sites. This change to CERCLA sought to eliminate some of the liability
concerns associated with CERCLA and to promote the cleanup ofbrownfields. These
two federal acts have instigated cleanup of contaminated sites and helped prevent future
contamination- but at the same time may have discouraged their redevelopment.

RCRA
RCRA was passed in order to closely monitor the utilization of toxic materials in
production and the generation and disposal of hazardous waste. It was created initially as
an amendment to the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965, which had no specific focus on
toxics in the waste stream. In its current form RCRA has ten subtitles: A-J. Of these
subtitles, three create programs while the remainder deals with provisions of oversight,
duties, and other regulatory issues. The three regulatory programs established through

14

RCRA deal with both land and water. These programs are Solid Waste, Hazardous
Waste, and Underground Storage Tanks (USTs).
Subtitle C ofRCRA deals with hazardous waste. This portion ofRCRA is often
referred to as a "cradle to grave" control mechanism since it regulates the entire life of
hazardous materials. RCRA has two major parts to it as they related to hazardous waste.
First, all treatment, storage, and disposal (TSD) facilities must obtain, and periodically
renew, a permit. Permitted facilitie.s are also required to demonstrate financial capacity
to pay for the closure, cleanup, and post closure care of their site. This feature is
particularly important in regards to the past creation of, and the avoidance of future,
brownfields. A second major part to RCRA is the creation of a system of inspections and
enforcement actions on facilities that generate or transport hazardous wastes. Unlike the
TSD facilities, these entities are not required to demonstrate financial capacity to pay for
cleanups, however, they are subject to corrective action orders as a result of violations of
RCRA. An interesting component to RCRA that is worth noting is that " ... EPA's
regulations have long provided that a generator may accumulate its own hazardous
wastes in tanks or containers for up to 90 days without triggering TSD status" (Percival et
aI, 2006, p. 358). This means that many generating facilities that are not subject to the
financial assurance and permitting requirements of TSD' s can continue being classified
as a generator, even if they have continuously full containers or tanks of hazardous
wastes. This can be achieved by storing wastes for 90 days, sending that waste to a TSD,
and replacing that waste with new waste. This loophole in RCRA can potentially have
significant implications for brownfields and brownfield programs.
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Intergovernmental relationships and interdependencies strongly influence the
processes and administration ofRCRA. The EPA sets basic minimums and requirements
while states do much of the front line implementation and administration. "When RCRA
was written, it was Congress' intent for the states to assume primary responsibility for
implementing the hazardous waste regulations, with oversight from the federal
government" (US EPA RCRA Orientation Manual, III-137). States may be granted the
authority to carry out the duties of the EPA with regards to RCRA by enacting a similar
hazardous waste program, so long as it is at least as comprehensive and strong as the
federal guidelines. Currently 48 states operate their own base RCRA program authorized
by the EPA, with Alaska and Iowa having no EPA authorizations (US EPA StAIS
database, 2006).
In most instances, State environmental agencies take the primary role in
compliance assurance. This role includes educating the regulated community on
the requirements, reviewing and approving necessary permits, inspecting for
compliance with applicable laws and permit terms, detecting violations and taking
appropriate enforcement response ... (US EPA ECHO FAQ).

RCRA administration by the states is an example of how multiple levels of government
can all be involved and impacting on the results and outputs of a government program.
In addition to the minimum requirements outlined by the federal EPA, each state's
program is also impacted by their EPA regional offices, state oversight, and state capacity
to run the program. The state level administrative agencies capacity to properly and
comprehensively regulate and inspect the population of regulated entities is something
that has been called into question in the past (Barnett, 1994). The complex and
interdependent relationships existing in the administration ofRCRA poses interesting,
and potentially harmful, questions for brownfields and the programs directed at cleaning
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and redeveloping them. In all ofthe RCRA authorized states, RCRA programs are
administered through the same administrative agency that deals with Superfund and
Brownfields. Although at this juncture brownfields and RCRA are not absolutely
connected or reliant upon each other, a state's performance in RCRA may be a useful
indicator for the regulatory nature of a state may be. More will be said on this in the
following chapter.

CERCLA
"After 1980, the history ofRCRA became tightly intertwined with that of
CERCLA ... by and large, RCRA has become the locus of Congress's prevention
concerns, while CERCLA tackles the problems of cleaning up past mistakes ... " (Percival
et aI, 2006, p. 320). The act has direct implications for brownfield sites and has gained
greater publicity than RCRA. CERCLA established prohibitions and requirements for
dealing with brownfields, provided for liability or financial responsibility for
contamination, and established a trust fund (Superfund) to finance cleanup when no
responsible party could be identified.
After the EPA began seriously enforcing CERCLA, courts broadly interpreted the
Act with regard to strict 'joint and several liability '. This meant that each of the
responsible parties at a site can be Hable for the entire cost of cleanup, so long as the

harm caused by each party is indivisible from harm that other parties caused (Grayson,
1995). Under the original CERCLA regulations new owners- sometimes not even
knowing the contamination existed-could be, and sometimes were, held liable (Coffin
and Shepherd, 1998; Ellerbusch, 2006; Hodge, 1996; Ryan 1998; Schwab, 1997).
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Of particular concern are the principles of "strict" and "joint and several"
liability. "Strict" liability does not require the demonstration of any
wrong-doing. This means that even if the contamination actions taken
were legal at the time they were done, a party may still be held
accountable for the costs of clean-up and environmental damages. This
liability is also retroactive, meaning that even if the pollution occurred
prior to the passage of CERCLA in 1980, one may still be held
accountable. "Joint and several" liability comes into play when there are
several PRPs, and means that anyone or all of the parties who might be
even remotely associated with the pollution may be held responsible for
the entire cost of clean-up (Meyer and Van Landingham, 2000, p. 4).

The aftermath of the liability concerns associated with CERCLA resulted in a negative
stigma and a widespread reluctance by the private sector to deal with brownfields. In fact
even financial institutions were reluctant to lend money for brownfield projects for fear
of becoming liable themselves under broad court interpretations of liability under
CERCLA. "Large cleanup expenses combined with a lack of legal finality leads potential
developers and investors to choose uncontaminated suburban land (greenfields) over the
more risky brownfields" (Eisinger, 2001, '1).
CERCLA underwent several amendments attempting to ease liability concerns.
Some of the most notable amendments occurred in 1996 with the passage of the Asset
Conversion, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act to offer lenders
liability protection against being held liable for contamination on properties that they may
have provided financing for. Additionally and more recently, CERCLA was amended in
2002 with the previously mentioned Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields
Revitalization Act. Regardless of these amendments, stigma over brownfields has
remained. " ... CERCLA liability has significantly retarded efforts to renovate brownfield
lands and buildings through its impacts on perceived real estate investment returns is a
belief widely promoted by policy analysts and practitioners" (Meyer et al, 1995, p.84-5).
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More than 25 years have passed since CERCLA was created and it has been extensively
analyzed. The major complaints, as summarized by Percival et al (2006) are:
•

Joint and Several Liability results in unfair allocations offmancial
responsibility

•

A litigation-driven system funnels too much CERCLA money into
transaction costs and too little into site cleanup

•

The cleanup process is too slow and often ineffective

•

Cleanup standards are too stringent; one size fits all health based standards
are inappropriate and impair productive uses of land

•

Where EPA does have discretion, remedies are uneven from site to site

An important difference exists between a Superfund site and a Brownfield site
that must be understood. There are approximately 1300 Superfund sites out of an
estimated 500,000 or more sites with contamination (brownfields). Superfund sites are
listed on the NPL and undergo a federal cleanup. In addition to the federal Superfund
sites there are also State Superfund sites. Each state determines their list in its own way,
and some states do not even have one. Some of the state Superfund sites are the same as
the federal sites; others are different. Many states have modeled their state program after
the federal law or have tried to improve upon the federal law. Generally, the state
programs have allowed the states to take emergency response activity, compel
responsible parties to perform cleanup, develop its own state list and cleanup standards,
and fmance staff, studies, and remediation.
CERCLA and State Superfund lists have markedly become less active over the
past several years with brownfield programs taking a much more upfront role in
contaminated properties, a fact that many do not realize.
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In fact, because federal and state CERCLA programs are close to moribund with
respect to the identification and remediation of new sites, brownfields programs
are likely to be used to address even very seriously contaminated sites that are not
already subject to a CERCLA cleanup. (Dana, 2006, p. 87)
CERCLA decline is often attributed to several factors. First, the Superfund Tax expired
in 1995 and was never reauthorized, leaving Superfund cleanups fighting for an ever
shrinking pool of discretionary funds at the federal level (Percival et al, 2006).
Additionally, judges have become less inclined to enforce CERCLA as strictly as in the
past (Dana, 2006). State brownfield remediation programs are increasingly taking on
more of the extremely contaminated sites and most do not have provisions excluding
properties based on level of contamination (Environmental Law Institute, 2002).
RCRA, Superfund, and Browrifield Programs
In principle, RCRA sites can become Superfund sites. A RCRA regulated facility
that does not properly close or does not adequately protect the environment and human
health can become a Superfund site. Given that the EPA provides authorizations to the
state to administer the RCRA program, a state failure to properly oversee and enforce
RCRA regulations can also transform a RCRA facility into a Superfund site. "State
failure to adequately oversee existing facilities and to enforce compliance with regulatory
requirements increases the likelihood of ground water and other environmental
contamination" (Barnett, 1994, p. 88).
Given the fact that additions to the Superfund site lists have markedly decreased
in the past several years, RCRA facilities that are not properly inspected, enforced, and
closed will likely have an impact on a state's brownfield problem- not on its Superfund
problem. More specifically, in addition to possibly becoming Superfund sites, RCRA
facilities that contaminate land or ground water can become brownfields if the

20

responsible party does not properly address the contamination through response actions,
closure, or post closure care. Again, given that 48 states administer their own base
RCRA program; wide differences often exist across the states in relation to RCRA
inspections and enforcements. Significant differences in inspections and enforcements
can contribute to a state's brownfield problem.
As Barnett (1994) points out "[t]he characteristics and strengths of state Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act programs depend on the current activism and political
power of affected interests as well as on historic patterns of environmental policy making
and control" (p. 89). Inevitably variations across the fifty state's RCRA programs will
result in impacts on a state's brownfield problem either through an increased inventory of
brownfields or by jeopardizing the effectiveness of the public solution (program).
The public solution to a state's brownfield problem has been to create and
administer state remediation and redevelopment programs. In public administration
literature a great deal of scholarship exists concerning how and why policies get
implemented as they do. Specifically, a stream ofliterature exists that deals with what
influence political actors and non-elected administrators have on policies and programs.
This literature is particularly important and salient to the study of brownfield programs.
As brownfield programs take on more of the heavily contaminated properties, invest
millions of dollars, and become more widespread it is an ideal time to explore how these
programs facilitate brownfield remediation and redevelopment, as well as why they work
the way they do. The following sections outline the theories associated with
implementation variations as a result of elected and non-elected administrators'
influences.
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Political Control and Bureaucratic Discretion Theories
In the last century Americans have demanded much more of and from their
government. These demands have contributed to the wide expansion of what is often
termed the American Administrative State (KettI and Fesler, 2005; Rosenbloom et al,
2005). This expansion and growth of afourth branch of government has spurred
numerous debates and lengthy discourse over the relationships and the proper role of a
non-elected administrative cadre in a democracy (Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast,
1989; Davis, 1976; Gilmour and Halley, 1994; Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler, 2001;
Huntington, 1952; Kingdon, 1995; Meier, 1993; Svara, 1994; Wilson, 1989; Wood and
Waterman, 1994).
This immense growth in bureaucracy has not been without resistance and calls for
change and reform. In fact, over the past two decades Americans have seen two largescale federal initiatives to fix the bureaucracy- reinforcing the widely held idea that the
bureaucracy is broken. In 1993 the federal National Performance Review was initiated to
deal with the bureaucracy and its inefficiencies. .. ... to change the culture of our national
bureaucracy away from complacency and entitlement toward initiative and
empowerment" (Clinton NPR Speech, 1993). Less than a decade later a new president
and a new initiative surfaced, again to fix the bureaucracy. "The need for reform is
urgent" (President'S Management Agenda, 2002, p. 3). Although these two reform
efforts are the most recent and notable, bureaucracy reform efforts span over the past
century. In fact one prominent scholar aptly noted that, "No politician ever lost votes by
denouncing the bureaucracy" (Wilson, 1989, p. 236).
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The bureaucracies that are charged with carrying out so many of America's
programs, regulations, and policies are generally regarded in a less than favorable
manner. "Citizens widely believe that bureaucracies are slow, lumbering giants that
accomplish little and are generally unresponsive to public preferences" (Wood and
Waterman, 1994, p. 2). The rhetoric that surrounds the ideas that bureaucracies are
wasteful, inefficient, and incompetent is often connected to an idea that administrators or
bureaucrats ignore or change the policy mandates given to them by the elected officials
(Bawn, 1995; Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler, 2001). This presupposition, if true, is
antithetical to the entire foundation of the American democracy. By constitutional design
the democratic control of government relies upon the relationship between the elected
representative and his or her constituents. The voters' ability to elect representatives and
subsequently elect different representatives at their discretion provides some semblance
of assurance that the citizens' wills are being expressed in the policies promulgated in the
federal and state legislatures. As our society has grown increasingly more complex, the
delegation of power to non elected administrators has grown immensely. It has been
pointed out that many bureaucrats exercise managerial (executive), legislative, and
judicial power as a result of elected officials' delegation of powers to them (KettI and
Fesler, 2005; Rosenbloom et al, 2005; Wood and Waterman, 1994). This delegation of
power seemingly opens the door for the unelected bureaucrats to manipulate and shape
policies without any accountability to the citizenry. Wood and Waterman (1994) point
out that "[t]his extensive delegation of power to the bureaucracy also violates the
principles of separation of powers and checks and balances" (p. 7).
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Interestingly enough, many of the current facets of bureaucracy that are perceived
to be problems were deliberately created over a century ago. Still reeling from the
corrupt and inefficient spoils system it was widely accepted that politics and
administration should be separate-the so called politics-administration dichotomy. "The
proposed politics-administration dichotomy was a normative, not an empirical, debate"
(Wood and Waterman, 1994, p. 15). Early public administration scholars viewed the
proper role of administration as simply administering the policy mandates as dictated by
the elected officials (Wilson, 1887; Goodnow, 1900). "The dichotomy was broadly
accepted in American public administration until the mid-I900s, when Dwight Waldo
and Herbert Simon challenged the dichotomy ... " (Frederickson and Smith, 2003, p. 16).
These first two scholars to recognize that administration is not, and cannot be, truly
separate and insulated from politics came to this realization for different reasons.
Dwight Waldo, writing in 1946, believed all administrative acts were inherently
political. Conversely, Herbert Simon, writing in 1947, believed it was empirically
difficult to separate politics from administration and administration from politics.
Following from these initial two scholars, it became widely accepted that, in fact, no
politics-administration dichotomy exists (Appleby, 1949; Long, 1949; Simon, 1947;
Waldo, 1946). However, ", . .in the 1980s, the dichotomy reemerged and is now alive and
well and found in control of bureaucracy theory" (Frederickson et al, 2003, p. 16).
Control of bureaucracy theory has several assumptions and characteristics inherent with
those who study it. First, bureaucracy theory allows for a distinction between political
and administrative acts thereby allowing for valuable analysis of the interaction and
relationships between the two. Secondly, the theories often rest upon an inherent distrust
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of administrative power. Finally, theorists studying the political control of the
bureaucracy often subscribe to the belief that the elected officials should control the nonelected administrators. One prominent scholar explains the context of these theories
well:
., . different approaches to the study of administration usually come from
one of two conflicting traditions in American politics-and each tradition
leads to a very different perspective on the role of administration in
American democracy. Some students of administration come to the
subject with a fundamentally Hamiltonian bent. Like Alexander Hamilton
they seek a vigorous state vested with a strong administrative apparatus.
Other students of administration, however, are fundamentally
Madisonians. Like Madison, they see a delicate balance of power the best
protection against tyranny. The competitions of political interests, in their
view, lessen the risk that bureaucracy can abuse individual liberty (KettI,
1993, p. 407).

Although opinions on whether the bureaucracy can be controlled by elected
officials or whether the bureaucracy influences policy in its own right are still extremely
varied and as of yet unresolved, one thing tends to be agreed upon across relevant
scholarship. That is, a general consensus exists across scholars that a variety of forces
shape policy during implementation (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984; Lipsky, 1980;
Palumbo and Calista, 1990; Rosen, 1998; Wood and Waterman, 1994). Some scholars
point to bureaucratic discretion (Handler, 1992; Hawkins, 1992). Other scholars point to
legislative or political control mechanism's influence on implementation (Banks, 1989;
Bendor, Taylor, and Van Gallen, 1987; Aberbach, 1990; Huber, Shipan and Pfahler,
2001).
Given the pervasiveness of bureaucratic activity, it is not surprising that
political scientists long have sought to understand the relationship between

legislatures and agencies. Understanding this relationship is essential to
democratic theory, as it focuses attention on the legitimacy of the role
played by unelected policymakers in a representative democracy.
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Furthermore, it sheds light on the actions, abilities, and motivations of
legislators (Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler, 2001, p. 330).

In the quest to understand and deal with the relationship between bureaucracy and elected
officials two distinct approaches have been taken in scholarship. The first is that of the
traditional or bureaucratic dominance approach. The second is that of the political or
legislative control approach.
Traditional or Bureaucratic Dominance
Under this approach to the study of administrative-political power views power
delegation to administrative units and officials as creating a heavily insulated
bureaucracy with a substantial principle-agent problem (Kaufman, 1981; Rourke, 1976;
Wilson, 1980). In essence scholars taking this approach recognize that bureaucrats have
information, time, and resources concerning their activities that elected officials do not
have-leading many scholars to believe that the balance of power is tipped in favor of the
bureaucrats (Mayhew, 1974; Fenno, 1978; Niskanen, 1971; Katzmann, 1980). Relevant
literature has identified several related facets of bureaucracy that lend credence to this
view of bureaucratic dominance. For example, lengthy career service is viewed as
creating a close-knit community that often outlasts political appointees enabling them to
capture even more power (Heclo, 1977; Kaufman, 1981).
Scholars writing about and in this approach to political-bureaucratic power
dynamics tend to view the outlook in a very dismal manner for an effective political
control of the bureaucracy. Bureaucrats are seen as power hungry and self interested
with political officials having little means or even desire to control them (Cronin, 1980;
Huber and Shipan, 2002; Noll 1971; Ogul, 1976). Several related and early streams of
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research also imply that political officials have little control over bureaucrats. Paramount
to this research came from many early economic analyses of the bureaucracy which
regarded the bureaucracy as a self-seeking individual in a market which seeks power and
hides information (Buchanan and Tullock, 1965; Downs, 1967). Another notable
example is that of capture theory which often pays close attention to regulatory agencies.
Capture theorists emphasize the clientele relationships that develop between various
agencies and their respective groups to demonstrate that bureaucracies are captured by
these groups and therefore are even further insulated from political influences (Bernstein,
1955; Lowi 1969; Stigler 1971). Other arguments exist that expand upon individual's
distastes and distrust of bureaucracy. For example, KettI (1993) states:
Americans have long had a reverence for private markets to match their dislike of
public power. Markets seek efficiency; government may not. Markets promote
choice, in quality and price; government does not. Markets offer competition;
government has a monopoly. The distinction between private liberty and public
authority has always been a critical one in American society.

In addition to the scholarship on how elected officials can't control the
bureaucracy, some scholars go so far as to state that the political officials voluntarily or
strategically design policy so that administrators have discretion (Huber and Shipan,
2002). More specifically, in the face of divided political ideology or interests
policymakers may develop policies that are deliberately vague so that the policy passes
through the legislature. American distrust of bureaucracy is not likely to be easily
changed; however, competing theories have emerged.
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Political Control ofthe Bureaucracy

In response to theories and research that indicated that political officials had little
control or influence over bureaucratic affairs a competing approach emerged. This
approach is sometimes termed congressional or legislative dominance, legislative control,
or political control theories. Proponents and subscribers to political control theories
argue that elected officials, in fact, have very powerful means by which to control the
bureaucracy. Earlier examples tended to focus on ex post controls-that is reactive
measures to get bureaucrats to cede to political officials wills. Common ex post controls
include new legislation, oversight and monitoring arrangements, budget cuts, and new
political appointees (Key, 1959; Meier 1993; West, 1997). Political dominance theorists
often cite ex post controls as enabling the current legislatures to control bureaucrats now,
that is the current elected officials are able to pressure the bureaucracy to cede to its' will.
The most recent and popular addition to this approach is often termed agency
theory.
Agency theory explicitly assumed that elected officials (principles), such as the
president and members of Congress, had political incentives to control the
bureaucracy (agents). Unlike the earlier writings on bureaucracy, which were
historical studies based on subjective assessments, most of the agency theory
literature was based on hard quantitative evidence" (Wood and Waterman, 1994,

p.22).
Agency theorists tend to believe that political officials control the bureaucracy because
they create/design the bureaucracy (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 1987). That is,
these theorists tend to believe political officials exercise powerful ex ante controls.
"Studies of ex ante influence look at the ability of the current legislature to influence the
future activities of agencies. These studies argue that through careful design of structures
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of bureaucracies and bureaucratic life shape and control policies and implementation.
These aspects often include: administrative resources, agency values, public demand for
services, and citizen ideology (Keiser and Soss, 1998).

Bureaucratic Discretion. Political Control, and State Brownfield Programs
Although, as evidenced by the scholarship outlined in this chapter, some
interesting and powerful insights into the relationships between the elected legislators and
the non-elected bureaucrats have been presented in past literature, this dissertation
provides several valuable additions to this topic and is directed at expanding on current
theories, not testing them. First, the majority of political control and bureaucratic
discretion studies have been conducted at the federal level (Frederickson, 2003). Rather
than study the federal government, this dissertation studies the state level bureaucracy
and political actors. The state level provides a rich, complex set of actors to study in
uncovering influences on brownfield programs. Secondly, it has been pointed out that
most of the political control studies have involved complex quantitative models. Having
a rich body of research on bureaucratic and political control issues at the federal level,
this dissertation seeks to inform theory by analyzing state level bureaucracy where more
complex relationships exist. Since an exploratory inquiry to state brownfield programs is
a primary purpose of this dissertation, qualitative research methodology is used for this
purpose. This research attempts to shed light on the complex nature of state brownfield
programs in relation to bureaucratic discretion and political control coupled with the
complexities of intergovernmental and inter-programmatic relationships which are
germane to environmental programs and regulations. The following chapter of this
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dissertation provides details on how this dissertation will proceed methodologically to
accomplish the goals of this dissertation which were outlined in Chapter One.
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CHAPTER III
DATA COLLECTION AND METHODS
In order to accomplish the goals of this dissertation this project involves two
distinct data collection methods and outputs. First, as pointed out previously, this
dissertation seeks to inform and add to theory, not test it. In order to accomplish this goal
a two step data collection process was employed. First, in order to begin to understand
how state governments are intervening in brownfield remediation and redevelopment, it
is necessary to have a clear understanding of what exists across the fifty states. The first
step in data collection for this dissertation involved creating an exhaustive database of
key components of state brownfield program efforts. Following from the insights and
lessons of the fifty-state database, three states were selected for in depth comparative case
studies.

Database Data Collection and Methods
The database created in this dissertation drew initial and basic information from
an annual EPA survey (State Brownfields and Voluntary Response Programs: An Update
from the States, 2005). Although the EPA survey provided some valuable information,
the survey is not completely accurate and lacks a number of important and relevant pieces
of information. In order to properly and accurately record and expand on this survey, this
dissertation undertook a multi-step process that was partially driven by the theories
presented in the previous chapter of this dissertation.
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The first step of the data collection process included inputting all information
from the EPA survey into a spreadsheet. The data contained in the survey was then
checked across all fifty states using state statutes, administrative codes, web pages, news
articles, and personal contacts. In the EPA survey the data is contingent upon the return
of the survey by the individual state. With this reliance on personal survey responses, the
data is not always answered by the most knowledgeable person. The survey lacks an
effective check on this fault to determine whether it is accurate information. In a number
of states the data was found to be inaccurate in the EPA survey. Additionally, a number
of states were missing some of the most basic information fields. This dissertation
checked and filled in all gaps in the basic information. Basic information included the
year the program was created, number of programs, liability protections offered, financial
assistance offered, and state statute references.
Given this dissertation in drawing upon intergovernmental relations, bureaucratic
discretion, and political control theories, data was added to the database based upon the
findings of previous scholarship. In order to properly encompass previous scholarship
the key pieces of information that were added included: administrative organization,
ideology measures of policy inception year, employees in agency, appointed or merit
status of head of agency, formal name of the program(s), types of liability protections
offered, 3rd party liability information, financial assistance offered in minute detail, costs
to enter the program, relationships with other administrative agencies in the state,
CERLCA 128a Funding, and RCRA inspection and enforcement data. Most of this data
was retrieved from statutes, web pages, documents from programs, and personal
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communications. However, the RCRA information was retrieved from an EPA database
called ECHO or Enforcement and Compliance History Online.
The RCRA information was retrieved over several days in July 2006. In the
online database only the previous three years of data are available. The information
retrieved included all regulated industries in the state for the immediate three year period
before July 2006. The following pieces of information were retrieved and calculated:
Number of regulated facilities, number of inspections, number of informal enforcements,
number of formal enforcements, number of EPA enforcements, and number of facilities
in significant non-compliance (SNC) status. A second step of data collection was
completed in this ECHO database. The specific facility type information was gathered in
much the same way the entire universe was collected. RCRA regulates specific types of
facilities: Large Quantity Generators (LQG) that produce more than 1000 kg of
hazardous wastes a month; Small Quantity Generators (SQG) that produce less than 1000
kg but more than 100 kg of hazardous wastes a month; Conditionally Exempt Small
Quantity Generators (CESQG) that produce less than 100 kg of hazardous wastes a
month; Transporters that transport hazardous wastes between sites, to disposal facilities,
and to storage locations; and Treatment, Storage, and Disposal (TSD) facilities that treat,
store, or dispose of hazardous wastes. These specific facility types were examined for
inspection rates across them. More will be said about the implications for specific
facilities in the following chapters. After collecting this information on RCRA
inspections and enforcements, all of the related percentages were calculated to enable
comparison across the states. The RCRA data is used for two purposes in this
dissertation. First, in order to ascertain the regulatory nature of the state the percentage
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inspection and enforcement rate is used to proxy how 'environmentally strict' that
particular state is. Secondly, it is expected that RCRA programs and brownfield
programs are interrelated and interconnected in many ways. This interconnectedness
may prove to be an important factor in the in-depth case studies and analysis of the fifty
state programs.
Upon the completion of the fifty state brownfield program database it is possible
to answer the following question: What are the Laboratories of Democracy doing with
their brownfields? This database enables a broad description and understanding of the
variety of mechanisms, methods, and roles of the state brownfield programs. Although
this database is a powerful tool in understanding what states are doing in their programs,
it cannot answer some of the questions about why the programs function and look as they
do. In order to provide a deeper level of analysis this dissertation utilizes a multiple case
study approach to enable a better understanding of the variety of influencers on these
programs---particularly bureaucratic and political control influences.

Case Study Methods
Utility of Qualitative Research
Phenomenological inquiry, or qualitative research, uses a naturalistic approach
that seeks to understand phenomena in context-specific settings. Logical
positivism, or quantitative research, uses experimental methods and quantitative
measures to test hypothetical generalizations. Each represents a fundamentally
different inquiry paradigm, and researcher actions are based on the underlying
assumptions of each paradigm (Hoepfl, 1997, p. 1).

Rather than rely on numbers which often do not capture the real story, this part
of the dissertation obtains in-depth information about these programs, political officials'
and administrative officials' understanding and role in the program, and specific

35

documents through in-depth open-ended interviews and document analyses. Anonymity
was promised to all interviewees in return for their candid answers. In order to better
protect identities, names and specific job titles are omitted. Job roles, as opposed to job
titles, are used. This use of qualitative data allows for a richer understanding of what is
truly going on within these programs (Patton, 2002).
Two key components of this dissertation make using a qualitative methodology
logical and necessary. First, a key component of the dissertation involves understanding,
learning, and potentially offering policy recommendations from an analysis of what the
various states are doing in relation to their brownfield programs. The level of
understanding required to provide potential policy recommendations for other states
requires a qualitative methodology. "Generative research is concerned with producing
new ideas either as a contribution to the development of social theory to or to the
refinement or stimulus of policy solutions" (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003, p. 30). Secondly,
this dissertation seeks to potentially add and expand theories of bureaucratic discretion
and legislative control. Given that this part of the dissertation does not seek to test these
theories, but add to and infonn it through the study of state level programs with a high
level of intergovernmental and inter-programmatic dependence, qualitative research
provides the necessary depth of infonnation required to do so. "It therefore has the
potential to ... detennine actions that are needed to make programmes, policies or
services more effective" (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003, p. 30-1).

It has been noted that a key strength of qualitative research is the ability to
explore unanticipated issues (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003; Stake, 1995). This is an important
aspect to this particular study as the variation across the states combined with the relative
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lack of research in these programs leaves a great deal of room for unanticipated issues.
Statistical analysis of these programs would likely miss important facets of these
programs which are of interest to this research. For example, in Indiana a portion of their
brownfield program has recently (2005) broken off into a separate quasi-governmental
organization. Statistical analysis of this program would not be ideal or even yield as deep
of a level of understanding for this particular aspect and rationale for this change in this
particular program. Furthermore, the complexities of these programs and the
relationships each hold with the federal government, local governments, regional EPA
offices, various other administrative units, various other regulatory and non-regulatory
programs, and citizens of each respective states, make qualitative research methods both
more appropriate and more fruitful than quantitative methods.
Case Studies
"Qualitative inquiry is not a single, monolithic approach to research and
evaluation" (Patton, 2002, p. 76). As Cresswell (1998) points out, it is possible to
distinguish five qualitative traditions: biography, phenomenology, grounded theory,
ethnography, and case study. Case study methodology " ... investigates a contemporary
phenomenon within its real-life context" (Yin,2003). This dissertation's subject is very
appropriate to case study research. This dissertation specifically utilizes a comparative
case study methodology. "Almost any observation, whether one makes it in academic
research or real life, implies some form of comparative assessment, such as big-small or
tall-short. Without comparison, one cannot tell whether an object is big or small" (Pierre,
2005, p. 454). Keeping with the view that comparison is essential to a deep
understanding in research, this part of the dissertation examines three specific state cases.
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In order to learn the most from these cases, these states were selected for their uniqueness
using a purposive maximum variation sampling method stemming from data gathered in
the fifty state database (Patton, 2002). This method of selecting cases is particularly
important and logical for this dissertation as it allows for a selection of information-rich
cases for study. "Studying information-rich cases yields insights and in-depth
understanding rather than empirical generalizations" (Patton, 2002, p. 230).
"Qualitative research can contribute by: ... exploring how the manifestations of
phenomena vary between groups, exploring how the reasons for, or explanations of,
phenomena, or their different impacts and consequences vary between groups ... "
(Ritchie and Lewis, 2003, p. 50). As Patton points out, the first step in maximizing
variation "involves identifying diverse characteristics or criteria for constructing the
sample" (Patton, 2002, p. 235). Drawing upon existing scholarship on political control
and bureaucratic discretion and this dissertation's fifty-state program database of
characteristics of the brownfield programs and related RCRA programs, the following are
selected key considerations to this research when selecting the three cases:
•

Administrative Organization
o

Given the interest in potential bureaucratic influence over these programs
diversifying the administrative organization of the program is of interest.
To provide the potential for rich analysis and information requires a
diverse set of environments by which the programs operate. Key
considerations here include how the program is structured in the
administrative agency and the level of fragmentation that exists across the
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program. Data gathered and presented in Chapter Four will provide the
basis for this classification.
•

Regulatory Environment (agency values proxy)
o Drawing upon relevant scholarship in control and discretion theories, this
dissertation posits that with all fifty state programs residing in the same
administrative body as their RCRA program, it is useful to measure
agency values with that state's stance on inspection and enforcement of
RCRA. That is, a state with a more lax approach to inspection and
enforcements indicates a certain value. That value may be expected to
carry over to the brownfield program. Attention is also given to states
with EPA Performance Partnership Agreements (PPA) concerning their
RCRA programs (approximately 64% have PPA and the remaining 36%
do not). In addition to the utility of a state's regulatory nature based upon
RCRA performance, it is posited that RCRA is a program with a great deal
of overlap and connection to brownfield programs, making the connection
worth more inquiry.

•

Ideology of Government
o

Referring back to studies that use government ideology as an explanatory
variable for proving political control over the bureaucracy, it is logical to
factor ideology scores into the selection of cases. Using the Berry et aI,
measure of ideology, a range of political ideology scores from the most
recent year and the year of the program's creation is an important
consideration in selected the cases.
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•

Age of Program
o

This facet is less driven by theory and more driven by an interest in
information rich cases. Attention is given to ensuring the selection of
cases with enough history and time to provide this information rich
potential.

This dissertation will draw from the details learned in the database and presented in
Chapter Four concerning the fifty state brownfield programs to select the final cases for
mqUIry.
As with any research methodology a comparative case study has its own
limitations. Specifically, case studies are not necessarily able to be generalized. What
happens in one state may be a product of the uniqueness that is that state and the lessons
learned there may only be applicable there. Individual states have unique contexts that
hinder the ability to assume the lessons are applicable elsewhere. A common way of
validating qualitative data is to see if other data sources seem to point to the same
conclusion as gained from the interviewees. This dissertation reviewed thousands of
pages of documents that included news articles, published reports, statutes, bill tracking
reports, policy analysis documents, and personnel documents. By following the
interviews with the other forms of research this dissertation is better able to be confident
in the findings. In a number of cases the interviewee was contacted multiple times to
discuss a new finding or to verify information.
The database of the fifty state programs is intended to provide a broad description
of what is going on in the laboratories. Conversely the case studies are intended to
provide a detailed story of what is going on and influencing the programs. These case
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studies provide a deep level of understanding concerning the roles, expectations, daily
operation, and environment of these programs. Through discussions with front line
administrators and political officials enables an understanding of the context under which
each of these programs operate.
Although interviews and data collection were intense and inclusive, some
limitations in this exist. Unfortunately, given both time constraints and reluctance on the
part of certain individuals to participate in an interview, some potentially valuable
individuals were not able to be included. Specifically, appointed officials in the three
case study states were not available for this research. Although a number of front line
administrators and higher up supervisors were interviewed, it is possible that the
appointed officials would have added valuable insights. Furthermore, the Governors of
the three states were not included in this research for much the same reasons. To be sure,
administrative agencies are entities of the state's executive branch and as such, the head
of the executive branch may have provided more valuable insights into a state's
brownfield efforts.
A further limiting factor in this research has to do with the economic climate of
the three states. Different levels of deindustrialization, economic capacity, and market
structure may very well play important roles in determining a state's capacity and
willingness to act upon brownfield remediation and redevelopment. This type of
limitation must be taken into consideration when attempting to draw policy
recommendations and lessons from the data. Although any research method is likely
imperfect, this research, as designed, will certainly fill a gap in knowledge by providing a
deeper, contextual understanding of the influences on state brownfield programs.
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CHAPTER IV
EXPERIENCES OF THE LABORATORIES

Academic and practitioner literature is dominated by liability issues surrounding
and contributing to the problem ofbrownfields (Bartsch, Collaton, and Pepper, 1996;
Coffin and Shepard, 1998; Ennist, 2006;Whitney, 2003), financial concerns over cleanup
costs (Connolly and Daddario, 1995; Depass, 2006; Schwab, 1997; Wernstedt et al, 2006;
Meyer and VanLandingham, 2002), and stigma attached to brownfields (Roddewig,
1996; De Sousa, 2003). Recently scholars have turned to the role public brownfield
programs take in aiding the remediation and redevelopment of these sites (Bartsch and
Walls, 2005). In many ways the state governments' various brownfield programs can be
seen as a creative mediatory working to level the playing field between brownfield and
greenfield sites.
As discussed and outlined earlier in this dissertation a major part of this
dissertation included collecting and organizing a database of details concerning the
various fifty state brownfield programs. The final database covers a number of details
concerning the scope and approach each state took to facilitate brownfield remediation
and redevelopment and the related RCRA regulatory stance. The details in this database
not only show the sheer diversity in programs across the fifty states, but it also enabled
the educated selection of cases for the next stage of inquiry of this dissertation. The

42

details covered in the database included a wide range of information intended to gain
insights into the various participation requirements, administrative make-up, liability
protections, financial incentives offered, ideology of government and citizens in year of
program creation, RCRA facility inspections and enforcements, and any specific cleanup
provisions of note. The final database contains over 4000 different pieces of information
across the fifty states. Appendix A provides the template of the information gathered on
each state in the U.S, while Appendix B offers the three case study states as examples of
the complexity of this database. Unfortunately, due to the extensive size and scope of the
database, it cannot be included in this printed dissertation, but will be available online at
http://cepm.louisville.edu. Data pertaining to an average state can run well over ten
pages in length.
A key to learning from other state's experiences is to have a clear understanding
of what others are doing. Drawing from previous scholarship several facets of the
brownfields problem, of which state programs are presumably attempting to remedy, are
focused on in this database and chapter of this dissertation. As explained by the
Northeast-Midwest Institute (2001):
Developers and investors, cautious of environmental liability, have shied away
from brownfield sites. Contaminated properties, which are subject to many
environmental regulations and procedures, also are vulnerable to costly
construction delays. Pollution concerns have led developers to pass up
opportunities in urban centers for ones in rural and suburban areas (a.k.a.
greenfields) where land is perceived to be less expensive and free from unknown
liability. If these barriers to brownfield reuse are to be overcome, site reusers need
funds to perform site assessment, funds to develop a cleanup plan, and funds to do
the cleanup (p. 2).

Drawing from the previous quotation, it can be inferred that among other things, the
following components are important and integral to getting brownfields redeveloped:
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liability abatement concerns, regulatory process concerns, and minimizing the financial
costs of cleanup and redevelopment. The overall findings of the diversity of the
programs as recorded in the fifty state database are elaborated upon in the following
sections not only using the three factors mentioned here but also by providing a
description of the major aspects that exist across the fifty states. This chapter first details
the most common brownfield program across the states-Voluntary Cleanup Programs
including a discussion of liability issues; then moves on to a discussion of the variety of
financial opportunities across the fifty states for brownfield remediation and
redevelopment; next moves to a discussion of states' approaches to RCRA; and
concludes with the detailed rationale for the case study selection to be discussed in the
following chapter.

Voluntary Cleanup Programs-a consistent overall approach by the States
Voluntary Programs-What are they?
As has been previously stated in this dissertation, all fifty states have some form
of a brownfield program. Brownfield programs take a number of different forms across
the fifty states. Some states have only one program while others have multiple programs.
Forty seven of the 50 states have a standard voluntary cleanup program (VCP);
sometimes called a Voluntary Response Program (VRP) or a Voluntary Remediation
Program. Only Alaska, South Dakota, and North Dakota do not have the typical
Voluntary Cleanup Program-although they do have some form of a brownfield
remediation and redevelopment program. Regardless of the exact title of a state's
voluntary cleanup program they all loosely follow the same procedure: upon the
completion of an agreed upon cleanup the voluntary party receives some sort of liability
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protection such as Covenants Not to Sue (CNTS), Certificate of Closures (COC), or No
Further Action Letters (NFA). As the Environmental Protection Agency (1997) explains:
Many states have established voluntary cleanup programs. The key ingredients of
a documented State voluntary cleanup program include established authority,
investigative and remedial procedures, cleanup targets appropriate to sites, State
sign-off conditions and procedures, and liability provisions. These voluntary
cleanup programs allow volunteers, such as site owners and developers, to
identify and clean up sites, to use less extensive administrative procedures, and to
obtain some relief from future state liability for past contamination. These sites
might otherwise not be cleaned up because of their relatively low priority, and
because these sites are too numerous for other state or federal cleanup programs
to address within a reasonable time frame (US EPA Guidance for Developing
Superfund Memoranda of Agreement, 1997).
In many states Voluntary Cleanup Programs coexist with a variety of other programs
directed at remediation or redevelopment of brownfields.
Almost all of the Voluntary Cleanup Programs require some fee for participation.
These fees are most often used to facilitate the program's existence without relying solely
upon appropriations from the state. Oftentimes the fees are required by state statute. For
example in North Carolina, " ... [t]here is a statutory fee of $2,000 for obtaining a
brownfields agreement" (North Carolina Program FAQ). At least two states, North and
South Dakota who do not possess a formal VCP, do not charge for participation in their
programs. Of the states with standard voluntary cleanup programs, only Florida does not
charge a fee. However, Florida does charge for other brownfield programs separate from
the VCP.
The VCP fees come in the form of oversight fees, sliding scale fees, and fixed
fees. Some states require both a flat application fee and an oversight charge. For
example New Mexico requires an upfront $1000 application fee to apply to participate in
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their YCP as well as oversight charges of $65 per hour (New Mexico Ground Water
Quality Bureau- Voluntary Remediation Program).

EPA's Role-MOAs
Although the voluntary cleanup programs are both state instigated and state run,
the EPA plays a role through a voluntary agreement-or a Memorandum of Agreement
(M.O.A.). Any state in which the EPA grants an M.O.A. to is one where the EPA has
determined the program meets minimum adequacy standards across six dimensions:
minimum community involvement levels, protective of human health and environment,
technical and financial resources, mechanisms for certification of response plan,
oversight, and enforcement ability (US EPA Guidance for Developing Superfund
Memoranda of Agreement, 1997). "The MOA gives the state YCP credibility and
autonomy; EPA has stated, in agency guidance, that it will not investigate or "second
guess" sites that have successfully completed the state's program unless there is a
compelling reason to do so - like previously unknown contamination that presents an
imminent threat to health and the environment" (Bartsch and Dorfman, 2000, p. 2).
Twenty-Three states currently have active voluntary cleanup program M.O.A.'s
with the EPA.
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STATE
Illinois,
Minnesota
Wisconsin
Indiana
Colorado
Texas
Michigan

DATE SIGNED
April 1995
May, 1995
October, 1995; Revised
November 2006
December, 1995
April 1996
May, 1996
July, 1996

Missouri

September, 1996

Maryland

February, 1997

Rhode Island

February, 1997

Delaware
Oklahoma
Florida
New Mexico

August, 1997
April,1999
December, 1999; Revised
November, 2005
December, 1999

Arkansas

December, 2000

Kansas
Ohio
Virginia
Wyoming
Pennsylvania
Iowa
Louisiana
Nebraska

March,2001
July, 2001
January, 2002
March,2002
April,2004
June, 2004
October, 2004
November, 2006

Table 4.1: States possessing vep Memorandum of Agreement's with the E.P.A.

Table 4.1 illustrates the range of states with MOA's for their VCPs. Of note are Florida
and Wisconsin which have both revised their MOA's since the original agreement.
A state with an MOA will be able to extend greater certainty to the participants of
their program that the EPA will not intervene and that the cleanup will not only suffice at
the state level but also at the federal level. "The EPA added to the authority of states in
1995 when the Agency similarly began providing state memorandums of agreement
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("SMOA") that granted assurances that the EPA will not require subsequent liability after
compliance with the state VCP had been achieved" (Collins, 2003, p. 304). This is of
particular importance because, "CERCLA does not preempt state cleanup laws, and thus
both the federal CERCLA and state's environmental laws must be applied in determining
the requirements and the liabilities for remediation of a brownfield" (p. 304).
As previously stated in this chapter a key component to a state's brownfield
remediation and redevelopment efforts is to provide liability protections. In the 47 states
with VCP's, liability protections are provided within that program. However, in North
and South Dakota no liability protections are apparent with their brownfield programs.
Of additional note is Alaska, which offers a mechanism where a prospective purchaser of
a property can receive a Prospective Purchaser Agreement (PPA) offering some liability
protections to that party.

Liability Protections
One of the primary and most important components of state brownfield efforts,
and more specifically their voluntary cleanup programs, are liability relief provisions.
The various voluntary cleanup programs' liability provisions usually come in the form of
a document issued by the overhead I agency, governor, state attorney general, or state
Department of Justice. In some cases more than one of these entities will issue a liability
release document. These various liability relief documents range in names with the
following being noted in this database: No Further Action Letters (NFA), Certificate of
Closures (COC), Covenants Not to Sue (CNTS), Prospective Purchaser Agreements
(PPA), No Further Remediation Required (NFR), Innocent Owner/Operator Certification
(IOC), Innocent Party Agreements (IPA), Case Closure Letters, Letters of Concurrence,
I

The Administrative Agency or Department in which the program is housed.
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Closure Letters, Site Status Letters, and Comfort Letters. In fact some states issue
several different types and with a sometimes varying level of protection based upon the
initial negotiated cleanup agreement. For example, in New Hampshire
... an eligible person can obtain a "Covenant Not to Sue" from the N.H.
Department of Justice (DOJ) and a "Certificate of Completion" from the N.H.
Department of Environmental Services (DES) when site investigations and
remedial actions are performed in accordance with DES cleanup requirements
(New Hampshire's Brownfields Covenant Program, 2005).
Comparing Wyoming to New Hampshire reveals how liability relief mechanisms can
vary from state to state. Wyoming uses the same terms but issues the documents for
different purposes and at different times.

DEQ expects that covenants not to sue will most often be issued while a cleanup
is ongoing, rather than at the end of a cleanup, and that in many cases, covenants
not to sue will be issued at the same time that a remedy agreement is signed. In
general, a certificate of completion documents DEQ's opinion that all cleanup
requirements for a site (or a portion of a site) have been successfully implemented
or satisfied (Wyoming Fact Sheet #5 Liability Assurances, 2003).

Responsible Party Participation
Regardless of the name and varying levels of liability protection offered, other
aspects of a states liability relief are important. More specifically, a key liability relief
component of state brownfield efforts is whether a party who is responsible for the
contamination in whole or in part can participate in the various programs and receive
benefits. Thirty three states offer the opportunity for the responsible party to participate.
The remaining states with liability protection programs explicitly deny responsible party
access to the program. For example, Maine has it written in statute that in order to
participate in the Voluntary Response Action Program that person shall be: "Subject to

the provisions of this section, a person may not be deemed a responsible party and that
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person is not subject to department orders or other enforcement proceedings or otherwise
responsible" (Maine Voluntary Response Action Program, 1993).
Many of the states that allow participation by the responsible party place additional
constraints that non-responsible parties do not face. In fact five states will not give the
responsible party liability protection, but they are allowed to reap the benefits of
oversight through the program. Other states place financial or cleanup standard
restrictions on the responsible parties participating. For example Louisiana's Voluntary
Remediation Program allows responsible parties to participate, but with additional
constraints. The state notes that "All persons are eligible except that only nonresponsible persons (as defmed in LAC 33:VI.903) are eligible to perform Partial
Voluntary Remedial Actions" (Louisiana Voluntary Remediation Program Description).
Other states allow the responsible party to participate but explicitly do not allow a
responsible party to utilize financial incentives associated with the program allowing
them instead to receive the technical assistance and assurance they are performing an
adequate response action. For example in New Jersey, " ... in accordance with N.J.S.A.
58:lOB-13.1, nothing in this Covenant [NJ Liability Protections] shall benefit any person
who is liable, pursuant to the Spill Compensation and Control Act (Spill Act), N.J.S.A.
58: 10-23.11, for cleanup and removal costs and the Department makes no representation
by the issuance of this Covenant, either express or implied, as to the Spill Act liability of
any person" (New Jersey Chapter 26C Department Oversight of Contaminated Sites,
2006).
A number of states do allow the responsible party to participate and allow them to
receive liability protections and financial assistance. For example, in Oklahoma as long
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as the responsible party is not already under order by the EPA to perform a cleanup, they
are allowed to participate fully in all aspects of the state VCP. One other variation on the
allowance of responsible parties, however, that exists across the :fifty states is that certain
states will not allow responsible parties to use land use controls on sites they cleanup
under the various brownfield programs even if they are allowed to receive liability
protection and financial assistance-generally meaning that they will be required to do a
complete cleanup as opposed to a risk based cleanup. Table 4.2 presented below shows
the states with additional constraints on the responsible party participating in the state's
brownfield program. Of particular note here are: Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Indiana,
Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Illinois, Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. These states both allow the responsible party to
participate and to receive liability protections, while at the same time have a MOA with
the EPA. These states are providing a route for responsible parties to receive liability
protections from the state and the federal government by virtue of this aspect of their
program.
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States

Liability Specifics

Alabama
Florida

Only relieves liability from future cleanup
The contamination must have occurred
before 1997
No Liability Prote~:;tions for RP
No Liability Protections for RP
Can't use department funding; Can't use
Institutional Controls
RP cannot have knowingly violated any
laws.
No Assessment Money Provided to RP
No CNTS awarded to RP
No liability relief for RP
No liability relief for RP
Contamination must have occurred before
2000; For post-2000 contamination the RP
must have had a prevention plan in place
(per department's rules) in order to
participate fully.

Hawaii
Idaho
Louisiana
Maryland
Montana
New Jersey
Texas
Utah
Wyoming

Table 4.2: State Programmatic Constraints on Responsible Party Participation

What is actually covered in these liability documents and the relative level of
liability protections offered through the various mechanisms is quite diverse across the
states. Virtually all of the states with liability provisions provide: that eligible recipient a
liability assurance that the state will not instigate a lawsuit for further cleanup or for
liability to the state. However, in a majority of states 3rd Party lawsuits resulting from
off-site migration of toxins or other related property or personal harms are not covered in
the liability release documents. Whether 3rd Party lawsuits are covered or not is very
complex across the fifty states. In some states, such as Kentucky, 3rd party rights to
bring a lawsuit against an individual for harms resulting from brownfields are not
allowed to be barred by the brownfield programs as a result of other aspects of state law.
As was so eloquently detailed in an issue of the Brownfield News:
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"The bill [a 2006 bill expanding on liability relief for brownfields] also preserved
the right of a third party or any person, other than the cabinet, to bring claims for
injury to property or person resulting from contamination migrating onto an
adjacent property. Such a provision is necessary due to Kentucky's "jural rights"
doctrine imbedded in case law and Kentucky's Constitution. The jural rights
doctrine restricts the authority of the General Assembly to limit common law
rights of recovery (Manning, 2006).

Across the fifty states the most common states to have liability provisions against suits by
rd

3 parties are those states that issue CNTS. States noting 3rd Pruty liability protections
include: Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigrul, New Jersey, New
York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Tennessee. Only Pennsylvania leaves
rd

the potential open for 3 Party Liability Relief for responsible parties. In fact, this is
written in statute:
Any person demonstrating compliance with the environmental remediation
standards established in Chapter 3 shall be relieved of further liability for the
remediation of the site under the statutes outlined in section 106 for any
contamination identified in reports submitted to and approved by the department
to demonstrate compliance with these standards and shall not be subject to citizen
suits or other contribution actions brought by responsible persons. The cleanup
liability protection provided by this chapter applies to the: following persons: (l)
The current or future owner of the identified property or any other person who
participated in the remediation of the site. (2) A person who develops or otherwise
occupies the identified site .... (Pennsylvania Land Recycling and Environmental
Remediations Act, 1995).

Pennsylvania also possesses an MOA for its program, making these liability protections
even more powerful for participants. The remaining states with yd Party Protections
explicitly do not allow the responsible party, even if that state allows responsible parties
to participate in the overall program, to obtain 3rd Party liability relief. Table 4.3
illustrates the liability specifics across these eleven states.
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States

Liability Details

Connecticut
Georgia
Indiana
Massachusetts
Michigan
New Jersey
New York
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Tennessee

CNTS, 3rd Party, NRP
rd
PPA, 3 Party, Superfund Sites, NRP
CNTS, 3rd Party only NRP, MOA
CNTS, 3rd Party only NRP
CNTS, 3rd Party only NRP, MOA
rd
CNTS, PPA, NFA, 3 Party only NRP
rd
CNTS, COC, 3 Party
NFA, PPA, 3rd Party, NRP
CNTS, 3 rd Party, MOA
CNTS, yd Party NRP Only
NFA, 3rd Party NRP only

Table 4.3: Liability Details for States with 3rd Party Protections

Additional states of note here are: Washington which is reviewing the ability to provide
these waivers; and Rhode Island that deals with 3rd Party Protections on a case by case
basis. In Florida the only thing barred pertaining to 3rd Party claims is that a 3rd party
cannot compel a participant with relief documents to cleanup the property any further.
Finally of note is Alaska which is able to offer some prospective purchaser liability relief
documents that cover 3 rd Party claims.
In addition to the complexities of what is covered under the liability relief
documents, differences exist concerning how far reaching into the future the liability
protections are. For example, in some states liability protection documents do not allow
for the voluntary party to be held responsible for any of the contamination formerly on
the site both at the time of completion and any that may be discovered at a later date
(with usual notable exclusions for fraud and illegal activities). However, most states,
such as Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina do allow for what
is termed reopeners. Reopeners are "[e]xpress exceptions to liability releases or
agreements that reserve the government's right to require further cleanup under certain
conditions. These conditions typically include fraud by parties responsible for the
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cleanup, discovery of previously unknown contamination, and discovery that
contamination remaining on the site is significantly more toxic than originally believed"
(Brownfields Center, 2006).
Across the 48 states with liability protection, all but Alaska have those protections
embedded within their Voluntary Cleanup Program; Alaska offers the PPA in their
general state cleanup process. However, one notable exception to this exists in Indiana.
In Indiana the state offers both a Voluntary Remediation Program (VRP) and a
Brownfields Program. Under the VRP participants receive both a Certificate of Closure
and a Covenant Not to Sue. These are the state's most powerful liability protections.
Alternatively, under the Indiana Brownfields Program participants can receive Comfort
or Site Status Letters. These do not necessary protect participants from liabilities but
provide them with assurances about the status of a particular site and is aimed more at
facilitating a sale of a low-to-no contamination present on the property site. If a property
is deemed to have more significant contamination present the property will likely be
referred to the VRP (Brownfield Director, IFA).
A relevant related point worth mentioning here concerns liability protections for
brownfield remediation and redevelopment and sovereign immunity. Although the courts
interpretation of CERCLA initially indicated that States were potentially liable under the
law, court cases since have reversed that finding based upon an interpretation of the 11 th
Amendment (Percival et al' 2006). Under the U.S. Constitution local governments are
not granted the same protections as states. However, across the fifty states exists a wide
variation in whether States grant their instrumentalities (municipalities, redevelopment
agencies, counties, etc) immunity from being sued by private parties. In fact Percival et
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al (2006) note that, " ... counties and municipalities are sued for contribution most often"

(p. 391). Whether instrumentalities of a state are granted sovereign immunity is a very
complex and disputed topic in whole that often changes with new court rulings.
Although it is not in the scope of this dissertation to examine the potential implications of
sovereign immunity being granted to states' instrumentalities, it is worth noting in
reference to liability protections. It is likely that some of the states in the U.S. offer
sovereign immunity to their instrumentalities thereby potentially eliminating some of the
liability concerns surrounding brownfields on the part of local governments and
redevelopment agencies who find themselves in a position to remediate a brownfield.
One additional, but rare, liability relief provision that exists in a few states is that
of state involvement in environmental insurance. At least four states have some form of
environmental insurance assistance: Wisconsin, Massachusetts, New Yode, and
Connecticut. Each of these states involvement in offering environmental insurance is
varied from tax credits for the purchase of insurance (NY), to endorsement and a discount
for insurance (WI), to actual state subsidized insurance (MA and CT).

Financial Considerations, RBCA, and Land Use Controls
In addition to liability concerns, the perceived and actual costs associated with the
remediation aspect of brownfield properties is a major obstacle in getting them cleaned
up and redeveloped. As a primary concern, the various state brownfield programs each
offer a variety of financial incentives and avenues available in the remediation process
for developers to help lessen the costs associated with the cleanup ofbrownfields. This is
where other programs other than the voluntary cleanup programs are commonplace

across the states. Some states will have incentives and methods for lessening the cleanup
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costs existing within their voluntary cleanup programs, while others will have their
offered incentives in separate brownfield related programs which are called something
different entirely and may have different rules for participation. The various programs
have both real financial offerings in the form of grants, assessments, or loans as well as
available and allowed cleanup methodologies for lessening the cleanup costs. The
standard methodologies that exist are the use of risk based cleanup levels, often termed
risk based corrective action or RBCA [pronounced Rebecca], and the ability of
developers to use Land Use Controls on a property being cleaned up. More will be said
about the cleanup methodologies in the f{)llowing sections following a discussion of the
monetary offerings across the states for brownfield remediation ~md redevelopment.
Monetary Offerings

The states have approached real financial incentives or offerings in a variety of
ways. According to the data gathered all of the state programs offer some kind of
financial consideration for brownfield remediation through their various programs. The
fimmcial incentives offered across the fifty states ranges from monies available as a result
of a specific EPA grant to actual state supported granting programs. Several states
exhibit a plethora of incentives while others will only have the barest incentives available
based upon EPA support. In a few cases, the financial considerations are only offered to
public entities. For example in Alaska the state's Contaminated Sites Program only
offers, " ... DEC, with support from EPA's Region 10, wishes to assist non-profits,
municipalities, local governments, and their communities by conducting environmental
site assessments at potential brownfield sites" (Alaska's Brownfields Program). The
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most common financial incentives offered across the states are assessment grants,
cleanup grants, revolving loan funds, and tax incentives.

Assessment Grants
A majority of the states offer some form of assessment grants. Virtually all of
these assessment granting programs actually stem from an EPA grant awarded to the
states by their respective EPA region in the form of a Targeted Brownfield Assessments
[TBA] grant. For example, Arizona offers assessment grants, "lbrough an EPA grant,
the VRP will contract a consultant to perform an environmental site investigation for a
qualifying brownfield property. The program is available to municipalities, prospective
purchasers, and parties who would not be found liable for any existing contamination at
the property" (Arizona Voluntary Cleanup: Brownfields Assistance). As the EPA points
out: "The TBA selection process varies with each EPA Region and by state Voluntary
Response Programs. Each Region is given an annual budget to spend on TBAs. State
Voluntary Response Programs allocate TBA funding on a case-by-case basis" (US EPA
Targeted Brownfield Assessments Fact Sheets, 2003).
A few states have internal assessment granting programs separate from the EPA
TBA program. For example, Michigan once offered the Site Assessment Fund (SAF)
grant to eligible public entities. The SAF is funded by the Michigan Environmental
Protection Bond Fund of 1988. The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality
currently notes that no funds are available under this program at this time-however it is
still noted as an available program with the hope that the state will be able to offer
funding again under this program in the future. Assessment grants, although not
necessarily pivotal to getting brownfields remediated, do enable states, localities, and
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developers to better understand what the status of a particular site is. Some sites thought
of as brownfields turn out to be either uncontaminated or less contaminated than feared,
and assessment grants can provide the necessary information to get that site cleaned up
and successfully reused.
Cleanup Grants

Outside of assessment grants the other most common granting program offered
across the states is cleanup grants. These cleanup granting programs are far rarer than the
assessment granting programs and are most often targeted to public or non-profit entities.
For the states offering actual cleanup money most have very specific restrictions on
whom and what site can receive the grant money. For example Michigan offers a Clean
Michigan Initiative (CMI) grant program that allows, "Any county, city, village,
township, Brownfield Redevelopment Authority, or other authority or other public body
created pursuant to state law may apply for a grant. Eligible activities include
environmental investigations and assessments, interim response, and due care response
activities necessary for the proposed development" (Michigan CMI Brownfield
Redevelopment Grants, 2006). A few states offer cleanup grants to a wider audience that
includes private entities. For example, in Delaware a brownfield granting program exists
that " ... authorizes the appropriation of $3,000,000.00 annually from the Hazardous
Substance Cleanup Act Fund (HSCA Fund) for the purpose of reimbursing reasonable
remedial costs ... " (Delaware Hazardous Substance Cleanup Act Mixed Funding and
Brownfields).
In addition to brownfield cleanup grants available within the brownfield programs

some states have enabled and encouraged the use of granting mechanisms from other
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programs and administrative agencies. For example in Oklahoma in 2000 a seemingly
unrelated grant program was amended to better allow redeveloped brownfield properties
to access to the funds.
The Oklahoma Quality Jobs Act was amended to apply to basic industries that
locate their principal business activities on contaminated properties of at least ten
acres in size which qualify as 1) a federal Superfund removal site, 2) National
Priorities List (NPL or Superfund) site, 3) a site fonnally deferred to the state in
lieu ofNPL listing, or 4) a site that was remediated pursuant to an order of the
DEQ. These companies may be eligible for the Quality Jobs Program incentive
payments irrespective of their actual gross payroll or the number of full-timeequivalent employees in new direct jobs [68 O.S. Supp. 2000 § 3604 (E - H)]
(Oklahoma Brownfields Financial Incentives Fact Sheet).

Variations do exist on the specifics related to the use of other programs' financial
mechanisms. For example, Ohio provides an example where one of their granting
programs requires a fund match by the recipient.
Another interesting component of some state brownfield programs is the use of
CERCLA 128a funds to public entities for cleanups, assessments, and other related
expenses. "Section 128(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), as amended, authorizes a noncompetitive
$50 million grant program to establish and enhance state and tribal response programs"
(US EPA Funding Guidance for State and Tribal Response Programs, 2007). All fifty
states get CERCLA 128a funds.
Grant applications are required by the states in order to receive funding under this
program and states are granted considerable leeway in detennining how to use these
funds. Tracking down how much funding each state gets has proven to be a difficult
endeavor. None of the EPA grant databases provides details on the amount of 128a
funding awarded. The EPA allows the individual regions to handle that grant, and only
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Region 1 (CT, ME, NH, RI, VT) has made that data available in published form.
Requests for data from the EPA and other regions are met with guidance to ask individual
states for that information. Calls and emails to the remaining states have provided spotty
results of how much each state gets. Additionally, some states only provide cumulative
totals, while others provide the most recent year. These programs have only been eligible
to receive funding from this since 2003, making the cumulative totals useful as welL The
following charts outline the known CERCLA 128a Funding to states for the most recent
year and cumulatively since the program's inception.

Most Recent Year 128a Funding

I
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Wisconsin
Washington _ _ _. _• • • •
I Vermont _ _ _ _•
I
Texas
I
Oregon _ . _. . . ._ . ._
Oklahoma
New_• •_ _ _ _•
Nevada _ . . . .
Montana _ -_ _ _ _If
Minnesota • • • • • •
Iowa
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Hawaii
II

___ __

Alaska ~~~--J------*-1----J

I~. ~ ~~~,ooo
i

$1,000,000 $1,500,000 $2,000,000

Figure 4.1: CERCLA 128a Funding for most recent Fiscal Year
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Cumulative 128a Funding
Wisconsin
Utah
Texas
Rhode Island
Oklahoma
Montana
Massachusetts
Maine
Iowa
Florida
Connecticut
Colorado
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$$2,000,0
________--------'00>DL-.._

$4,000,0
00

$6,000,0
00

$8,000,0
00

$10,000,
000 ___ _

Figure 4.2: CERCLA 128a Funding, Cumulative over life of grant

As stated previously, some states use this 128a funding to provide grants and
assessments to participants in their programs. As with the actual funding amounts, it is
not entirely clear how many states use their funding, or how much is used, for this
purpose. However, Nevada and Florida are examples where they provide grants to the
public sector with 128a funds; with Nevada using the entire amount for grants and
administration of the Land Recycling Program (not the Voluntary Cleanup Program).
Judging from the three case study states, some states use these funds primarily for
providing grants, others use them for some combination of grants and administrative
costs.
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Overall in terms of grants available-assessment grant programs, particularly
EPA supported TBA's, are much more common than any state supported cleanup grant
programs. Important and of particular educational value to other states is that, a number
of states have started to make the connection from brownfield property needs to other
state supported economic development grant programs, which often have many more
grant opportunities than the brownfield programs do-but there exists a lot of room for
improvement in this connection.
Loan Programs
Outside of assessment and cleanup grant programs, loan programs are the next
most common form of financial assistance offered by states for brownfield remediation
and redevelopment. The most common form of loan program is an EPA originated
Revolving Loan Fund (RLF).

A major component of the Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initiative is the
award of pilot cooperative agreements to States (including u.S. territories),
political subdivisions (including cities, towns, and counties), and Indian tribes to
capitalize Brownfields Cleanup Revolving Loan Fund (BCRLF). The purpose of
the pilots is to enable States, political subdivisions, and Indian tribes to make low
interest loans to carryout cleanup activities at brownfields properties (US EPA
Brownfields Cleanup Revolving Loan Fund Pilot Program).
Approximately twenty states have received EPA capitalized revolving loan funds.
Important to note here is that many cities and counties across the United States have also
applied for and received funds from the EPA to capitalize revolving loan funds. So even
in the thirty states without an EPA capitalized RLF, larger cities or counties may have
actually received these funds enabling developers within that state access to revolving
loan funds for brownfield redevelopments.
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In addition to the EPA capitalized RLF's a nwnber of states have created loan
programs of their own. Oftentimes these loan programs will involve a low-to-no interest
loan program similar to the EPA capitalized RLF. For example, New Jersey provides a
wide expanse of loan programs to a variety of individuals including private parties:
"Loans are available to private entities for up to 100% of the funding needed to remediate
a discharge of hazardous substances up to $1 million per year. The interest rate is the
Federal Discount Rate with a minimwn of 5% and is determined by the NJEDA. The
maximwn term for any loan is 10 years" (New Jersey HSDRF Fact Sheet). Some states,
such as Michigan, have created more than one loan fund.
Brownfield redevelopment loans provide funding to local units of government and
other public bodies to investigate and remediate known sites of environmental
contamination, which will be used for identified economic redevelopment
projects ... The Revitalization Revolving Loan (RRL) Program is designed to
support local community efforts to redevelop brownfield properties by providing
eligible entities with low-interest loans which may be used to evaluate
contaminated or potentially contaminated properties, demolish dangerous or
hazardous buildings that obstruct redevelopment, and to conduct interim response
actions necessary to investigate a property or demolish a building (Michigan
Department of Environmental Quality-Brownfields Grants and Loans).

In addition to the more common low-to-no interest loan programs, several states
have loan guarantee programs directed at enabling investors to obtain outside financing in
place in their brownfield programs. For example, in Oregon the state offers a program
named the Capital Access Program (CAP). "Capital Access program offers loan
portfolio insurance for environmental evaluations and brownfield redevelopment
projects" (Oregon Brownfields Program: An Overview). Although CAP was initiated in
1991 for economic development purposes, the program has grown to include
brownfields. This program does not provide loans, but it offers a state guarantee on the
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loan thereby increasing the likelihood that a bank will approve an applicant. Other states
noting loan guarantee programs include Florida and Missouri.

Tax Incentives
In addition to upfront money programs such as the grants and loans available,
many states offer a variety of tax incentives. According to data gathered at least 32 states
offer some form of a tax incentive. The types of tax incentives offer vary widely with the
following types being noted: credits and deductions for the cost of cleanup, tax reductions
on increased property value for a length of time, tax credits for each new job created,
sales tax exemptions, special provisions allowing the use of Tax Increment Financing
(TIF), property tax abatements, various fees and tax exemptions, deductions for cost of
environmental insurance, sliding scale tax rates on properties redeveloped, Fees in Lieu
of Taxes, tax exemption on hazardous waste shipments, tax cancellations, and the ability
to transfer-at no cost- tax delinquent properties to new owners willing to clean them up.
Tax incentives vary widely across the states that offer them, with a variety of restrictions
and eligibility rules across the states. Some of the more common and interesting of the
various tax incentives available are elaborated on below.

Income Tax Credits or Deductions for Cleanup Costs
Several states offer deductions or credits on an individual or businesses' state
income tax for the costs of cleanup. This is the most commonly available type of tax
incentive across the states who offer tax incentives. Key examples include Colorado
where tax credits are offered to offset the cleanup costs ofbrownfields:
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As part of Governor Owens' smart growth initiative, the Colorado General
Assembly passed a Brownfields Tax Credit (this has been extended to the end of
2010) as an added incentive to develop formerly used and possibly contaminated
properties (Brownfields). The bill provided an income tax credit of up to
$100,000 to offset cleanup costs and make the redevelopment of such properties
more financially viable (Colorado Brownfields Tax Credit).
Florida also offers cleanup tax credits, but for corporations only:
The 1998 Florida Legislature created the Voluntary Cleanup Tax Credit (VCTC)
to encourage voluntary cleanup of certain drycleaning solvent contaminated sites
and sites in designated Brownfield areas. The 2006 Florida Legislature modified
and expanded the VCTC. With the repeal of the Intangible Personal Property
Tax, Section 199.1055, F.S, the VCTC is valid against Florida Corporate Income
Tax only ... (Florida Voluntary Cleanup Tax Credit).

Income tax credits or deductions are fairly common across the 32 states offering tax
incentives, however the requirements, eligibility, and specifics vary widely. As is
evidenced in the two examples above, some states allow both individuals and businesses
to benefit from the tax incentives, while others only allow businesses. As is the case with
the liability and participation rules, some states allow responsible parties to benefit, some
explicitly do not, and some judge it on a case-by-case basis. Most commonly the income
tax incentives allow the individual or business to deduct a certain percentage of the costs
associated with the cleanup ofbrownfields from their personal and/or corporate tax
liability. These tax credits and deductions usually have a maximum cap on the amount
able to be claimed and some allow the costs to roll over to the following year, while
others do not.

Property Tax Incentives/Programs
In addition to programs that allow individuals or businesses to deduct or receive a
credit on income taxes for cleaning up and redeveloping brownfields, some states provide
property tax incentives. The most common property tax incentive involves enabling the
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local or county governments to freeze or reduce property tax on a remediated and
redeveloped brownfield. For example, in Georgia, "The Brownfields tax law allows
property owners to apply to their local taxing authority for preferential assessment of the
Brownfield property. The preferential assessment reduces taxes on the property for ten
years, or until the certified assessment and cleanup costs are recouped, whichever occurs
first" (Georgia Brownfield Redevelopment Incentives).
Other variations and examples exist as well. In Idaho a VCP participant is
eligible to receive a seven year, up to a 50% reduction in property taxes on remediated
brownfield properties (Idaho Statute Title 63 Chapter 6, Exemptions from Taxation).
Although some states, like Georgia and Idaho, require that the local taxing authority
participate if a request is made--other states do not require subdivisions to participate
and leave the final discretion up to the local authority. Maryland is a key example of this
where the local jurisdiction must elect to participate in the state Brownfields
Revitalization Incentive Program (BRIP).
Maryland is also a good illustration of how a brownfield program's essential
components can be distributed throughout a variety of administrative units. More
specifically, in Maryland the liability relief and cleanup components of the VCP is
located in the Department of Environment; however, this tax incentive is part of the
Department of Business and Economic Development.
Sales Tax Incentives

Less frequently than the previously discussed tax incentives, a few states offer
sales tax incentives. Most often these sales tax incentives involve exempting or

refunding the sales taxes paid on brownfield cleanup equipment or machinery. At least
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three states provide clear guidance on sales tax incentives: Alabama, New Jersey, and
Oklahoma. A good example of a common form of a sales tax incentive exists in
Oklahoma. "The Oklahoma Sales Tax Code allows an exemption for machinery,
equipment, fuels, and chemicals incorporated into the treatment process to substantially
reduce the volume or harmful properties of hazardous waste at facilities approved by the
DEQ for the cleanup of a site of contamination" (Oklahoma Brownfields Financial
Incentives Fact Sheet).

Use ofRBCA and Land Use Controls

In addition to the offering of grants, loans, and tax incentives to help lessen the
financial burden of remediating a brownfield, many states offer alternative methodologies
for cleaning up brownfields. More specifically, many states allow for risk based
corrective action (RBCA) and land use controls on remediated properties. Although
these are not actual money incentives they do work to lessen the financial burden by
making the overall cleanup less cost prohibitive--theoretically enabling and encouraging
more cleanups and redevelopments of brownfields.
RBCA is by far the most common alternative cleanup methodology allowed under
the fifty state programs. RBCA is, "A streamlined approach in which exposure and risk
assessment practices are integrated with traditional components of the corrective action
process to ensure that appropriate and cost-effective remedies are selected, and that
limited resources are properly allocated" (US EPA RBDM FAQ 6). Under traditional
definitions the RBCA process is derived from ASTM (American Society for Testing and
Materials) guidance which states, "The RBCA process ... us[es] a tiered approach that
integrates site assessment and response actions with human health and ecological risk
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assessment to determine the need for remedial action and to tailor corrective action
activities to site-specific conditions and risks" (ASTM Standard Guide for Risk Based
Corrective Action, 2007).
At least 40 states allow some form of risk based corrective actions in their
brownfield programs. However, the comprehensiveness, eligibility, and specifics of the
usage ofRBCA or RBCA-like processes vary widely across the states. For example in
Utah one ofthe key benefits (as expressed by the agency) of their VCP's is the fact that
"[v]oluntary cleanups can be tied to land use allowing for a risk-based approach to
cleanup" (Utah Department of Environmental Quality Voluntary Cleanup Program). In
many ways risk based cleanups are dependent upon some form of land use control and
most of the states will include language in any liability relief document concerning any
land use controls required and used by that property and developer. Land use controls,
whether used in conjunction with risk based corrective action methods or not, is also a
way for states to enable investors to clean brownfields at a lower cost.
Land Use Controls (LUCS) are " ... also known as 'institutional controls', are
defined broadly as legal measures that limit human exposure by restricting activity, use,
and access to properties with residual contamination" (US EPA Land Use and
Institutional Controls). Often LUCS will be a pivotal part of a state's risk based cleanup
process. It has been pointed out that the array of terminology and definitions concerning
risk based remediation across the states is complex and confusing (Land Use Control
Site, 2007). For the sake of understanding and providing consistent human health and
environmental protection the Uniform Environmental Covenants Act was proposed and
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offered across the fifty states by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Law (NCCUSL).
Land use controls, activity and use limitations, institutional controls, engineering
controls, restrictive covenants, and deed restrictions, etc. all may provide the same
legal remedy for risk-based cleanup but for differing sites. The Act attempts to
encompass all of this terminology by connecting broadly defined activity and use
limitations with the requirement that they are enacted in conjunction with an
agency-authorized environmental response project (Land Use Controls Site,
2007).

Currently 14 states have adopted the Uniform Environmental Covenants Act with an
additiona124 introducing the bill in 2007 (Uniform Environmental Covenants Act).
Table 4.4 illustrates the states' status in terms of the Uniform Environmental Covenants
Act.
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ENACTED

Introduce 2007 Ongoing Study

Delaware
Hawaii
Idaho
Iowa
Kentucky
Maine
Maryland
Nebraska
Nevada
Ohio
Oklahoma
South Dakota
Utah
West Virginia

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
Connecticut
Florida
Georgia
Indiana
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
North Dakota
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Texas
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
Wyoming

North Carolina
Oregon

Table 4.4: Adoption Status of Uniform Environmental Covenants Act

Understanding the lack of uniformity in definitions, tracking, and requirements
for Land Use Controls is particularly important point for understanding brownfield
programs. According to data gathered virtually all of the states allow for, some even
require, land use controls on brownfield redevelopments. A lack of uniformity is an
interesting component of state brownfield efforts and could be a point of improvement
for many states. Some states provide an extensive and complex tracking system; others
do not track the controls at all. Arkansas and Alabama are key examples of states that
allow controls but currently do not track them. On the other side, some states (Florida in
particular) have an extensive, publicly available tracking system for Land Use Controls.
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The ability of brownfield investors to use various land use controls is likely a
valuable and effective way of reducing the cleanup costs associated with reusing
brownfields. It seems that almost all of the states are allowing the use of these controls,
but the tracking and long term control of these measures is not consistent across the
states. Furthermore, a majority of the states are not party to the Uniform Environmental
Covenant Act which would enable individuals, businesses, and concerned parties a
clearer, more consistent understanding of terminology, control, and requirements for
these land use controls across the fifty states. It would also provide a much needed
consistency for the future of these land use controls.
RCRA Regulatory Nature
In addition to the details concerning the actual brownfield specific programs, the
database also collected data concerning RCRA inspections and enforcements to use as a
proxy for regulatory stance of a state as well as to explore any possible relationships
between the two programs. Although both RCRA and CERCLA have contributed to the
problem ofbrownfields, RCRA is the most logical area of inquiry to characterize a state's
regulatory nature as it may impact its state brownfield program. As outlined in Chapter
Two, RCRA is intended to be implemented and administered by the states. In fact,
remembering that 48 of the fifty states have received base RCRA authorization from the
EPA illustrates the widespread nature of the state-level participation in RCRA. A state's
activity level in relation to RCRA may be able to enable a deeper level of understand of
an overall state's perspective on brownfields. More specifically state performance under
RCRA may be able to be used as a proxy for state commitments to environmental
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regulation and enforcement. The database included RCRA enforcement and inspection
data.
In addition to providing a proxy for a state's environmental regulation and
enforcement stance, another issue of concern to brownfields is that ofRCRA failure. By
RCRA failure, it is meant that a state who does not adequately inspect regulated facilities
and enforce any violations discovered may lead to failure of the protection of the
environment and human health. In addition to short term problems associated with it,
RCRA failure also holds the likelihood of increasing the number of brownfield properties
within a given state. A state that does not provide a high, or even adequate, level of
RCRA inspections and RCRA enforcements relative to the number of establishments
using, disposing, or treating toxic materials can be expected to not only have more
brownfield properties (due to neglect of efforts to avoid them), but also have a lower
motivation for state spending on remediation and redevelopment of those properties.
Additionally it may be expected that this potentially could translate into a more liberal
risk-based cleanup program. Conversely, a particularly strict regulatory stance on
hazardous wastes may be expected to limit certain types of risk-based cleanups,
institutional controls, and/or types of assistance provided under that state's brownfield
program. That is, a state that inspects and enforces hazardous waste violations at a high
level is logically more likely to regulate the hazardous wastes being remediated in their
brownfield program. Across all 48 RCRA authorized states the program is operated under
the same department, often even the same office, as the brownfield programs. The
variations in inspections and enforcements ofRCRA regulated facilities can be
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counterproductive to even the best state brownfield remediation and redevelopment
efforts as well as are likely related to the efforts of the brownfield programs.

RCRAPPA's
Before discussing specific inspection and enforcement rates it is necessary to
understand that the EPA offers a mechanism for states to work more closely with them
through a Performance Partnership Agreement (PPA). PPA's are negotiated agreements
a state agency will enter into with the EPA in order to detail the working relationship
between the two. "The scope and contents ofPPA's varies. Individual PPA's can range
from general statement about how the state and EPA will work together as partners
(perhaps identifying joint priorities that will be addressed) to comprehensive, multiprogram documents that detail each party's roles and responsibilities" (US EPA About
Performance Partnership Agreemetns). Of the 48 RCRA authorized states, 33 have
PPA's. Under RCRA, and in some states, these PPAs can dictate how many inspections
each state will conduct annually. When statistical tests are run on this data, interestingly
enough, states with Performance Partnership Agreements (PPA) do not have statistically
significant differences in rate of inspections as compared to the remaining states without
PPA's.

RCRA Inspections
A pivotal part of the RCRA regulatory process is inspections. Every type of
RCRA regulated facility is subject to inspection. The EPA Enforcement and Compliance
History Online (ECHO) database tracks RCRA regulated facility inspections.
Inspections are available in one, two, or three year increments for the past three years

from the date of inquiry. EPA recognizes that it is not possible to inspect ever regulated
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facility every three years (US EPA ECHO Frequently Asked Questions). However, a
state's commitment and commitment to inspecting facilities can be gained from an
examination of this database. Additionally, with 48 states having their base RCRA
program authorized by the EPA, and two being administered by the EPA, it is possible to
compare states with state authorization to states where the EPA administers the RCRA
program. Figure 4.3 demonstrates the percentages of facilities that received an inspection
in the past three years in each of the fifty states, keeping in mind that two states receive
their inspections directly from the EPA.

Inspection Distribution
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Figure 4.3: RCRA Facility Inspection in the past 3 years. States listed in Alphabetical Order

As would be expected with the varying capacities across the fifty states, Figure
4.3 illustrates a moderate level of variation existing across the fifty states in the
percentage of regulated facilities that received an inspection in the last three years.
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As of July 2006, ECHO reports a total of 653,720 RCRA currently regulated
facilities across the United States. RCRA regulated facilities generally include things
like furniture manufacturers, gas stations, chemical plants, and other activities that
produce, transport, handle, or dispose of a hazardous waste as defined by the EPA. The
average state inspected 7% of their facilities in the past three years. Nevada inspected the
most, at 44.75% of their regulated facilities, and New Hampshire inspected the fewest, at
just 1% of their facilities. Alaska and Iowa, the two EPA administered RCRA programs,
inspected 9.37% and 13.06% of their regulated facilities respectively. The state and the
EPA rely on self-reported data to assess compliance in the facilities that they have not
inspected. "It is possible that facilities do have violations that have not yet been
discovered, thus are shown as compliant in the system. EPA cannot positively state that
facilities without violations shown in ECHO are necessarily fully compliant with
environmental laws" (US EPA ECHO FAQ).
It has been pointed out that, " ... by several orders of magnitude the system is
much harsher on TSD facilities" (Percival et al, 2006, p. 357). Recognizing a difference
exists in inspection rates at the different types of facilities, information was collected on
specific facility types. Figure 4.4 illustrates this facility specific inspection rate across
the states.
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Figure 4.4: Inspection rates of specific types of RCRA regulated facilities. States in alphabetic order.
Large Quantity Generators (LQG), Treatment Storage and Disposal Faeilities (TSD), Small Quantity
Generator (SQG), Conditionally Exempt Small Quantity Generators (CESQG) and Transporters.
States are listed in alphabetical order.

RCRA regulated facilities are broken up into five separate classifications. These
classifications are as follows: Large Quantity Generators (LQG) which produce more
than 1,000 kg of hazardous waste in a month; Small Quantity Generators (SQG) which
produce more than 100 kg but less than 1,000 kg of hazardous waste a month; treatment,
storage and disposal facilities (TSD), Transporters of hazardous waste, and conditionally
exempt small quantity generators (CESQG) which produce less than 100 kg of hazardous
waste per month. Examining the breakdown of types of facilities, reveals that inspections
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across all states are performed most often at TSDs and least often at CESQG's. The high
level of inspection at TSD's is consistent with previous scholarship indicating a harsher
stance on these properties. What is interesting, however, is the incredibly varied
inspection rate at the SQG and LQGs which is illustrated well in Figure 4.4.
Table 4.5 illustrates the highs and lows across the fifty states in terms of specific
facility inspection rates.
Type of
LQG
Facility
NTLAverage 54%

SQG

TSD

CESQG

Transporter

21%

75%

9%

19%

Highest State

MT,N.D.
(100%)

MT(97%)

NV (55%)

MT(90%)

Lowest State

N.Y.
(14%)

MD (0%)

ND(O%)

EPA
Administered
States

AK(53%)
IA(63%)

CA,MD,
andUT
(1%)
AK (48%)
IA (13%)

MT,NC,
ND,RI,
SC,SD
(100%)
CT (47%)

AK(83%)
IA (74%)

AK(13%)
IA (15%)

AK(7%)
IA (9%)

Table 4.5: Highs, Lows, and National Averages ofRCRA specific types of facility inspection rate

As can be seen in the table above, Montana holds four of the five highest rankings for
inspection rates at specific types of facilities. This is a bit misleading. Montana has very
few regulated facilities when compared to other states. In July 2006 Montana reported a
total of 2003 facilities in their state. In fact in absolute numbers by type of facilities
Montana only inspected a total of 292 facilities over the past three years. What is more
important to be gathered from the scatter plot above (Figure 4.4), is that across the fifty
states two things are fairly consistent: TSD's get the most inspections and CESQG's get
the fewest. The remaining types of facilities are extremely varied across the fifty states.
This variation may be an indication of discretion and political control influences at the
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state level. This variation may also have impacts on that state's brownfield program- as
LQG, SQG, and Transporters are not insignificant in hazardous waste generation and
handling. This data was also checked across the EPA regions and no significant
statistical findings were found indicating a significant variation across the various EPA
Regions. The next stage in RCRA compliance and enforcement for the database was the
rate of informal enforcements.
RCRA Informal Enforcements
When a RCRA regulated facility has been identified as an alleged violator, the
usual first step in the enforcement process involves the state or the EPA issuing a
warning letter or notice of violation (NOV). These warning letters and NOVs are
considered informal enforcements. This process generally serves as the notification to a
facility that it is in violation of the law and that it should remedy the situation or face
formal enforcement actions. Important to note here, is that a RCRA regulated facility
may not even be subject to an informal enforcement if the inspector believes the violation
to be insignificant enough not to warrant any enforcement. Informal enforcement
measures are most often the result of discoveries made during standard inspections.
"[Informal Enforcements] ... reflect determinations made by EPA or States when
conducting inspections or reviewing facility self-reports" (US EPA ECHO FAQ). Across
the fifty states an average of 97.8% of informal enforcement measures occur in facilities
that have been inspected. It is expected then that most of the remaining 2.2% of informal
enforcement measures result from self reported or complaint information.
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Table 4.6 illustrates the distribution of the state's percentages of facilities
receiving informal enforcements in the past three years as reported by ECHO. The
national average for informal enforcement measures is 2%.

ABOVE AVERAGE

NATIONAL AVERAGE

BELOW AVERAGE

NV

National Average 2%

CO 0%
SD 0%
MD.29%
MS .30%
NH.48%
PA .54%
LA .69%
SC .76%
WY.80%
IL 1.22%
CA 1.23%
TX 1.29%
UT 1.33%
M01.39%
HI 1.4%
NJ 1.43%
MNI.59l'1o
NY 1.71%

7.4%
WV 5.95%
OH 5.69%
AL 5.15%
TN 4.38%
ME 4.37%
NC 4.36%
DE 4.11%
IN 4.05%
NE 3.98%
KY 3.85%
OR 3.80%
KS 3.58%
MI 3.54%
AK 3.39% *
ND 3.38%
GA 3.34%
CT 3.16%
OK 2.96%
FL 2.86%
WA2.78%
VA 2.77%
WI 2.73%
RJ 2.6%
AZ 2.58%
NM2.38%
MT2.35%
MA2.34%
IA 2.30% *
AR 2.23%
VT 2.23%
ID 2.06%

Table 4.6: Notice of Violation Rates for RCRA regulated Facilities

* EPA Administered RCRA programs
Alaska and Iowa, the two EPA administered RCRA programs, have informal
enforcement measures of 3.39% and 2.30% respectively. As would be expected, the rate
of inspections is positively correlated with the issuance ofNOVs (see table 4.7).
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PERCIN5P

PERCNOV

PERCIN8P

PERCNOV

Pearson
Correlation
8i9. (2-tailed)

1.000

.516**

N
Pearson
Correlation
5ig. (2-tailed)

50
.516**

N

50

.000
50
1.000

.000

50

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 4.7: Correlation oflnspections to notice of violations

Referring back to Figure 4.3, it is logical to assume that states with low inspection rates
will have less opportunity to identify regulated facility non-compliance. In fact the EPA
recognizes this, "If ECHO shows a recent inspection and the facility is shown with no
violations, user of the ECHO site can be more confident that the facility is in compliance
with the programs ... " (US EPA ECHO FAQ). In essence a state who conducts
comparatively few inspections on regulated facilities is relying more heavily upon self
reporting for compliance information. An unusually low inspection rate logically can
contribute to RCRA failure, which in turn can contribute to an increase in brownfields
and/or Superfund sites and also indicates a state's regulatory environment.
The fact that over 97% ofNOVs are issued to facilities who received inspections
seems to imply that a heavy reliance on self reporting does not ensure a high level of
RCRA compliance. If, as more inspections are performed more violators are discovered,
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states with low inspection rates likely are exposing their citizens to a greater likelihood of
exposure to toxins as a result of RCRA failure.

RCRA Formal Enforcement and SNC Status
The next step in the RCRA enforcement process is what is termed a Formal
Enforcement procedure. "The next step, or in a number of cases, the first step in the
enforcement process is the initiation of a civil administrative action or civil judicial
action (in some serious cases, criminal enforcement actions may be taken)" (US EPA
ECHO FAQ). The national average for formal enforcement measures is 65.28 formal
enforcements over the past three years. The average state has 0.54% of their regulated
facilities with a formal enforcement measure in the last three years. Hawaii has the
highest percentage of formal enforcements at just over 2% of its RCRA regulated
facilities. North and South Dakota possess the lowest level of formal enforcements:
neither had any in the last three years.
A facility that is deemed to be in 'Significant Non-Compliance' or SNC status
means that it has done one or more of the following: caused exposure or has a threatened
exposure to hazardous waste; is a chronic violator; or it deviates substantially from the
terms of a permit, order or agreement, or from RCRA statutory or regulatory
requirements (US EPA ECHO FAQ). South Dakota, North Dakota, and New Hampshire
have the fewest facilities in SNC with 0 facilities reported. As a percentage of total
RCRA regulated facilities, Hawaii has the most SNC facilities at 0.76% of their RCRA
regulated facilities falling into SNC status. Unlike informal enforcement measures,
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formal enforcement measures and SNC status are not uniformly correlated with a state's
frequency of inspections. This lack of correlation is likely a result of the level of
discretion a state RCRA inspector has in enforcement measures.

Regulatory Nature and Expected Impacts
Having reviewed state RCRA enforcement and compliance information it is
possible to draw some broad conclusions about what the likely impacts are on a state's
brownfield situation. Although further study of this issue will allow for a deeper
understanding of this relationship, it is possible to draw some preliminary conclusions
across the fifty states.
Important to reiterate here is that all 48 RCRA authorized states house their
RCRA program in the same department or agency as a main part of their brownfield or
Voluntary Cleanup Program. In most situations, the same overhead administrator sets the
budget, mission, and goals for both programs. Several states appear to be particularly

strict in terms of its RCRA inspection and enforcement statistics. These stricter
regulatory natures will likely reduce the likelihood of an increase in RCRA failure,
thereby reducing the risk of an increased prevalence ofRCRA brownfields.
Brownfield redevelopments are directly connected to regulations, although a
brownfield sitting idle is not necessarily subject to regulatory action. The American
Federalist system has created a myriad of political, regulatory, administrative, and social
conditions across the fifty states. This variation is apparent in the regulatory nature of
each state. Examining RCRA regulatory activity has shown that states are not consistent

in their inspections or their enforcement measures. As state governments continue to
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spend increasingly scarce tax dollars on programs it is important to understand the
connections, and sometimes the counterproductive nature, of other state programs. In
this case a state's RCRA program may logically impact its brownfield problem and
program-thereby making it essential to understand if one is concerned about the
presence and correction of these properties.
Although the database created in the research for this dissertation enables a very
broad and important look at state brownfield efforts and state regulation of hazardous
waste, it does not speak about the specific nuisances of the programs. In order to gain a
more in-depth look at these programs and better tell the story, it is necessary and
worthwhile to take a look at three specific cases. The cases can be selected using
information gathered in the database. The final section of this chapter outlines the
rationale stemming from this database for the three cases to be studied in depth.

Case Study Selection Rationale
Drawing from the rationale outlined in Chapter Three, three state case studies
were picked for maximum variation in several components. These states are Florida,
Indiana, and Nevada. Each of the components used as a selection tool is outlined below
providing justification for the selection of the three cases. The individual components
were taken collectively before selecting the three cases and are presented individually
below.
Administrative Organization
In gathering data about the fifty state programs it became apparent that certain
states organize their programs in an administratively interesting manner. While many
states clearly have their brownfield program located in one administrative unit, others
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have the various components of their brownfield program spread throughout a number of
other administrative agencies. Of the states who exhibit an administrative fragmentation
their programs the most common organization included having the economic incentive
part of their program located in an Economic DeVelopment agency while the remediation
aspect of their program located in the Environmental agency. To account for this
variation, and keeping with the rationale of maximum variation sampling, this
dissertation selected a case that was administratively fragmented (Indiana) and cases that
were administratively unified (Florida and Nevada).
In addition to a level of fragmentation of the program one particular state
exhibited an additional administrative aspect that was unique and potentially valuable to
this research. Florida exhibits a very unique organization that seems to be echoed
throughout its state. That is, Florida requires participation from the local government
before anyone or any entity can participate in the liability protection or economic
incentive aspects of their brownfield program. This devolution of responsibility is an
interesting case study of how to organize a brownfield program and certainly provides an
interesting and information rich case to analyze for this dissertation. With specific
attention to the potential to offer policy guidance to other states, Florida is a potential
gold mine of information.

Regulatory Environment
In order to learn about any connection between brownfields and ReRA, including
a state's regulatory stance, it is logical to select cases that have variation in this aspect.
The first consideration revolves around selecting at least one case that possesses and one

state that does not possess an EPA Performance Partnership Agreement (PPA). Ensuring
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a case selection that includes variation in the presence or absence of a PPA is a logical
consideration. Of the three selected cases for this dissertation, Nevada and Florida do not
have PPAs and Indiana has one. Although this ratio is not consistent with the percentage
of states with the PPA nationally, it does not jeopardize the validity of this selection.
Recall that states with PPA's do not show a statistically significant difference in
inspections from those states without a PPA. However, it is useful to take into
consideration at least one state with a PPA so that any connections and impacts ofPPA's
not caught in the database can be potentially discovered in the case studies.
Further consideration in terms of regulatory environment centers on the inspection
and enforcement levels of the state as recorded by EPA ECHO database and is evidenced
in this chapter. The three states selected provide an interesting and information rich
variation in terms of regulation and enforcement of RCRA. Specifically, Nevada has the
highest level of inspections of all fifty states, with approximately 44.75% of their
regulated facilities showing inspections over the other states. This will provide an
interesting variation from Florida where approximately 9.5% of their facilities received
an inspection over the last three years and Indiana where the PPA agreement spells out
certain percentages which have been recorded as approximately 11 % over the last three
years. This variation in regulatory environment is particularly useful for this type of
study.

Ideology of Government
In literature concerning bureaucratic discretion and legislative control theories, a
common theme used to examine the influences of each revolves around operationalizing

policy preferences of legislators and bureaucrats. Several authors have pointed to
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ideology as a mechanism for demonstrating and testing these policy preferences (Clark
and Allen, 2004; Huber and Shipan, 2002). This dissertation also uses ideology as a
proxy for policy preferences of government employees (bureaucrats) and political
officials. Drawing on work done by William Berry in which he measures and records
both citizen and state government ideology, this dissertation will use his ideology
measures as a proxy for policy preferences of bureaucrats and political officials. "We
construct dynamic measures of the ideology of a state's citizens and political leaders,
using roll call voting scores of state congressional delegations, the outcomes of
congressional elections, the partisan division of state legislatures, the party of the
governor, and various assumptions regarding voters and state political elites" (Berry et ai,
1998, p. 327). Berry's measure of ideology ranges from a 0 to a 100. The closer the
score is to 0 the more conservative it is; the closer the score is to 100 the more liberal it
is. "One is state citizen ideology, generally conceived as the mean position on a liberalconservative continuum of the active electorate in a state. The other may be termed state
government ideology---the mean position on the same continuum of the elected public
officals in a state, weighted according to the power they have over public policy
decisions" (Berry et aI, 1998, 327-8). For the sake of maximum variation in cases this
dissertation used ideology measures as a factor in determining the cases.
Of the three selected cases each show ideology variation. Florida has an
approximate ideology measure of 55 for the state government (thought to represent the
policymakers) and 45 for the citizens (thought to represent the bureaucrats) in the year of
the creation of the brownfield program. For the most current year available Florida offers

a government ideology score of 7 and a citizen ideology score of 46. This compares to
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Indiana at 63 government and 46 citizens for the year the brownfield program was
created and 57 government and 43 citizens for the most recent year available; Nevada at
47 government and 57 citizens for the year the brownfield program was created and 37
government and 46 citizen for the most recent year available. Although these particular
states do not have the most extreme ideology scores across the fifty states, they offer
variation on each side of the spectrum for citizen versus government. More simply
stated, these cases represent both a more liberal government and conservative citizen
(Indiana); a more conservative government and liberal citizen scores (Nevada); as well as
a government that changed scores drastically from the year the program was created until
the most current year (Florida). This variation will potentially enable more insights on
the argument that political officals and bureaucrats would attempt to shape policy based
upon individual policy preferences.
Political Appointees
All fifty states possess a political appointee at the top of the bureaucracy that
administers the brownfield program. Without interviewing and studying each state in
depth, understanding any small differences in changes in these political appointees as a
way of selecting cases is not feasible. However, besides being an interesting component
of the study of the cases individually, this aspect did enable and expand on the rationale
for selecting Indiana. As will be elaborated on in the following chapters, Indiana has a
very fragmented program where one large aspect of it falls into a quasi-governmental
authority with reporting requirements to a completely politically appointed board. This
will provide some interesting variation in this aspect.
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CHAPTER V
CASE STUDY PRESENTA nON

The implementation and administration of state level brownfield programs are
likely impacted by a multitude of things. Although this research cannot point to all the
potential influencers some valuable and significant contributions can come from this
research. As has been outlined in Chapter Four, state intervention into the remediation
and redevelopment of brownfields is both complex and widely diverse. Although the
overall database provides keen insights into this diversity, the in-depth interviews and
document review has enabled this research to go one step further in detailing the specific
complexities and the influences elected and non-elected officials can have on these
programs.
Drawing on the theories of political control and bureaucratic discretion, this
research is able to demonstrate some of the influences each have had on the
implementation and administration of the various brownfield programs. In each of the
case studies a number of key individuals were interviewed. Depending upon the state
and organization, the number of interviews conducted in each state differed. In Indiana a
total of seven interviews were conducted; in Nevada a total of five interviews were
conducted; and in Florida a total of nine interviews were conducted. These interviews
lasted anywhere from 45 minutes to two hours in length. In some cases interviews were
conducted more than once with the same individual as a result of new information and
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questions. The individuals being interviewed ranged from brownfield program heads to
political officials involved in the crafting of the enabling legislation. RCRA officials
were also interviewed in each state. Unfortunately in no state was the appointed official
in the overall department interviewed. These individuals were very reluctant to discuss
their jobs and the programs. However, unfortunate this lack of interview opportunity is,
the findings from these individuals are very worthwhile and significant. These appointed
department heads change with each administration, are located many offices above the
brownfield programs, and can likely provide little additional information on the programs
that is not able to be gleaned from the individuals interviewed. The individuals in the
administrative capacities of the programs provide keen insights concerning the impact, or
lack of, by the appointed head of the overall department or agency.
As outlined in Chapter Four these cases were selected for their variation on the
key components outlined in political control and bureaucratic discretion theories. These
cases represent three different EPA regions, varied environmental and economic
histories, and very different programs for their brownfields. This chapter records the
findings and specific details discovered during the interviews and document reviews; the
following chapter discusses these findings in relation to bureaucratic discretion,
legislative control, regulatory environment, and intergovernmental relations. In all cases
the names of the interviewees are intentionally omitted per an agreement of
confidentiality in return for the candid answers received for the interview questions.
Additionally, the job titles are omitted and replaced with job roles to provide more
obscurity to the individuals participating in these interviews. The three cases are
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presented individually in preparation for a synthesis and analysis in Chapter Six. The
following text outlines the findings for Indiana, Florida, and Nevada.
Recalling from the previous chapters, these states were selected for their variation
on several key points. Both Florida and Nevada show administrative unity, while Indiana
shows a greater level of fragmentation. All three states show a stark difference on their
regulatory issues as they relate to RCRA. Indiana possesses a PPA with the EPA for
their RCRA program, Nevada exhibits an extremely high level of RCRA inspections and
enforcements, and Florida shows a lower than national average inspection rate. Ideology
scores varied across the three states as well. Finally, all three states have been in
existence for several years allowing for a richer set of experiences than if they were
particularly new programs.

Indiana
Indiana is a state that has dealt with significant deindustrialization over the past
several decades. According to the United States Census Bureau the following reflects the
change in percentage of employment in manufacturing over the past three decades.

1970
1990
2000

Total Wage &
Salary
Employment
1,965,281
2,632,040
3,118,980

Manufacturing
Employment

Percentage

717,420
648,151
697,911

36%
25%
22%

Table 5.1: Source: US Census Bureau. NOTE: Classifications of industry changed in 1997,
discrepancy may exist in 2000 data as a result.

As the table indicates, from 1970 to 1990 Indiana experienced a sharp decline in
manufacturing. Employment in this industry dropped by over 36% in this thirty-year
period. Logically, this may be indicative of prevalence in brownfields within the state of
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Indiana. That is, as deindustrialization occurs brownfield sites are potentially left behind.
Over this same period Indiana experienced only a marginal growth in terms of population
change. Overall from 1970 to 2000 Indiana's population grew by about 17%. It is not
easy to assess what Indiana's brownfield situation may actually be. Even the officials
dealing with brownfields in the state admit: "A lot of people don't want it public that
their site is a brownfield and as a result we may never know it exists" (VRP
administrator, 11/9/2006).
Although making a clear and completely accurate statement surrounding the
potential applicable population for the public brownfield programs in Indiana is nearly
impossible, it is still fruitful to examine this program in this research. In response to the
known presence and potential presence of additional contaminated sites in their state the
policymakers created public programs directed at these properties. Indiana currently has
two major brownfield programs-the Voluntary Remediation Program (VRP) and the
Brownfields Program. The brownfield remediation and redevelopment efforts began in
earnest in 1993 when the state passed legislation creating IC 13-25-5 forming the
Voluntary Remediation Program (VRP) housed within the Indiana Department of
Environmental Management's Office of Land Quality. Alternatively, the Brownfields
Program as currently organized and functioning was created in 2005 with the passage of
Senate Enrolled Act 578. Each ofIndiana's two programs will be detailed in the
following sections. The findings from the Indiana RCRA program will also be detailed.

Indiana's VRP
The passage of the enabling legislation for the VRP made Indiana one of the first
states in the country to have a voluntary cleanup program. According to one elected
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official in the state legislature at the time of the creation of this program the VRP was at
least partially directed at the problems Indiana faced stemming from deindustrialization
in the state (Policy Maker #1. 11111/2006). The statutorily stated purpose of the Indiana
VRP is to: " ... provide an alternative procedure to assure compliance with the law and to
encourage the voluntary remediation of hazardous substances and petroleum" (IC 13-255 Sec la). The statutes creating the VRP are very broad and offer guidance concerning
the purpose of the program, eligibility for participation. appeal processes, fees, public
comments and notices, and other broad details concerning the work plan creation and
approval process. Although the statute allows for administrative rulemaking concerning
the implementation of this program, none are noted in the Indiana Administrative Code
and only guidance documents have been created, not formal rules.
This particular program is located in the Office of Land Quality in the Indiana
Department of Environmental Management. The Office of Land Quality encompasses a
variety of programs dealing with, " ... waste management, site cleanup or spill prevention"
(IDEM Office of Land Quality, 2007). Of note here is that the RCRA program is also
operated out of this same group of programs. Although all the programs within this
office have similar roles, the VRP administrator reports little overlap and day-to-day
working relationships between the various programs with the slight exception of RCRA.

We don't really work with any other program. Well, we have some sites that
overlap with RCRA the RCRA folks. There's a couple of different parts to
RCRA. One part of RCRA is called RCRA corrective action and we have some
RCRA corrective action sites that are completing their responsibilities to RCRA
through the VRP. So we probably have a half a dozen of those or so. On those
we will interact with RCRA staff pretty hard on those. But I would say in general
outside of those we don't really have that much interaction with the RCRA
program (VRP Administrator, 11/9/2006).
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The VRP program has eight project managers working in it. Like all the other
voluntary cleanup programs across the United States, Indiana's VRP provides a
mechanism for obtaining liability relief for completing a certain level of cleanup of a site.
Specifically, participants receive a Certificate of Completion (COC) leading to a
Covenant Not to Sue (CNTS) upon the completion of the cleanup. The chief
administrator in this program views the CNTS as the key benefit to this program:

... for our participants if they successfully conclude our process they get a
Covenant Not To Sue which relieves them of any environmental liability for
issues that were addressed in their project. So essentially the state says we will
not be coming after you for any future cleanup for anything you do in the VRP ....
Covenant not to sue and Certificate of Completion essentially goes together. And
when a site completes our process the agency, IDEM, issues the COC and then it
is the responsibility of our participant to record that certificate onto the property
deed just to show the work has been done. Then once they have done that they
automatically get the covenant not to sue. It is the only thing we offer. We don't
offer any other form of liability protection or different levels like some states
(VRP administrator, 11/9/2006).
An additional liability abatement assurance that goes with the CNTS is the fact
that Indiana possesses an MOA with the EPA for their VRP. As discussed in Chapter
Four Indiana's VRP possesses a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the EPA that
was signed in December 1995. This MOA certifies that the federal government will not
seek to intervene in sites that have successfully completed Indiana's VRP.

When a site in Indiana has been investigated or remediated in accordance with the
practices and procedures of the VRP and IDEM has issued a Certificate of
Completion for the site, Region V will not plan or anticipate any federal action
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980 (Brownfields and Voluntary Remediation Program MOA, 1995).
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In addition to CoC, CNTS, and the MOA the VRP in Indiana allow responsible
parties to participate and allows all participants to use risk based cleanups and
institutional controls:
... in fact most of them are responsible parties. They don't necessarily have to but
certainly that tends to be the biggest percentage of our sites. We do [allow
institutional controls]. We track them somewhat informally. One thing we do
require is that they have to be formalized through an environmental restrictive
covenant that gets recorded on the deed indicating which land use restrictions that
property has (VRP administrator, 1119/2006)

The VRP administrator also notes that reopeners are virtually unheard of but are allowed.
"Our assumption is that we issue closure and it is final" (VRP administrator, 1119/2006).
For sites entering the VRP a fee is required ofthem. In fact the VRP was
designed with intent to make it almost exclusively self-funded. "We associated a fee
with the program in order to help pay for, to make it almost entirely self sufficient to
cover the costs of the program and not rely on departmental budgets or appropriations"
(Policymaker #1, 11119/2006). According to the chiefVRP administrator:

Our program is primarily self-funded through cost recovery. We have an
agreement with all the sites in our program that they will reimburse us for our
time and effort for the management of their project. That doesn't account for
100% of our time but in terms of a budget it is difficult to say exactly. Weare
mostly self-funded. In addition to that since it is not possible to fill 100% of your
time we have an EPA grant we are part of and we get money from the EPA for
our work not specifically related to a project (VRP administrator, 1119/2006).

It is this cost recovery and lack of direct funding from the state that is cited as key to the
lack of any formal oversight or reporting mechanisms to state elected or appointed
officials. Both the elected officials and the administrators state that they do not have a
real relationship. "As far as any reporting to the legislature, governor, or towns-we
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don't have those requirements" (VRP Administrator, 11109/2006). Policy makers also
concede a lack of oversight and influence on this program. "We don't really get involved
with that program or anything on a real basis" (Policymaker #3,0113112006). In addition
to no real relationships with elected officials, the VRP also reports little to no relationship
or influence by appointed officials. In fact the VRP administrator reports little-or-no
noticeable changes upon changes of administration in relation to their appointed
commissioner ofIDEM (VRP Administrator, 11109/2006). In the hierarchy of the overall
department the appointed commissioner is at least three steps above the overall office that
houses the VRP.
Although the VRP seems to have little connection or oversight by Indiana
policymakers or elected officials, they are somewhat more connected to and constrained
by their EPA region. "We submit semi-annual reports to the EPA. We are required to
report what we have done with the funds they have given us" (VRP administrator,
1119/2006). Although the administrator of this program acknowledges reporting
requirements to the EPA he also goes further to explain the relationship is not a strong
one.
We have a MOU [MOA] with the EPA. For any site that completes a cleanup in
our program they will essentially not consider taking any action against those
sites. So essentially what that says is they have reviewed our program and like
what we are doing well enough to give us free reign to run it how we see fit and
they will not take any federal actions against those facilities. But they are not
really involved with us directly on a day to day basis in our projects. As far as the
regional office in Chicago a couple times a year we will go to a meeting. There is
usually a mid year and an end year meeting that we go to and talk about issues
related to brownfields and remediations projects. At the federal level we don't
have any contact at all and the regional level we have a very distant relationship"
(VRP administrator, 1119/2006).
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The Indiana VRP does not provide any financial assistance within its own
program. As the VRP administrator noted: "No [we do not provide financial assistance].
There are some tax incentives for cleanups. Our only real participation advantage is to
certify that the cleanup has been done. But we don't offer any sort of incentive
ourselves" (VRP administrator, 11109/2006).
To date this program has completed 190 brownfield sites with approximately 360
currently in the program (VRP administrator, 11109/2006). The administrator reports that
the most recent and biggest challenge with this program in his opinion is the prevalence
of sites that are eligible for the VRP but do not fit in really well. He explains:

We do find sometimes that there are sites that are eligible to participate in our
program that just don't fit in real well for one reason or another. For example,
landfills. And this is not the big municipal landfills you might imagine. But there
are a lot of old decades old abandoned landfills that will apply to our program.
And there are really pretty difficult to manage in terms of risk related to health
risks. So we just find sometimes that we have problematic sites that just don't fit
real well within the framework of the intention of the program. I think that when
it was first devised the legislature didn't really anticipate that we would be
looking at sites like landfills. But there's nothing in our statutes or process that
allows us to keep them from entering and participating in our program. So we are
sort of stuck with figuring out a way to evaluate those complex sites and make
sound and technical decisions on them" (VRP administrator, 11/9/2006).

Indiana Brownfields Program
Unlike Indiana's VRP, the Brownfield Program does not provide liability
protections to would-be redevelopers and is primarily directed at political subdivisions
and redevelopment agencies as opposed to a private developer or responsible party.
Although both programs facilitate the redevelopment ofbrownfields, both are voluntary,
both use risk based closure levels, and both issue closure documents- the mechanisms and

levels of protections offered are quite different across the two programs.
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"The Indiana Brownfields Program was created by 2005 legislation that merged
the brownfield technical review and fInancial review programs into one program"
(Indiana Brownfields Program Financial Incentives, 2006). "This merger and
reorganization was really aimed at making Indiana more responsive, efficient, and
customer friendly. Now one place has control over most of our fInancial programs.
Rather than go to multiple places and have competing offices, we have one" (Policy
Maker #2, 10/20/2006). Before this merger several small brownfield related programs
existed in IDEM. The new organization took all debt issuing programs and placed them
under one organization called the Indiana Finance Authority (IFA). Indiana's Public
Finance Director is appointed by the governor and is the chief of the IFA.
In the 2005 General Assembly, the Public Finance Director was given statutory
oversight of all state debt issuance and is the chief executive of the Indiana
Finance Authority (IFA), leading a staff of 50 and reporting to the IFA Board.
The IFA is the successor entity to the former Indiana Transportation Finance
Authority, the State Office Building Commission, the Recreational Development
Commission, the Indiana Development Finance Authority and the State
Revolving Fund Loan Programs (Biography of the Public Finance Director of the
State of Indiana, nd).
In addition to the Public Finance Director's role in the management of the IFA, it is also
managed by a board of five statutory individuals. These" ... members are the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, the Treasurer of the State, and three other
members appointed by the Governor. No more than two of the Governor's appointees
may be members of the same political party, and they all must be residents of the State"
(Indiana About IFA, 2006).
The legislation creating the Indiana Brownfields Program is much more detailed

than the VRP laws. Under the new legislation procedures for debt issuing are outlined in
great detail, explicitly who will serve on IFA's board of directors, and what funds can be
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used for what purpose. Administrative procedures are still being worked out for the new
organization in terms of the brownfields program. According to brownfield program
employees the IFA board provides some oversight but hasn't really impacted the day-today operations of the program as of yet. " ... there are monthly board meetings where
sometimes the brownfields program will present information or present grants to be
approved and things like that. But other than that we do not really have any real
relationship" (Brownfield Program Coordinator, 11106/2006). To the individuals
working in the Brownfields Program this reorganization is seen as a good thing. " ... it' s
been mostly positive. It helps make it a more efficient program. And with everyone
working together and in one location it is more unified and easier for people on the
outside to contact us and everyone seems to really like it" (Brownfield Coordinator,
11/06/2006). As of November 2006 the Brownfields Program employs twelve
individuals ranging from attorneys to geologists to biological scientists (brownfield
program coordinator, 11106/2006). The program does not yet maintain a solid tracking
system of sites going through the program but it is estimated that over 400 separate sites
have entered the Brownfields Program through the history of the technical assistance and
financial granting programs that existed before IFA was formed in 2005 .
. . .we have recently started to try and go out and get all of that information but it
is still in progress. So our problem is that a lot of times when people come to us,
they are coming to us looking for assessment money. Or sometimes some
cleanup money. But then we don't really know what they don't really keep in
touch with us as to when the project is redeveloped" (brownfield program
coordinator, 11106/2006).

Probably one of the biggest differences in the two programs comes with the type
of closure documents offered. While the VRP offers the CNTS, the Brownfields
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Program offers Comfort Letters and Site Status letters. These comfort and site status
letters do not actually offer any liability release-just a statement defining or easing the
concerns surrounding contamination at a site. Oftentimes the Brownfields Program is a
first stop for brownfield sites in Indiana. An individual working in the Indiana
Brownfields program notes that, " ... a lot of times sites will start in our programs and they
will find out that either through their bank or through the developer that wants a property
that they need a higher level of liability protection than what we offer in this program. So
then they go over to the Voluntary Remediation Program" (brownfields program
coordinator, 11106/2006).
The brownfield program's guidance indicates that the Brownfields Program is
more geared towards redevelopment while the VRP is geared towards environmental
remediation. "Brownfields Program's main goal is to provide government guidance
assistance for the assessment, cleanup and redevelopment or reuse of properties to
revitalize communities. VRP's main goal is to provide government oversight of privately
conducted remediation projects" (Crosswalk Brownfields Program Document, 2006).
Unlike the VRP which had no direct financial aspect, Indiana's Brownfield Program has
a number of financial incentives.
Most ofthe financial incentives offered by the Brownfields Program are reserved
for municipalities, counties, or redevelopment agencies. In some cases a private party
can be a co-applicant, but a public entity must be part of the application. Financial
incentives noted include: Site assessment grants, remediation grants, petroleum
remediation grants, low-interest loans, and tax credits. The low-interest loan program
allows for a municipality, county, or redevelopment agency to re-Iend to a private
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individual. In whole the Brownfield Program individuals indicate that the reorganization
and merger's details are still being worked out. " ... we are constantly reevaluating our
new program and structure and how we respond to the needs of the public since we are
still newly reorganized and still in that stage of constantly evaluating how we are doing"
(brownfields program coordinator, 11106/2006). However, they feel that they are able to
offer more streamlined services to Indiana's communities.
Although program officials and political officials interviewed do not indicate a
strong monitoring of this program, the EPA regional office does require reporting
concerning the grants that the program receives from them. This program indicates a
strong relationship with the region in terms of communication. " ... we communicate with
them for many things. For example, we had a workshop on November 2nd to help send
the applicants to the federal grant round that is going on right now and our Region V
person Deborah Orr came down and gave a presentation" (brownfields program
coordinator, 11106/2006).
Overall the Brownfields Program's goals are to get publicly held brownfields
remediated and ultimately redeveloped. However, they have not yet been able to
determine the impact they are having in Indiana. With the newly organized program the
impacts and day to day operations are still in flux and program employees are still
working out the kinks from the reorganization.
ReRA in Indiana

Given the logical connection between RCRA inspections and enforcements and
brownfields interviews in all states included officials in that state's RCRA program.
Indiana's ReRA program's duties are located within the Office of Land Quality of
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IDEM, the same office where the VRP is located. Within the Office of Land Quality is a
multimedia office with four sections: air enforcement; water enforcement; solid waste,
underground storage tanks, leaking underground storage tanks, and confined feedings;
and a section that does hazardous waste and industrial waste enforcement (RCRA
enforcement, 10/1412006).
Indiana has an Environmental Performance Partnership Agreement (EnPPA) with
the EPA concerning its RCRA program. "It is an agreement we have in order to get
funding grants from the EPA. A certain percentage of our program is actually funded by
the EnPPA grant. It has some fairly specific measures we have agreed to" (RCRA
compliance, 12/05/2006). Basically this agreement requires a specific percentage of the
various RCRA regulated facilities be inspected annually. This percentage is determined
through negotiations and agreements between the EPA Region and the State. Although
the percentage of facilities to be inspected is detailed in this agreement, the staff selects
which of the actual facilities will be inspected. For the negotiated percentage the
employees look back at what previous inspections have been done and choose facilities
that have gone the longest without an inspection. It usually comes to a five year
frequency (RCRA compliance, 12/05/2006). The inspections are not announced in
advance to the facilities being inspected.
If the inspectors find a violation they have some discretion in what the
enforcement route will be. "When they [the inspectors] find violations ifthey are pretty
minor they will not refer them to my office. They will take care of it on site or in a
follow up inspection" (RCRA enforcement, 10114/2006). However, if the inspector finds
a violation that he or she feels is serious enough to warrant a more formal enforcement
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measure they will be referred to the enforcement office within the Office of Land
Quality.
The enforcement office in Indiana has six case managers. When a violation is
referred to them the case manager will take over.
We have pretty much two enforcement routes that we do. We can do a violation
letter. Which all it is, is a letter that says there are the violations that we found
and generally you have thirty days to make corrections and submit documentation
showing it has been corrected. There's no civil penalty or anything. That is
really the minority of our cases. Most of those kinds of things are handled with
the inspector themselves. We do some of those that we feel are a little more
severe but don't really warrant a penalty. If a problem is not corrected after a
violation letter or if the violation is more severe to begin with, we can issue a
notice of violation. At this point we are trying to reach an agreed order that
would include injunctive relief and civil penalty (RCRA Enforcement,
10114/2006).

During the enforcement process it is possible that the appointed head of IDEM can be
involved. " ... most of our cases are done through the notice of violation and agreed order
process that the commissioner does not get involved with. However, sometimes a
respondent or their attorney will want to discuss it with the commissioner and so the
commissioner would meet with them. That does happen fairly often" (RCRA
enforcement, 10/14/2006).
The RCRA enforcement process in Indiana frequently involves elected and
appointed officials. In addition to the likelihood that the commissioner will be called
upon to discuss a case with a violator after receiving a notice of violation, one of the
biggest penalties in the enforcement process is called a Commissioner's Order.

We have a fairly successful rate in getting agreed orders negotiated. However, if
we can't get it resolved we go to what is called a Commissioner's Order. This
basically recites the issues in the notice of violation. However, there have been
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different administrations when it is difficult to issue those commissioner's orders.
So when we tell a company that they need to enter into an agreed order and they
are refusing and we make the threat that we will go to the next step of the
commissioner's order. It is kinda frustrating when we can't get those issued. And
there's been a real difference across administrations in their willingness to issue
commissioner's orders. I think the word gets out that all the people outside know
we won't issue a commissioner's order (RCRA enforcement, 10114/2006).

Although it is very apparent that political influences exist in the enforcement or penalty
process of RCRA, the inspection to ensure compliance side of RCRA does not note such
strong influences. RCRA compliance officials note that: "It is not unusual to get requests
or complaints that are funneled through different politicians. But we don't have any
functional relationship" (RCRA compliance, 12/05/2006).
In addition to the involvement by the commissioner acting on behalf of the
governor, the EPA has some level of involvement in the enforcement process of RCRA
in Indiana. However, this involvement is fairly minimal. " ... ifthere's some case that for
some reason we would prefer EPA to do the enforcement we will refer it to them. That
rarely happens though. EPA also does a small number of inspections annually, I think
six. If they find a violation in one of those inspections they would also do the
enforcement" (RCRA enforcement, 10114/2006).
RCRA enforcement officers note that the EPA provides guidance and a definition
concerning what constitutes a significant non-complier but they are in charge of doing the
actual determination of whether a violator falls into that category. "There's some
guidance on significant non-compliance status that requires a certain penalty. However,
we have actually do most of the determination of what level of violation we consider the
offense to be" (RCRA enforcement, 10/14/2006).
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RCRA officials note that they are involved in determining financial assurance and
post closure inspections. " ... we do some post closure inspections ... we have an
individual on staff that we call our financial assurance officer and he is dedicated to
financial assurance reviews" (RCRA compliance, 12/05/2006). The financial assurance
and closure aspects of RCRA are connected to brownfields and some level of discretion
is involved in this aspect of RCRA.

Indiana Overall
Indiana's brownfield remediation and redevelopment efforts are channeled
through two different programs. The VRP is the standard voluntary cleanup type
program offering investors, developers, and responsible parties' liability relief in return
for participation. This liability relief includes relief from both further cleanups and from
3rd Party lawsuits (3 rd Party relief only for non-responsible parties). The program is
funded through EPA grants and cost recovery. Although they are statutorily constrained

in that they cannot deny certain sites entry even when they do not fit well into the
program they indicate they are pretty autonomous in their functioning. The Indiana
Brownfields Program declares itself an economic development program, however, its
primary function seems to be providing funds to public entities in order to assess and
cleanup some sites in Indiana. The Brownfields Programs, in theory is subject to a great
amount of oversight by state officials on how they spend money and operate; however,
the program is still very new and underdeveloped.
RCRA in Indiana is far more impacted by political officials than are the
brownfield programs. In fact in terms of RCRA enforcement, a politically appointed
official can actually prevent ReRA administrators from issuing the highest enforcement
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order. A key connection from RCRA to the brownfields programs is that a RCRA
facility can complete a RCRA corrective action order under the VRP. This is not the case
in every state.
Florida
Florida's brownfield program was created in 1997 with the passage of the
Brownfields Redevelopment Act. Elected officials involved in the creation of this
legislation cited two primary concerns that led them to believe Florida needed such a
program: cost of cleanup and environmental justice issues. "You know we wanted some
incentive system that would help or I guess keep Florida from having to pay the bill for
these cleanups. We figured it would be less expensive to give incentives than it would be
to just pay for the cleanup. You know also there is a real racial aspect to brownfields. So
many of them are in minority areas that the state really has a duty to do something to help
that to remedy that" (Policymaker #2, 10/2112006). News articles at the time also reflect
an environmental justice aspect to the program's creation. "The Florida proposal was
sparked by a report that showed nine of every 10 of 9,000 known Brownfield sites were
in low-income and minority communities" (Christenson, 1997). In fact these same
justice sentiments are echoed in the legislative intent aspect of the Act along with several
other issues related to brownfields.
The statute is very specific about the intent. The key legislative intentions in the
statute are as follows: to reduce public health and environmental hazards on existing
commercial and industrial sites; alleviate blight; to encourage voluntary cleanup through
incentives; to provide clear and predictable remediation standards; to allow risk based
cleanups; to address the prevalence of environmental hazards in low income and minority
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areas; to potentially reduce neighborhood decline; and to provide for cooperation across
governments and organizations (Florida's Brownfield Redevelopment Act, 1997). The
statute is also very specific about the roles, duties, and requirements of the program
explicitly outlining the processes and methods for entering into and completing the
program.
One interesting and potentially unique aspect of Florida's Brownfield Program
was created within the statute itself by then-elected policymakers.

A local government with jurisdiction over the brownfield area must notify the
department of its decision to designate a brownfield area for rehabilitation for the
purposes of ss. 376.77-376.85. The notification must include a resolution, by the
local government body, to which is attached a map adequate to clearly delineate
exactly which parcels are to be included in the brownfield area or alternatively a
less-detailed map accompanied by a detailed legal description of the brownfield
area. If a property owner within the area proposed for designation by the local
government requests in writing to have his or her property removed from the
proposed designation, the local government shall grant the request (Florida's
Brownfield Redevelopment Act, 1997).

As of the writing of this dissertation this is the only state where participation by the local
government is statutorily required to designate a brownfield area as a precursor to
participation in the program. Both elected officials and non-elected administrators
concur on the purpose of this designation. "We didn't want the local governments to feel
like the state was interfering in their rights and responsibilities" (Policymaker #1,
09/15/2006). "The local government designation is very interesting. But I think that was
very intentional on the legislature'S part at the time. There was a big concern that there
was, well there was a lot of voices down there at the time it was being developed that said
we want to make sure that the local government doesn't have this shoved down their
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throats" (brownfields program administrator, 09/20/2006). As of February 5, 2007 there
were approximately 145 designated areas in the state of Florida encompassing a total of
78,198 acres of designated brownfield area (Florida Brownfield Areas, 2007). This entire
acreage is not necessarily brownfields given the fact that many Florida localities
designate blocks, census tracts, or other larger areas that encompass both brownfields and
uncontaminated land. As of February 6, 2007 a total of85 sites had executed
remediation agreements with the program with a total of 1,827 acres being included
(Florida's Sites with executed BSRA's). The sites with remediation agreements actually
encompass the brownfields part of the property in the designated areas making this an
accurate acreage of brownfields, unlike the previous measure.
This requirement of local government participation has not been without conflicts.
In fact brownfield program officials and news articles demonstrate one interesting and
recent conflict concerning the program and the designation.
It's allover the paper in St. Augustine. They just designated one in St. Augustine.
It was a historic golf course that the city was not able to purchase and the folks in
the area wanted it to stay a golf course. But it turns out that there was some
arsenic contamination that required cleanup. But there was some issue about
whether the developer should be able to use cleanup tax credits. Really, it
appeared that there were some people who just didn't want it to become a housing
development and they were using many different types of ways to try and block it.
I fielded a lot of calls on that one. It just got designated on November thirteenth I
think" (brownfields program manager, 1111512006).

Now, Stokes [developer] is trying to join the state's Brownfields Redevelopment
Program, an initiative to encourage development as a way to clean polluted
grounds. He could generate up to $500,000 in tax credits for a cleanup many
people feel he should do without the financial assistance. Mayor George Gardner
is one of them. "He went in knowing that it was an area that needed to be cleaned
up. He started cleaning it up," Gardner said. "The Brownfields act, which is an
excellent act, is meant for cleanup of industrial land that no developer wants to

touch. This could be used as a golf course. It's not a gas plant or an oil refinery."
A local resolution supporting Stokes' Brownfields request is required before the
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state Department of Environmental Protection considers designating the former
Ponce de Leon, a Brownfields site (Hunt, 2006)
However contentious this particular situation was most officials in elected and
bureaucratic positions associated with the brownfields program feel that the designation
is a good thing that encourages and fosters local participation. In fact" ... an individual
can request an individual property be designated a brownfield area and for most of the
ones that have occurred this year they have been for individual properties rather than a
specific part of town" (brownfields program manager, 09/2012006). Public participation
was a key consideration when the program was created. "We wanted to encourage
people to have a say in the process. You know to get involved. We wrote it so that at
least one public comment session was required for a site or area to be designated" (Policy
Maker #1,09/15/2006).
After the creation of this program in 1997 the Florida Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP) was charged with implementing the program. The DEP
has a very vertical organization. The office that controls the Brownfields Program is at
least 6 levels away from the appointed Secretary of the DEP. Specifically, within the
DEP the Bureau of Waste Cleanup oversees the program. The Bureau of Waste
Management is located under the regulatory programs branch of the Department-the
same branch that oversees the RCRA program. Within that Bureau the program has three
individuals working directly in the program. There is also one person who oversees the
Voluntary Cleanup Tax Credit program.
All programs located in the regulatory branch of the DEP have what are termed
regulatory districts. There are six of these districts across the state. Each district has its
own office that deals with brownfield issues in their designated areas. "We are organized
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into six districts and there is a brownfields coordinator in each district. Their
responsibilities have to do with technical implementation once sites enter the program,
assessment, and remediation. They are there to help the properties get through the
process" (brownfields program manager, 09/2012006).
Liability Provisions
Florida's brownfield program is similar to other states' voluntary cleanup
programs, although it is not formally called that. Upon the completion of an agreed upon
cleanup a voluntary participant receives a No Further Action letter indicating that:

Based upon the information provided by (property owner) concerning property
located at (address), it is the opinion of (the Florida Department of Environmental
Protection or approved local pollution control program) that (party) has
successfully and satisfactorily implemented the approved brownfield site
rehabilitation agreement schedule and, accordingly, no further action is required
to assure that any land use identified in the brownfield site rehabilitation
agreement is consistent with existing and proposed uses (Florida's Brownfield
Redevelopment Act, 1997)
rd

This liability protection does not extend to 3rd Party lawsuits. The only 3 party
protection Florida offers is an assurance that 3rd Parties cannot litigate to force additional
cleanup. However, participants in the Florida Brownfields Program do also enjoy the
added liability protections associated with an EPA MOA for the program. Florida's
MOA was originally signed in December 1999 and was renegotiated to allow for a wider
eligibility in sites participating in the program in November 2005. Florida does not allow
a responsible party to enter into the Brownfields Program and receive any liability
protections or incentives if the contamination was caused after 1997.
The state of Florida allows and encourages risk based cleanups and the use of
institutional controls. " ... originally when the brownfields rule was passed in 1997 it was
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one of the few ways a site could use RBCA in Florida. Since that we have passed a
RBCA rule that pretty much encompasses all sites in Florida. Yes [we allow Institutional
Controls] and we have a registry that is available online and it tracks any of these controls
that might be used" (Brownfields Manager, 09/20/2006).
Although the statute creating the program includes a lengthy list of possible
incentives to be created for the remediation and redevelopment of brownfields under this
program, the actual state level incentives stemming from the Brownfield Program itself
are very few. There are not any real grants associated with the program:

We do not offer any grants. We do have one through an EPA grant and we offer
grants in services to successful applicants. For example, we are working with a
mission over in Jacksonville that is trying to build a group home and they need
soil removal done. We are going to be conducting the soil removal with one of
our own contractors so we don't actually give grants but provide services
sometimes (brownfields program manager, 09/20/2006).

Additionally the state does not have a revolving loan fund. Although it is noted that
several Florida cities have their own revolving loan fund capitalized by the EPA. The
one major financial incentive that Florida does offer is a Voluntary Cleanup Tax Credit
Program (VCTC). Both sites in the brownfields program as well as certain dry cleaning
sites that cannot participate in the state dry cleaning program are eligible for these tax
credits. In 2006 these tax credits were increased substantially to provide for up to
$500,000 in tax credits as well as enable responsible parties to access the benefit
(Florida's Voluntary Cleanup Tax Credit). Department guidance is still being worked on
and little can be said yet about these changes. " ... we are all working on rule changes
based on legislative activity this year" (brownfields program manager, 09/20/2006).
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Although the actual Brownfield Program as located in the Department of
Environmental Protection a separate agency called the Florida Department of Tourism,
Trade, and Economic Development offers several brownfield related economic
development incentives. Brownfield properties are eligible for: Loan Guarantees and
bonuses for jobs created through the aforementioned economic development agency.
Additionally, brownfields are eligible for sales and use tax exemptions for building
materials through the Department of Revenue in Florida. Virtually all of these incentives
located in other agencies are incentives that existed without reference to brownfields and
have subsequently been altered or have decided to allow and to include brownfield
redevelopments in their potential beneficiaries.
Unlike all of the other states with voluntary cleanup programs, there is no fee to
enter the Florida Brownfields Program. "There is not a fee to the department. We don't
charge a fee to enter the program or to review documents. The only fee associated with
brownfields in Florida is a $250 application fee for the tax credits" (brownfields program
manager, 09/2012006). This program is instead funded partially by the state and partially
by EPA funds.
Brownfield program administrators indicate that they are quite impacted by
appointed officials following guidance from the governor. "The department has an
agenda that is spelled out very specifically by the secretary and we just had a change of
administration and we are getting a new governor so we will likely get a new agenda next
year. Our primary job is to implement what we are given by the legislature and we make
changes when we get new rules from them" (brownfields program manager, 09/20/2006).
The program officials also indicate that as administrations change so does their
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involvement with elected officials. In addition to having strict guidance about how the
program is to be administered, the program also is required to file an annual report with
the state. In this report they are required to detail all their activities for the year including
cleanup agreements, economic impacts, economic expenditures, and designated sites.
In addition to oversight and monitoring relationships with elected officials the
program also reports to the EPA.
We talk to them [EPA] quite a bit. We have one brownfields grant and we have
one of the state tribal response grants and we have chosen to keep this separate
from administering the program so I talk to them a lot about that grant. You
know some states use the state tribal response grants to actually administer their
programs, we don't do that. We do have a MOA for CERCLA and RCRA so they
don't really override what we do, but we interface with them a lot concerning the
money they give us (brownfields program manager, 09120/2006).

Florida's ReRA
Florida's RCRA program is also located in the regulatory branch of the DEP.
This program is divided into six districts just like all the other programs in the regulatory
branch of the DEP. Brownfield program officials acknowledge a connection between the
two programs. "I just sent an email to them [RCRA employees] about a site that is under
RCRA cleanup that entered our program. That is sort of a new thing that is something
that was added to our MOA during the revision. You didn't used to be able to use the
Brownfields program if you were in RCRA cleanup, now you can" (brownfields program
manager, 09/20/2006).
Florida's RCRA program does not have a PPA with the EPA. As a result the
RCRA manager explains how sites are selected for inspection:
We negotiate a work plan with EPA Region IV to outline minimum inspections
for the year. If you look at the OECA guidance [EPA guidance on inspections]

we follow the suggested usual drill of about half of the permitted facilities are
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inspected in any year and a percentage of the other facilities (RCRA manager,
1110212006).

In addition to the negotiated work plan with the EPA region the EPA conducts a small
number of inspections in the state.
An interesting aspect, with potential ramifications, is the abilities and duties of the
six districts in Florida. Each of the six districts in Florida have the power to enforce and
sign enforcement letters in the field (RCRA Field Manager, 11103/2006). "Each of the
five major environmental programs we have out there each of the DDMs [field managers]
are authorized by the secretary to manage the day to day compliance enforcement. If it is
a big enough issue or concern, like the Everglades, it is actually handled out of the
Secretary's Office" (RCRA manager, 11102/2006). It is also noted that the central RCRA
office does very few enforcements in the field-with each of the six districts handling
most of the RCRA processes on actual facilities.
Funding in the RCRA program is cited as the biggest concern. " ... well the
biggest thing is dollars to run the program. We are on a combination of EPA grants and
general revenue. The EPA grants just have not increased in the last several years and our
share of the program has gone up. So where before we may have only been paying for
55% of the program now it's crept up towards 60%" (RCRA manager, 11102/2006).
Although the program reports to and works closely with the EPA regional office,
the program officials site very little interaction with elected or appointed officials. "The
secretary's office has reporting requirements, but not for the RCRA program per se.
Sometimes something might get passed by the legislation that says they want a report in x
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months. Then we will compile that report and submit it but we have to coordinate with a
legislative office the department has" (RCRA manager, 11102/2006).

Florida Overall
Florida has only one brownfield program that follows the typical voluntary
cleanup structure seen across the United States. Brownfield exclusive financial
incentives are very minimal, but the program has adopted a number of economic
development incentives for their own program. The brownfields program and the elected
officials in Florida both indicate that the program has specific guidance both written in
statute and given to them by the Secretary on an annual basis.
Both the brownfields program and the RCRA program are organized into six
districts with powers delegated to each district over various aspects of the programs. In
the case of the brownfields program the districts only guide participants through the
process. However, in the RCRA program the districts actually perform inspections and
enforcements of facilities. These RCRA districts then report back to the central RCRA
office in Tallahassee which in turn handles any EPA, EPA region, or state involvement.
Additionally, the Secretary's office handles all of the big environmental concerns, like
the Everglades-thereby bringing certain properties closer to appointed and elected
officials.
The Brownfields Program's requirement of a local government delegation of a
brownfield area facilitates a greater level of public participation than might otherwise be
achieved. This greater level of public participation has contributed to some pretty
contentious issues in the recent past. This requirement not only encourages public

participation but it also allows local officials a say in the brownfield process.
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Nevada

Nevada's efforts at brownfield remediation and redevelopment started in earnest
in 1999 and include two separate programs: The Nevada Brownfields Program also called
the Land Recycling Program, and the Nevada Voluntary Cleanup Program (VCP). Both
programs are located within the Bureau of Corrective Actions within the Nevada
Department of Environmental Protection. The bureau of corrective action:
... oversees cleanup of releases of regulated substances using a multi-media (air,
water, soil, and ecological resources) approach. The bureau also administers the
environmental response program, superfund and brownfields programs, a
reimbursement fund for petroleum claims, and a certification program for
environmental consultants" (Nevada Bureau of Corrective Actions Home).
Nevada's RCRA program is located in the Bureau of Waste Management in the Nevada
Department of Environmental Protection. These programs were once in the same bureau.
"We used to be in the same bureau. I believe ten years ago the bureau of waste
management and the bureau of corrective action were the same. Now the bureau of waste
management does primarily RCRA" (VCP Manager, 01124/2007). Both of Nevada's
brownfield programs are very small and underdeveloped in many ways.
The Land Recycling ProgramiBrownfields Program
Although program officials in both brownfield related programs admit the
programs are small, the Nevada Land Recycling Program (LRP) is the more active
program of the two. This program is also called the Nevada Brownfields Program. The
program was created in 1999 as grant program for Nevada public entities (Brownfields
Coordinator, 01103/2007). This program relies solely on funding from the EPA and does
not receive any support from the state of Nevada. "The State of Nevada has received

federal funds intended for use in encouraging brownfields redevelopment; the Nevada's
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Land Recycling Program manages these funds for use in a holistic approach to
redevelopment where environmental concerns may be present as a barrier" (Nevada Land
Recycling Program). To date this program has helped cleanup 25 sites in the state of
Nevada and employs only one individual directly for all oversight and administration of
the program.
The LRP receives approximately $600,000 annually from the EPA in the form of
CERCLA 128a funding to administer the program and give out grants to public entities.
Each year Nevada has up to $400,000 of that total to award to grant seekers for
brownfield projects. The main goal of this program is to just give out as much of that
money as possible (brownfields coordinator, 01103/2007). The grants they award pay for
everything for site assessments to the actual cleanup of contamination (brownfields
coordinator,01l03/2007). The LRP also has a revolving loan fund capitalized with EPA
funds. To date the RLF has not completed any loans. " ... we have not had any success
with the revolving loan fund. As of yet we have not given out even one loan in the life of
the grant" (Brownfields Coordinator, 01103/2007)
The program official and policymakers alike do not report a substantial
connection by elected or appointed officials on this program. "Our department head is
appointed, but he oversees the entire department .... he is way up there. He doesn't have
any day to day conflicts or participation in our program .... My program is a grant
program and I do not run off of state funding so they do not really involve themselves
with my program" (brownfields coordinator, 01103/2007). "The EPA handles most of the
oversight and monitoring of that program. It's their money you know" (Policymaker #1,
January 24, 2007).
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As was the case in the other two states, this program reports an oversight and
reporting relationship with their EPA region. "We have quarterly reports and quarterly
meetings. We get along quite well" (brownfields coordinator, 01103/2007).
Nevada Voluntary Cleanup Program
Nevada's Voluntary Cleanup Program was created in 1999 through the state
legislature. This program offers a similar structure as compared to the other state VCPs
where a voluntary party can obtain a liability release from the state for completing a
cleanup of a property. Nevada has:
... established cleanup requirements for soil and groundwater that has been
contaminated with hazardous substances or petroleum products. Sites requiring
cleanup are usually identified through property transfer assessments or reports of
contamination from the owners of a property or the general public. The owners of
the property are required to remediate the property to State cleanup standards until
the State determines that No Further Action will be required" (Nevada Voluntary
Cleanup Program Fact Sheet).

The state cleanup process that is separate from the VCP allows for an end-use appropriate
cleanup level, although they do not specifically use RBCA as formally defined. A
property that is cleaned up under a state required cleanup does not offer any legal release
ofliability. Conversely, the VCP " ... provides a means of giving permanent relief of
liability to owners of a property where a cleanup is conducted ... " (Nevada Voluntary
Cleanup Program Fact Sheet).
The Nevada VCP charges an oversight fee to participants. This fee is varied and
is determined on a case by case basis. Although the program has been in place since
1999 only one site has entered the program and that site has not completed the cleanup
yet. This one site is the University of Nevada at Reno-a state owned facility. The VCP
supervisor reports that, "1 honestly think the main reason it is part of the VCP is because
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the university has an academic interest in the program" (Vep supervisor, 0112412007).
The program's supervisor feels that individuals do not enter the vep because:
The RP's do not take advantage of the program because they are happy with our
regular cleanup process. Our state process. vep gives them a little more liability
protection and so far most folks don't feel like they need that. The big
disadvantage of this program is that we charge for our oversight (Vep Supervisor,
01124/2007).

The vep program's supervisor is also in charge of the Nevada Superfund
Program, the overall brownfields program, an environmental assistance program directed
at outreach to rural parts of the state concerning emergency responses, and the revolving
loan fund. All of these programs combined have a total of four employees. Only the
environmental assistance position is funded through state appropriations, with the
remaining three positions being funded through EPA grants. The brownfield programs
cumulatively do not receive any appropriations from the state. "We are very proud of
that" (Vep supervisor, 01124/2007).
The vep supervisor reports no real oversight or monitoring relationships with the
state elected or appointed officials. However, he does note that, " ... we have to report to
the environmental response committee how many spill calls we get and how we
responded. And then we have performance requirements tied to the biennial budget we
do. Like we may have a question of how many brownfield sites did the program have in
the last two years? Then we would answer that as a way of showing our performance,
but they don't really hold us accountable for much" (Vep supervisor, 01124/2007).
The vep in Nevada also reports a strong tie to the EPA region.
Our relationship is really good, but overall there is some friction between the state
and the federal EPA in general. But as far as the programs I work with we have a
lot of programs that we grant money. We have one superfund site and the EPA
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has given us complete control over that site. We have a lot of terms and
conditions with the grants we receive. We have some paperwork and bean
counting that goes along with getting money" (VCP supervisor, 01/24/2007).

ReRA in Nevada
Nevada's RCRA program was noted as being exceptionally high in the number of
inspections conducted as compared to the other 49 states in the overall state database.
What was not able to be captured in the quantitative values in the database is an
explanation for this high level of inspections. This illustrates evidence of why qualitative
inquiry is necessary at times.

We have an agreement with our two largest counties by population, Washoe
County which is Reno and Clark County which is Las Vegas. We basically have
a contract with the local health departments to do inspections. They do the real
small ones. They get paid about $250 an inspection. They do about 75 a quarter.
So that's 600 annually. They really pull up our numbers. We just don't have the
staff time or resources to do that (RCRA supervisor, 02/28/2007).

Although this contractual relationship for inspecting the smaller facilities partially
explains the high level of inspections in Nevada, other components of the program are
pivotal to Nevada's inspection rate. The final sites to be inspected are determined
through a negotiation with the EPA region. "The state has committed to inspection of all
of our large quantity generators annually and all of our small quantity generators every
other year. We do a lot more than the EPA holds us to. They want us to do something
like 25% annually" (RCRA supervisor, 02/28/2007).
RCRA program officials and policymakers report little oversight or involvement
with their program by state elected or appointed officials. "The only time we ever have a
political influence is when they are asking us to look at something specific, like a
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complaint. We are not a very large state" (RCRA Supervisor, 02/28/2007). "We have
little involvement there" (Policymaker #2,02113/2007).
Nevada Overall
Nevada has strict requirements that any property with a known hazardous
contamination on their property must clean it up to their state mandated standards. At
the end of the general state cleanup process individuals are given No Further Action
letters that carry no liability protections. Only one individual has accessed the VCP and
only 25 public entities have received grants from the LRP-making both of these
programs very small. All of Nevada's Brownfield programs are entirely funded by the
EPA and as such policymakers and program officials report little connection between
state elected or appointed officials and the program. Another cited reason for the lack of
oversight by the state legislature is the fact that Nevada's legislature is only in session
ever other year-not giving them a lot of opportunity to monitor or oversee the programs.
The EPA provides oversight and monitoring requirements for all the programs.
However, that oversight tends to be directly tied to the funding received.
Initially Nevada appeared to be very heavy in terms of regulatory nature by virtue
of their reported inspections and enforcements in EPA's ECHO database. However, this
number is inflated through a delegated process of inspections to local health departments.
Although this fact explains the high level of inspection and enforcement reporting,
Nevada still appears to be heavy in terms of regulation of environmental harms. In terms
of RCRA the program has set the bar much higher than the EPA requires them to.
State law dictates that any release or known contamination by a hazardous
substance is required to be cleaned up to state standards. The oversight for this process is
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free and funded by the state. The VCP is not free, but provides real liability relief for the
contamination. It is possible that with a heavy regulatory environment and booming
economy properties do not often make it to the point of brownfields to enter into these
programs.
All Three States
Looking across the three case studies, we have seen a great deal of variation. We
have seen a state plagued by deindustrialization with two relatively successful programs
that help private and public entities. We have seen a state where the lower governments
and public participation is pivotal, allowing for both public and private entities to
participate. We have also seen a very small underdeveloped program that receives all of
its funds from the EPA and has only helped a total of 26 sites-all public entities.
Across these three states are a multitude of financial offerings ranging from EPA
grant funded assessment and cleanup money to state tax credits and loan guarantees.
Two of the states show money available only to public entities, while one has money
available for everyone with few restrictions on whether the entity is public or private.
We have seen two programs using the entirety of its CERCLA 128a funds for grants to
public entities and for administration of the program; and one where it is used to offer
grants-in-services to communities and non-profits. We have seen two states with
revolving loan funds and one without.
We have seen a varied RCRA environment in the three states. One with very
high levels of inspection and enforcements-in fact much higher than the EPA requires
them to perform. We have seen a state with an agreement with the EPA that spells out

the percentages they must reach in inspections. Finally, we have seen a very
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decentralized RCRA program where six districts each have their own decision making
and inspection discretion-although the percentages of each type of facility is determined
at the central state level through negotiations with the EPA region. Across these three
states we have seen a state who has always allowed RCRA facilities to utilize their
voluntary cleanup program for RCRA corrective actions; one that has recently allowed
them to do so; and one where they cannot use the VCP for RCRA corrective action.
The overall diversity, complexities, and relationships across these states is very
striking and provides some interesting questions about state level brownfield efforts. The
following chapter will delve into discussion of what lessons we might gain from the
database and these case studies as well as provide some insights into what this data may
mean in the bigger picture.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The research agenda for this dissertation involved two distinct goals. The first
goal was to determine what the fifty states are doing in the quest to remediate and
redevelop their brownfields. Taken alone, this is a significant contribution to the
literature on brownfields, because the data currently available is unreliable,
underdeveloped, and incomplete. The database described in Chapter Four, and partially
presented in the Appendices, is the product of this research. The size of this database
prevents presentation in this printed document, however, as stated in Chapter Four, it is
available online. The second research goal of this dissertation included taking a closer
look at three specific state programs while adding to and expanding upon bureaucratic
discretion and legislative control theories. This is accomplished through an in-depth
comparative case study of three individual states. As was pointed out in Chapter Two,
this dissertation seeks to use the more complex state level government as a vehicle for
informing these theories, which at this time are primarily concentrated on the federal
government. Part of the complexities at the state level is the interdependence between
other state level programs and agencies as well as federal level programs and agencies.
This chapter draws on the themes discovered in this research to critically assess the two
overarching research goals of this project. First, some findings and conclusions are
presented concerning the overall data on the fifty states sometimes supplemented with
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findings from the cases. Following the discussion of the fifty states, the theories of
bureaucratic discretion and political control concerning the case studies are discussed.
This chapter also includes some policy recommendations and overarching conclusions.

What have the "laboratories of democracy" taught us?
One potential key to the goal of remediation and redevelopment of hrownfields is
to enable and foster an effective public effort. Understanding the differences across the
fifty laboratories of democracy and what can be learned from these differences is a
valuable lesson in policy. To be sure, each state has a different set of resources, level of
brownfield problem, and desires to remediate these properties-however, with public
investment into these programs growing each year, it is wise to take a moment and learn
a little more about what is being done across the states and what implications these
programs may have.
The database has shown that liability concerns and financial costs of redeveloping
brownfields across the states have been handled in a diverse, sometimes unequal, way.
The database also shows unique differences in state level RCRA program enforcement
and compliance. Questions posited in Chapter One included: How, if at all, does the
regulatory environment of a state influence their brownfield program? What can the
states learn from each other? Are there any commonalities across the fifty states that are
interesting to the quest for remediation and redevelopment of brownfields? Drawing
from the themes discovered in this database enables this analysis to discuss these
questions.
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Regulation
The data gathered in the fifty state database shows interesting and striking
differences in the numbers of inspections at RCRA regulated facilities. As was detailed
in Chapter Four an examination of the entire universe ofRCRA regulated facilities
reveals some states with extremely low inspection rates and some states with relatively
high inspection rates. Using this data as a proxy for the environmental regulatory nature
of a state reveals that, in fact, some connection may exist between the two. More
specifically, if the states with higher levels of inspections and enforcements are viewed as
being more environmentally protective than states that do not, then it is possible to
examine the details of the brownfield programs to see if they have attributes that are
equally as environmentally protective. To do this we can take a sample of states with the
highest inspection rates and a sample of the states with the lowest inspection rates and
compare them across their stated mission/purpose of their brownfields programs.
BF Mission

NV
(44.75%)

MT
(24.91%)
VT
(1.83%)
NH(1%)

"'The Nevada Land Recycling Program ofNDEP maintains
technical staff which can oversee assessments and site cleanups to
ensure they are consistent with Nevada laws and are protective of
human health and the environment".
"'The primary focus .... .is to facilitate investigation and cleanup of
releases of unregulated hazardous substances".
"VRCPP is a road for invigorated community growth".
"The New Hampshire Brownfields Program encourages the
redevelopment of contaminated properties through a variety of
initiatives that address the uncertainty and liability concerns
associated with brownfields sites".

Table 6.1: RCRA Inspections and BF Missions across small sample of states
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Examining Table 6.1 shows that in the two states with the highest propensity to inspect
and enforce environmental regulations, their brownfield programs have a mission that is
rhetorically centered on environmental remediation. Conversely, the two states with the
lowest propensity to inspect and enforce RCRA environmental regulations have a
brownfield purpose/mission more centered on the economic development aspects of
brownfields. Taking a look at additional specifics of these four state brownfield
programs seems to lend further credence to this finding. For example, in Nevada the two
brownfield programs only offer an EPA funded revolving loan fund and EPA funded
grants to public entities. Comparing this to New Hampshire where that state offers
nineteen separate grant programs that range from EPA grants to state funded grants
drawn from various administrative agencies shows a state more focused on funding
environmental remediation to facilitate the redevelopment of a brownfield. As has been
stated throughout this dissertation, I am not testing a theory---but providing an
exploration of the issue. These possible connections are something that further research
can explore to see if states can be characterized in an environmentally protective versus
economic development oriented manner. If a measure like this is possible, then future
quantitative studies of brownfields can be facilitated through the use ofRCRA ECHO
data as a proxy for environmental regulatory versus economic development nature of the
programs.
In addition to these indirect connections between RCRA and Brownfield
Programs, direct connections exist that make it logical to study the two in conjunction.
Certain hazardous substances being removed from brownfield sites may be regulated
under RCRA, providing a direct link between the two. These substances will likely have
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at least two facility connections with RCRA: first, the act of transporting the substances
will fall under RCRA's Transporters regulations; second, the end resting place for these
materials will likely be a TSD (Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facility) that is often
not in the same state. Florida, for example sends RCRA hazardous waste to Alabama or
North Carolina; and Kentucky sends waste to Oklahoma. Although as was discussed in
Chapter Four, TSD's are the most heavily inspected and regulated facility type across the
fifty states, Transporters did not receive this same consistent level of enforcement of
RCRA. Referring back to the four extreme states touched on above reveals the following
variation in these two types of facilities:

Nevada

Montana

Vermont

New Hampshire

TSD: 91%
Transporter: 19%

TSD: 100%
Transporter: 90%

TSD: 86%
Transporter: 13%

TSD: 50%
Transporter: 31 %

Table 6.2: Specific RCRA facility inspection rates in selected states

Even in just these four states, a wide variation exists in the transporters who get inspected
under RCRA regulations. Leaks, accidents, carelessness, or even fraud in these
transporters of hazardous materials being removed from brownfields can cause serious
environmental harm-potentially resulting in another contaminated property somewhere
new.
Another direct link to Brownfield Programs is that of RCRA corrective action. In
some cases when a violation is discovered in inspections or when a facility is closing,
corrective action is ordered under the RCRA regulations. This cleanup process can
possibly be able to be completed in a state's Voluntary Cleanup Program. Although the
database is not able to provide an exact tally of which states allow this connection, the
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three case studies provided some additional infonnation here. In Indiana and Florida,
RCRA corrective action sites are able to be cleaned up under the brownfields programs;

in Nevada it is not allowed. Another state of note is Colorado, where RCRA corrective
action is strictly prohibited from participation in the Brownfields Voluntary Cleanup
Program. It is likely that further qualitative inquiry across the other states will reveal
more states where RCRA corrective action is allowed to be completed under the
brownfields program. Enabling RCRA corrective action sites to utilize a state's
brownfield program has a number of implications for RCRA and for the brownfield
programs. First, the allowance of an actively operating facility into a program
presumably geared for inactive or abandoned sites changes the nature of the entire
cleanup. The capacity of the brownfield program to accommodate these differences is
unknown and can potentially be detrimental to the purpose ofRCRA to the environment
as a whole. A second implication comes with accountability for funding. We know from
the database and details presented in Chapter Four that most brownfield programs across
the fifty states utilize a combination of user fees and EPA grants to operate. The EPA
grants were awarded to the states from the EPA to enable more brownfields to be
remediated and redeveloped-not necessarily to enable a RCRA facility to obtain
liability relief for their faults under RCRA. The accountability for these EPA grants as
well as the capacity of the brownfield program to properly oversee a cleanup in an active
RCRA facility is unknown.
Examining the two seemingly independent programs, RCRA and Brownfield
Programs, has revealed that connections do exist, making it logical and necessary for
future brownfield program studies to further investigate the connection between these
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two programs. In some cases the lines between the two programs become very blurred
with accountability to the EPA, the state, and the citizens being in question. It would also
seem that using RCRA inspection and enforcement data may be able to provide a
reasonable indicator for the nature of that state's brownfield efforts, although further
inquiry in this respect would be fruitful in future studies. In all cases across the 48
RCRA authorized states, the RCRA program is operated in the same Department as the
Brownfield Program, thereby potentially working under the same institutional culture.
Judging from the cases outlined above, something between the two programs seems to be
connected, or at least being influenced by the same thing. Future studies could
potentially use the highly quantitative RCRA inspection data to provide a measure of
environmental protectiveness of a given state when studying brownfield programs.
Additionally, future studies could use the implications ofRCRA corrective action
cleanups using the brownfields programs as an interesting inquiry into intergovernmental
relations and financial accountability.
Lessons Learned?
Both the database and case studies of this dissertation enabled a look at the
complexities of these programs. No two states are identical in how they handle their
brownfield programs. As was pointed out in Chapter Four, brownfield literature is
dominated by the premise that brownfields are not more widely developed as a result of
developer's liability concerns and concerns over the financial costs of cleanup. Table 6.3
restates, in a simple form, the basic foundations of these programs that exist across the
states in relation to these two aspects of brownfield remediation and redevelopment.
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Liability Abatement
-48 of 50 states have liability protections
-23 of 48 states have an EPA sMOA
-Approximately 50% of states allow
responsible party to receive liability
protections
-11 States offer 3rd Party Liability
Protections

Financial Abatement
Opportunities
-EPA funded grants
-Revolving Loan Funds
-State Funded Grants
-Loan Guarantees
-Tax Incentives: Sales, Property,
Income
-RBCA/Institutional Controls

Table 6.3: State Liability and Financial Abatement Methods

First, in the 47 states with a typical Voluntary Cleanup Program, liability
abatement is a pivotal part of that program-in fact sometimes it is the only benefit of the
program. The concept and goal of achieving voluntary cleanups in exchange for liability
protections is one that is not without opponents and detractors. First, in some ways it
relieves the responsible party of duties to cleanup contamination that they have created
because as it is quite possible that a voluntary party will step in and cleanup the site.
Second it likely allows for cherry-picking in sites. Making cleanups voluntary and
providing public resources for that purpose, does create the potential for less than
equitable results in what sites will be remediated. That is the sites with the most
redevelopment potential, in the best markets, will likely be redeveloped using the benefits
of these programs. However, there is a risk that these 'best' sites would have been
redeveloped anyway, leaving all of the most undesirable sites behind. Without future and
additional studies, this is not something that this dissertation can prove, however,
logically from the data gathered this makes sense, and as such, it warrants future studies.
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Although some amount of cherry picking probably occurs as a result of these
voluntary programs, it is certainly true that before these liability mechanisms were in
place many current property owners and municipalities were at risk of being held liable
under state and federal law for contamination that they may not have created or even
contributed to. The liability mechanisms in the voluntary cleanup programs certainly can
help get the redevelopment process started for a number of sites where the parties are all
innocent. Irregardless of the benefits to be gained by providing these liability relief
documents they are not without detractors and problems. With the number of states
possessing EPA MOA's for their VCPs and allowing responsible parties to participate
fully, have these liability protections gone too far? Have the remedies for the
unanticipated consequences of the strict environmental laws of the 1980s, gone so far as
to possibly recreate the potential for similar harms that prompted the original strict
environmental laws?
The CERCLA strict liability that the brownfield laws were passed to relieve may
very well be quite an effective incentive to prevent future contamination. By
encouraging cleanup through liability relief guarantees, it is possible that liabilities for
future contamination become less feared and less avoided, thereby increasing the
likelihood of future problems: a sort of unanticipated consequences problem. That is,
taking away the liability concerns may leave cities and states vulnerable to future
contamination and problems. An additional concern with these liability protections is
present in the eleven states with 3rd Party liability protections. It is quite possible that
harms to other individuals will not be able to be litigated to an acceptable solution in
these states. This type of liability protection may provide little recourse to individuals
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who may have suffered as a result of contamination in a neighboring property or as a
result of groundwater contamination. Although it eases the developers concerns, what
implications might this have for the injured innocent party? Finally, providing a
mechanism for liability relief may encourage businesses to cleanup, but may result in
giving tax dollars to these businesses to perform cleanups they may have been
responsible for or that they may have performed without the program at all- the socalled cherry picking problem again.
These liability relief documents in some states go further with an EPA M.O.A.
Just under half of the states have a MOA for their Yep. The same implications and
unanticipated consequences could result to a greater degree under the states with an EPA
MOA. From a developer's point of view, a state possessing a MOA may be looked upon
more favorably for the location of potential development, or in this case redevelopment.
This EPA MOA can be looked at as beneficial in providing extra assurances to
developers concerning their potential for future liability--- but it could also be viewed as
an additional way in which the responsible party for contamination cannot be required to
pay for their own cleanup. Almost thirty states allow the responsible party to participate
and receive liability protections from the state. Fourteen of these states also possess an
MOA with the EPA. In essence, these states are providing double liability assurance to
the responsible party. Allowing the responsible parties to obtain this level of liability
protections has potentially troubling implications for environmental problems that
science may not yet know about, or that the state has not identified on a list of hazardous
substances. As was outlined earlier in this dissertation, the states do not uniformly
identify hazardous substances or require that they be cleaned up to a specific, uniform
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level. With this variation across the states, this double liability protection for responsible
parties potentially leaves citizens in very unequal situations.
Some further important questions raised by the growing acceptance and use of
voluntary cleanups are: is it good use of tax dollars and policy to utilize public resources
to provide a voluntary party liability relief in order to clean up contaminated property if it

means the entity at fault for the contamination never has to pay for it? Or, as is true in
Pennsylvania, is it good policy to provide state and federal cleanup and 3rd Party liability
relief to someone who may have been partially responsible for the contamination, even
though they, by former laws, should have cleaned up the contamination anyway? The
answers to those questions are certainly debatable.

Financial Costs
The second often cited impediment to brownfield redevelopment is the added
financial costs associated with cleaning up brownfields to ready them for redevelopment.
There is a logical relationship that exists between liability relief and financial incentives
in the quest to get brownfields redeveloped. Obviously, liability relief documents reduce
the risk on the part of the developer. With a reduction in developer's risk, the risk
premium2 for obtaining and developing a brownfield will be lower, thereby theoretically,
requiring fewer financial incentives to get the brownfield done. In states where liability
protections are less comprehensive, those states may be able to compensate by offering
more financial incentives to developers. The most commonly offered incentives as
explained in Chapter Four were: EPA assessment and cleanup grants; loan guarantees and
revolving loan funds; and various tax incentives. Some states have begun drawing from
other economic development programs as a way to encourage and facilitate
2 The

reward for holding a risky investment rather than a risk-free one (lnvestorwords, 2007).
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redevelopment. The use of these types of financial mechanisms may be able to offer
enough incentive to get developers to invest into brownfields---achieving the remediation
and redevelopment of brownfields. However, much like the liability relief aspect of these
programs, financial opportunities offered across the states are not without some
concerning aspects.
A majority of financial incentive programs offered across the states stem from the
EPA's grants to the states-although in terms of total dollars state investment is likely
higher. In fact, one large (in terms of grants directly to states) grant that was created in
the 2002 federal Brownfields Law, CERCLA 128a, provides up to $50 million a year for
states to expand or establish their brownfield programs. An interesting component of this
funding is that the states must apply through their EPA Regions for this funding. As was
seen in Chapter Four funding is quite varied across the states. For example, Montana
received $976,426 from this grant program last year while Minnesota received $753,000.
Translating this into per capita reveals that Montana received an average of $1.03 per
person living in the state while Minnesota received $0.15 per person. This is quite a
discrepancy. Most states report using these funds for administrative purposes,
formulation of a database for brownfields, and for cleanup and assessment grants to
public entities. This use of federal brownfield money across the states appears to be
diverse and has the potential to be awarded in a discretionary manner with less than fair
results. Unfortunately, as was detailed in Chapter Four, the amounts these states receive
are not made readily available by the EPA or the EPA Regions and must be gathered on a
state-to-state basis. Some potential policy recommendations concerning these funds
include: A transparent tracking system by the EPA. Public funds provided to public
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entities should be made readily available to policy analysts and researchers. Relying on
state responses to inquiry to determine amount of funding received does not enable
accountability to citizens. Additionally, funding should not solely be done by grant
applications by the states. Certainly, many states have been in the brownfield
remediation and redevelopment process for much longer and have a potentially unfair
advantage in the experience and awarding rates for grants. In fact, what is seen in the
states that CERCLA 128a funding is known, is that the states with the most established
programs are actually receiving more money than those with less established programs.
For a grant program directed at states for the purpose of expanding brownfield effortsthis makes little sense. Certainly, future research should further expand on this tracking
to determine whether discrepancies exist across regions and how the EPA regions
determine which grant applications to approve.
The brownfield efforts across the fifty states have not widely offered financial
incentives from their own funds---particularly direct grants. In some ways it seems that
states are relying more heavily on abating the risk on the sites in order to achieve
remediation and redevelopment. What grants that are offered tend to be tied to the EPA,
and many of those EPA grants are awarded on the basis of grant applications. Again, this
implies that those states with more experience and more persistence will likely be able to
obtain greater EPA funding. This may not always be the states that need it the most.
Furthermore, since brownfield policies at the state level are not directly related to any
federal standards, remediation standards are left to the state decision makers who may
make decisions based upon the costs and willingness of developers. Brownfield
programs, in essence, are replacing environmental health with risk relatively-something

137

that might result in higher cleanup standards in wealthier areas and lower standards in
poorer areas (Landy, 1999). Additionally, Bullard (1993) has pointed out that poor and
minority communities are oftentimes willing to accept lower levels of remediation for
fear of missing all economic investment and development. The so called, "environmental
blackmail".
Outside of these EPA funds, the primary state originated incentive comes in the
form of tax related incentives. The use of tax incentives requires a financial commitment
by the states, and sometimes by local governments. In some of these tax incentives the
local government is required to take the financial burden of these incentives. More
specifically, many states permit their local governments to provide property tax
abatements or reductions for remediated brownfields. Although this may work to
encourage remediation and redevelopment, it is at the expense of the local government.
not the state. Arguably the local government is the most ill-equipped of all levels of
government to absorb this cost. In some of these property tax programs, current revenue
is forgone either voluntarily, or by state requirement, through a partial or full exemption
of property tax on a brownfield being redeveloped. To be sure, in the poorer cities it may
not be economically feasible to forgo revenue in order to get remediation done---even if
in the long run the property brings in more revenue for the local government.
Some states that offer property tax incentives ask or require that the local
government forgo future revenue for a specified period of time by not taxing the
additional value of the remediation or redevelopment of the property. Certainly from a
local government's perspective the tax incentives based on future revenue are more easily
dealt with and is very similar to the process used by Tax Increment Financing (TIF) for
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other economic development projects. However, it can still pose a problem to local
governments by creating an increased demand on services as a result of the
redevelopment without an immediate or even near-future increase in tax revenues. For
example, if a brownfield is remediated and redeveloped into a large scale housing
development in a city where the property tax is frozen for several years, that city will still
be forced to provide local services to that development and its residents but will receive
no additional funding to do so for the period of the program. These sort of financial
incentives that require the local government to either forfeit current or future revenues,
has a strong likelihood of producing unfair and unequal results across localities.
Another key incentive offered across many states is income tax deductions and
credits. Generally, these income tax credits and deductions allow a developer or
individual to deduct (or obtain a credit) for a certain percentage of the cost of
remediation, or sometimes the equipment or labor costs, from their state income tax.
Credits are certainly the bigger and better incentive, as they will count as the equivalent
of a payment to the state department of revenue, unlike a deduction which only counts to
reduce taxable income of a business or entity. In order for this incentive to provide a
substantial relief from financial costs the entity obtaining the deduction or credit would
need to be a significantly large enough entity to have state tax liability or the state would
need to provide for the ability of the credit or deduction to roll over to the following year
if all of it is not able to be used. Some states do allow for roll over of the tax incentives,
but not all. This is certainly an area where states could improve. Providing credits with
roll over capacity will help alleviate some of the potential unanticipated consequences

associated with these types of incentives. This form of incentive favors larger developers
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with greater tax liability, over smaller developers with less state tax liability. A business
or individual with marginal state tax liability will likely not see this sort of incentive, with
the exception of extremely small brownfield sites with equally as small cleanup bills, as
helpful as other forms of financial assistance. Furthermore, this sort of incentive requires
that the developer pay for the cost of remediation upfront and recoup a portion of the
costs later through their tax deduction. Again, this favors the larger entities that have the
upfront funds to conduct the cleanup. It is possible that these sorts of incentives are
working to encourage big box development. Something that may not have been
considered by the state administrators or policymakers creating these types of incentives.
RBCA and LUCs
Another key financial aspect seen across the fifty states are the risk based
corrective action and land use control allowance that reduces the cost of remediation of a
brownfield. Almost all of the states provide a mechanism for the use of these cleanup
mechanisms. By allowing for flexible cleanup standards, these programs have
circumvented the whole issue of "how clean is clean" that filled environmental debates
for years. Under these flexible guidelines clean enough is accepted even if that means
contamination still exists in the groundwater or soil. In most states that allow for risk
based cleanup levels, intuitional controls and engineering controls are attached that that
particular site to provide for monitoring and public notice of the remaining
contamination.
Most often the institutional controls used across the states are notations on the
deed and/or a registry providing the information to the public. The public notice capacity
and publicly available database for land use controls across the states is extremely varied.
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As was seen in Florida, the state has an extensive system in place to both inform the
public and to allow the public complete transparency in what controls exist across the
state. However, other states do not have this same level of transparency or public
information availability. Overall, the process of LUCs, although it likely reduces the cost
of cleanup, has some potential unanticipated consequences associated with it. First, these
controls on residential property may very well not be understood by individuals
purchasing the property. With the high number of states with underdeveloped and
potentially ineffective land use control monitoring and reporting systems, it is quite likely
that a purchaser of a property with these controls or restrictions may not fully understand
what that control means. Additionally, this leaves open the possibility for controls to
become completely untracked, essentially falling through the cracks, as a result of
administrative negligence or disorganization. Furthermore, some individuals may find
the lower costs of these sites the only affordable option to them in some markets across
the country possibly leading to a disproportionate number of lower income individuals
and minorities living in homes, or operating businesses that were erected on sites with
contamination still present.

An additional issue that is present with the use of flexible cleanup standards is
that it favors industrial and commercial developments where the end-use dictates a lower
level of cleanliness in the contamination. To be sure, across the states the level of
cleanup is the highest for residential developments. Providing for flexible cleanup
standards is certainly a disincentive to developers to invest in residential developments
where the costs are going to be the highest for cleanup. In fact, by having these flexible
guidelines, middle and low priced residential developments are not going to be as
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economically feasible as commercial, industrial, or high end residential. Furthermore, it
is relatively few markets that high-end residential development can take the place of a
brownfield- leaving developers to decide between industrial or commercial end use.
Unfortunately for this situation, many of the brownfields are located in former industrial
centers surrounded by residential development where the most appropriate use would
likely be residential. However, the use of these flexible standards is likely discouraging
the more appropriate end use in some areas. Overall, with the increased use and
acceptance of flexible cleanup standards, even on residential developments, some serious
environmental justice and equity implications exist.
One theme that is apparent across the state's financial offerings is that the states
with heavier industrial backgrounds tend to offer incentives specifically focused on
distressed urban communities. This is a stark difference from some states, such as
Nevada or Iowa, where incentives and assistance are often geared towards more rural
communities. Key states that have distressed or urban specific incentives are: Ohio, New
Jersey, Michigan, and Massachusetts. These states specifically have a financial program
restricted for use within distressed and/or urban areas. Other states, those with higher
unemployment rates, have tied some brownfield incentives to the number of jobs created.
Delaware and Oklahoma are two examples of this. This structuring of incentives reflects,
to some degree, a state that recognizes their economic development needs and places that
need onto the brownfield programs incentives. What is interesting about this so-called
need oriented incentive, is that it clearly illustrates a view of brownfields as an economic
development opportunity-and less of an environmental hazard.
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It is probable that financial incentives do actually encourage remediation of
brownfields, however, they are not to be taken lightly and they are not without
unanticipated consequences that deserve further study. Each of the various types of
incentives will likely work to encourage certain types of development. For example, in
Oklahoma the Quality Jobs Act will actually pay a developer quarterly incentives for
locating on a minimum of a 10 acre brownfield and employ a certain number of people.
This form of incentive will naturally encourage commercial or industrial use of
brownfields, which create the prerequisite number of jobs required to receive the
incentive.
Overall each of the primary incentives offered require both a risk and forgone
revenue or explicit costs on the part of either the state or local government. Additionally,
loans and loan guarantees require a level of risk that may be too great for states to take
and create a problem in states with a balanced budget requirement. As the state
governments are being handed more and more responsibility over federal programs, these
incentives may not be accomplishing exactly what they are intended to accomplish and
each state should look internally to analyze what the state's development needs are, what
their environmental situation is, and redirect their scarce financial abilities to those that fit
best with their states situation. They should also include general economic development
tools to their brownfield efforts. In the states where economic development tools are not
encouraged or allowed to be used for brownfields, the state is essentially providing yet
another disincentive for investment in brownfields.
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Discretion and Control of the programs?
As was pointed out in earlier chapters, a number of issues are known from
previous scholarship to impact program implementation and administration. As was
discussed in Chapter Two the literature concerning bureaucratic discretion and political
control theories is currently concentrated at the federal level-this study has enabled an
examination of the much more complex state level with the goal of informing these
theories and providing the groundwork for future studies. These case studies are not
intended to test these theories, but to inform them through the examination of a more
complex administrative and political environment. Several themes were uncovered in the
three case study states that may offer some insights into how these programs are
influenced by administrators and political officials alike. The major themes across these
states were: money/funding, EPA region and lower-level government officials.

Money
All three state case studies indicated oversight and monitoring in relation to their
funding. All three states receive money from the EPA and as a result are accountable to
the EPA for that funding. In addition to the reporting requirements associated with this
funding, political officials also indicate a lack of interest in oversight as a result of the
program's non-reliance on state appropriations. For example, as was detailed in Chapter
Five, a Nevada policymaker concedes that they do not get involved with the programs
because it is the EPA's money funding the program. This lack of oversight has some
very interesting implications for the actions of these programs. As contaminated
properties increasingly move through these voluntary programs, jUdging from these three

programs, the public seems to have little direct recourse in the programs where the state
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does not provide funding. The non-elected administrators are administering, with little
oversight by state political officials, a program where the potential for human health harm
is quite real. Furthennore, the level of decentralization in some of the programs likely
allows administrators to become more discretionary. For example, in Florida where the
brownfield program and RCRA program both are divided into six separate districts with
each district having discretionary abilities, these programs are further removed from
political oversight and monitoring. This is not something that has been accounted for in
bureaucratic discretion or political control theories. Certainly, these and other state level
programs influence the daily lives of citizens, and they are perhaps offered less political
oversight, and thereby popular control, than the federal program analyses that
demonstrate political control. In many ways these state level programs are more
influential to citizens than are some of the federal programs-making discretionary and
control issues much more relevant and important. These three cases seem to be showing
that the level of direct political control is associated with the funding, not the results or
operation of the program. RCRA is an exception to this in Indiana where the political
officials have actually exerted direct control over the program, but not for the purpose of
protection the environment. This has very real implications for popular control of these
programs.
A commonality across found in two of the states was that a fee was made part of
the program so that the program would not have to rely on appropriations. Both Nevada
and Indiana policymakers indicated this was a key consideration when detennining how
to

design the program. Florida, is an exception and policymakers indicated that other

issues were more important to them rather than impose a fee on participants. More
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specifically, policymaker #2 indicated, "We had a pretty significant situation with the
racial report that I mentioned. Attaching a fee to this program would have certainly
impeded participation and the goal was to help and encourage participation, not prevent
it" (Florida Policymaker #2, 10/2112006). Important to note here is that Florida is the
only program of the three that does not impose a fee, and is the only voluntary program
that doesn't at least allow for a charge across the entire United States-thereby relying
upon state appropriations. As a result of these appropriations it is also the only program
of the three to indicate a significant political oversight and monitoring from the state
level.

It is possible, perhaps even likely judging from lessons of these three states, that
states which offer state-funded financial incentives are faced with more oversight than the
states that do not have such programs. Again, this would be oversight tied to financial
contributions at the state level. Future research should certainly pursue this form and
level of oversight. Popular control of the government relies on accountability to the
citizens. However, if oversight and monitoring is tied to funding and budgets in these
programs, then the utility of oversight is questionable for the accountability to the public
and purposes of the program.
Overall, jUdging from these three states, it would seem that oversight and
monitoring in these programs is tied strongly to funding and money. At the state level
state policymaker interest is highly centered on accountability for funds provided. In
essence these policymakers want to know exactly what have they gotten in return for
their investment? In Nevada, where no funds are provided by the state, very little
oversight and interest was reported. However, in Florida, where state funds are being
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used, policymakers took a much more keen interest in monitoring the program's actions
and successes. It seems that on some level, the discretion ability of administrators may
be, in part, determined by who they get the funding from. This implies that in
discretionary terms, the administrators who are funded by federal grants may have
oversight and monitoring by federal officials but not state officials. This, too, has real
implications for a democracy that rests upon the popular control of the government. If
these administrators are not being held accountable to the citizens of the state they
operate in, what control do the citizens have over how they operate? While federal
oversight appears present, the reality is that there will be less detailed scrutiny than would
be possible - or possibly expected - if a state were monitoring its own internal programs
and activities.
With discretion and control being tightly related to who is funding the programs,
some interesting implications for discretion and political control questions emerge from
the relationships with the EPA and the EPA Regions. Specifically, with state programs
reporting to federal EPA administrators, not elected officials, how do the citizens of that
state ensure representation in something that likely impacts them? How does political
control manifest itself in these programs when it comes from a few steps above? To be
sure, EPA headquarters and EPA regional staff have oversight by Congress and the
President; however how that oversight gets channeled down to the lower level state
administrator is yet to be seen and cannot be answered in this dissertation.
A further consideration concerning funding and discretion, is when the EPA
provides funds to the states to use in administration and granting--- how those funds are
being distributed in the state is left to the state level administrators. It is quite possible
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that in order to be able to show results the state level administrators use these funds to
facilitate the easiest redevelopments, again leaving the less than marketable sites
unremediated.

EPA Region
The EPA is a highly complex administrative body. Decisions, influence, and
control is channeled down from Washington to the Regions and then on to the States.
Implementation of brownfield programs is likely impacted by decisions made at the
federal level, regional level, and the state levels all working together in some manner.
Due to this complexity, coupled with the highly administrative and vertical organization
of the EPA, political control of the state level programs are not as clear or as easily
identified as is in the federal studies of this topic. All programs, including the RCRA
programs, noted that their respective EPA region was pivotal and key in their relationship
with the EPA. In fact all reported little-to-no contact with the headquarters of EPA at all.
What is interesting about the EPA region in relation to discretion and political
control theories is that the EPA regions are a set of administrators acting on behalf of the
EPA. This provides an interesting funnel of political control. How CERCLA and the
brownfields legislation are being funneled down the set of non-elected administrators is
again something which is being missed in current political control and bureaucratic
discretion theories. What level of discretion exists at the EPA Region may well impact
what level of discretion the state level administrators, and perhaps even local
administrators, possess in determining how to implement and administer a program.
Although most states have passed enabling legislation for their brownfield programs, the
state programs are all still relying, in whole or in part, on federal EPA dollars to operate
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their program, including administrative expenses. When the EPA funds state programs in
some capacity and level, the programs are faced with oversight and monitoring from the
individual EPA regions. EPA regions are comprised of non-elected administrators which
may have varying levels of discretion across them. How EPA regional officials respond
to their non-elected administrator bosses, who in turn are responding to appointed and
elected officials at the national level illustrates a very complex discretionary and political
control environment. Even in Florida where state officials are overseeing and monitoring
the program more acutely than in Nevada and Indiana, the program is also responsive and
accountable to the EPA region.

Lower Level Government Involvement

An interesting theme that came from these three case studies is the role lower
level governments sometimes play in the state brownfield programs. Although the exact
role varied across the three cases, the fact is that the lower level governments were still
involved, making it worth noting. This relationship can be purely informational or for
communications like in Indiana. However, the relationship can also be more controlling
like in Florida where a local government and its elected officials must approve a
brownfields area in order for individuals to participate. To be sure, an aspect of the
various programs that either require or encourage local government participation is
subject to many of the problems associated with local government implementation. That
is corruption and poverty may often act as an impediment, or leave some local
communities prone to excess influence from wealthy outsiders, to any measure that
requires local level participation. Furthermore, in the states where grants are provided to
the local governments for assessments and remediations, it is likely the cities who need
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the funds the most are also the most ill-equipped to be persistent in the application for
these grants from the state. This is a fact that is also likely true at the state level. That is
the poorer a state is, the more likely it is to be less able to be persistent to their respective
EPA region in the application for grants and funds. If a state or local government is
strapped for funds, they may quite likely not have the funds for an employee to become
educated and persistent in grant applications to their EPA region or EPA headquarters.
In terms of local government participation, Florida is likely the most unique in
that it both allows and requires local government participation. However, in many state
programs the customer of the brownfields programs are local governments. For example,
as was seen in Nevada- the only participants in any of the programs are public or nonprofit entities. Local government participation in the state brownfield programs, whether
through direct participation as in Florida or through indirect participation as the customer,
is fundamentally shaped by their political coalitions and economic abilities, something
not accounted for in current brownfield literature or in current political control and
bureaucratic discretion theories.

Overall
Not so long ago the fears of red ice and purple dogs associated with contaminated
sites struck fear in citizens and businesses. Stemming from these fears harsh federal
legislation aimed at punishing those responsible for the contamination and preventing it
from happening again were created. Certainly, this harsh outlook on contaminated
properties provides a very real incentive for industry to avoid future contamination.
However, as a result of a complex set of circumstances, many sites remained
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unremediated and undeveloped years after industry left. Many cities are in decline and
liability and fmancial cost concerns keep developers away from these sites.
However, in the past fifteen years or so, we have seen a shift in the public
response to contaminated properties that is quite striking. Gone are the days of wide
public support for Superfund and strict liability. With New Jersey, Minnesota, and
Illinois leading the way in the 1980's states began to develop ways to help get these
properties developed. Some states started the process with legislation, others with
agencies creating administrative codes. Throughout the nineties the remaining states
began to create similar redevelopment programs. The Federal government came on
board in 2002 and the last state, South Dakota, created a program in 2004.
State efforts at remediation and redevelopment of brownfields rely heavily on the
private sector to do the remediation and redevelopment. Most states provide market
incentives in the form of liability relief, flexible cleanup, and financial opportunities to
try and help developers see brownfields as a marketable, viable alternative to Greenfield

development. In essence these programs are seeking for the private sector to voluntarily
remediate and redevelop properties that were already, for whatever reason, unmarketable.
Cities are in distress because industry moved out and left behind contaminated, unusable
land. These programs are offering financial opportunities and liability relief, but it very
well may not be enough to address the reasons why the industry left in the first place.
Some of the communities that have the most brownfields are faced with real estate
market conditions that exhibit low marketability on even the cleanest property. Adding
contamination to an already bad market only further exacerbates the problem. These

voluntary brownfield programs focus on making sites profitable to a developer so that
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these sites will be invested in. Any time profit is a key consideration, discrepancies
across states and localities will ensue. To be sure, states and localities do not have equal
economic capacities, political willingness, and market conditions. In states like Florida,
Nevada, and Arizona where market conditions are extremely favorable, brownfields
become more competitive with greenfields for development. However, in states like
Mississippi, Kentucky, and West Virginia where market forces are not so strong, the
properties are not going to be so successfully or easily dealt with. Unfortunately, some of
the states with the most brownfields, are also the states with the least capacity to address
them. The states with the biggest problems and least capacity to address them will
require more creative mechanisms and more federal assistance to successfully redevelop
their brownfields.
The movement to invest public funds into voluntary brownfield remediation and
redevelopment programs has spurred a plethora of mechanisms and variations across the
fifty states. The database and the case studies have shown just how diverse these
programs truly are. With this diversity come a number of significant questions and
implications that only future research will provide insights into.
Findings from this research include:
•

The States have very diverse, unequal mechanisms to promote brownfield
remediation and redevelopment. A variety of balance between risk abatement and
financial incentive mechanisms are distributed across the states. Some states are
providing extensive, far reaching liability abatements, while others are providing
the barest.
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•

State political officials are minimally providing oversight. That oversight is often
tied to funding. The EPA Regions playa pivotal role in oversight. Popular
control of these programs can be seriously questioned judging from the three
states examined in this dissertation.

•

Bureaucratic discretion seems to be, in some ways shaped by other non-elected
administrators as well as political officials. The discretionary ability of the EPA
regions and states answering to these regions is a logical next step for research.

•

Political control of environmental programs, particularly RCRA, can sometimes
be contrary to the political goals of the program.

•

Environmental protection and regulation has gone through a dramatic
transformation in the last fifteen years, with yet to be seen consequences.

•

Understanding Brownfield programs requires understanding RCRA programsThey are undeniably connected.

•

RCRA program activity may be able to reflect and measure the regulatory nature
of a state in terms of their brownfield programs.

Some policy implications for these findings are:
•

State political officials should tie oversight and monitoring of these programs
more closely to the potential impact they can have on the public instead of strictly
controlling and asking for accountability for funds allocated.

•

The balance between liability and financial incentives should be determined by an
individual states level of resources. However, unanticipated consequences of
flexible cleanup standards need to be thoroughly understood and recognized
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across the states. Environmental Justice issues are likely under these flexible
cleanup standards.
•

Land Use Controls should have greater consistency and states should pass the
Unifonn Environmental Covenants Act. LUCS have the potential for great public
hann if not tracked or monitored effectively. States need to make this a priority.

•

Brownfields have lost some of the stigma previously associated with them. States
are increasingly moving to more flexible, less controlling, perspectives on these
properties. Policymakers should critically assess whether the current trend and
level of flexibility is appropriate.
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APPENDIX A
CONTENTS OF DATABASE
Br~wnfield

Specific
RCRA Related
Year Initial Legislation Passed
Base Program: RCRA Authorized State?
Administrative Organization
Number of key RCRA rules authorized?
Citizens Ideology Measure of Program
RCRA Corrective Action?
Inception Year
RCRA Land Disposal Restrictions?
Government Ideology Measure of Program RCRA Closure Standards
RCRA Remediation Waste Management
Inception Year
Citizen Ideology Measure most recent year Requirements?
Government Ideology Measure most recent Number ofRCRA regulated facilities (July
2006)
year.
Absolute number of facilities with
Employees in Overall Agency
Employees in Program( s)
inspections
Status of Head of Agency
Percentage of facilities with inspections
Absolute
number of NOV/Informal
Name ofProgram(s)
enforcements
Additional Names?
# of Liability Provisions
Percentage of Facilities with Informal
CNTS
EnforcementslNOV
Number of Facilities with inspections and
NFA
informal enforcements
COC
Percentage of inspected facilities with
Otherl3rd Party Liability
informal enforcements
Re-openers?
Absolute Number of Formal Enforcements
# of Spinoff Programs
Number of formal enforcements in
EPA Approved UST Program?
facilities with inspections
Non-approved UST Program
Percentage of inspected facilities with
Drycleaner Program
formal enforcements
Others
Percentage of facilities with formal
# of Financial Incentives
enforcements
Grants
Number of facilities in SNC
-Types
Percentage of facilities in SNC
-Notes
Number of NOV done by EPA
Loans
Percentage of NOV done by EPA
-Types
Total LQG facilities
Tax Incentives
Inspections at LQG
-Types
Percentage of LQG with inspections
PRP Participate?
Total SQG
Restrictions on PRP Participation?
Inspections at SQG
128a Funding most previous year
Percentage of SQG with inspections
128a Funding Cumulative
Number of CESQG
RBCA?
Inspections at CESQG
Other Risk Based Standards?
Percentage of CESQG with inspections
Institutional Controls?
Number
ofTSD
Tracking System?
Inspections at TSD
Costs to enter program?
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VCPMOA?
Works with other agencies in state?
Economic Development
Environmental
Other
Location relative to RCRA?

Percentage of TSD with inspections
Number of Transporters
Inspections at Transporters
Percentage of Inspections at Transporters
PPAforRCRA
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APPENDIXB
THREE STATE EXAMPLES
Of note: RCRA data in this appendix was updated in March 2007 to provide the most upto-date information. However, as a result the exact percentages may not match some of
the examples in the text of this dissertation. However, all implications taken from these
examples remain the same with the new calculations as the percentages are not extremely
deviant after being updated.

INDIANA

Brownfield Programs Specific
Year Initial Legislation Passed
1993; 2005 technical and many fmancial
components moved to IFA
VRP: Indiana Department of
Administrative Organization
Environmental Management-7 Office of
Land Quality
62.788
Citizens Ideology Measure of Program
Inception Year
46.36168
Government Ideology Measure of
Program
Inception Year
43
Citizen Ideology Most Recent Year
Government Ideology Most Recent Year 63
934
Employees in OveraU Agency
Employees in Program(s)
8 in VRP; 12 in Brownfields Program
Status of Head of Agency
Commissioner appointed by Governor
heads IDEM; Board of appointed officials
headsIFA.
1. Voluntary Remediation Program (VRP)
Name ofProgram(s)
2. The Indiana Brownfields Programs
NA
Additional Names?
# of Liability Provisions
2
Yes
CNTS
NFA
No
Yes
COC
Other/3,4 Party Liability
3rd Party protections for Non-Responsible
Parties.
Brownfield program offers Site Status
Letters, Prospective Purchaser Agreements,
and Comfort Letters--however, they do
not protect from liabilities.
3+
# of Spinoff Programs
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EPA Approved UST Program?
Non-approved UST Program

No

Drycieaner Program

Not a cleanup program; Voluntary
certification program, and compliance
assistance program
Confined Feedings; Auto Salvage Program
3+
Yes, in Brownfields Program only
Assessment grants, cleanup grants,
petroleum remediation grants, CDBG
grants, revitalization grants.
VRP has no funding available specifically
through their program. The brownfield
program handles all the financial
components offered by the state of Indiana
and the EPA in the state.
Yes.
EPA funded RLF awarded in 1999. Local
governments are eligible for a low interest
loan program offered through IFA.
Amounts above $750,000 require approval
by IFA board.
Yes.
Cleanup tax credit: Lesser of $200,000 or
sum of 100010 of first $100,000 of qualified
investment plus 50% of the amount of the
qualified investment over $100,000.
Yes, in most cases the VRP participant is
rd
the responsible party. RP cannot get 3
party liability protections.
Cannot receive 3rd party liability
protections. Many of the financial
incentives are for public entities.
Allowed, but never happened. VRP staff
reports that closure means closure to them.
$751, 117 (since IFA created- shares small
percentage with IDEM, but IFA actually
receives the funds).
$2,726,705
Similar
State RISC (Risk Integrated System of
Closure) standards are in effect for VRP
and brownfields program. Does not have
force of law and must be used in
conjunction with existing laws. Provides

Others
# of Financial Incentives
Grants
-Types

-Notes

Loans
-Types

Tax Incentives
-Types

PRP Participate?
Restrictions on PRP Participation?

Re-Openers
128a Funding most previous year
128a Funding Cumulative
RBCA?
Other Risk Based Standards?

Yes
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Institutional Controls?

Tracking System?

Costs to enter program?

VCPMOA?
Works with other agencies in state?
Economic Development

Environmental
Other
Location relative to RCRA?

guidance on how to identify contamination
and what level it should be cleaned to for
final development.
IC's are viewed as acceptable to cleanups.
VRP has a database and an inter-office
database is under development.
VRP has internal database, office wide
database under development. VRP has
public notice requirement that 'advertises'
the use ofIC. However, no online or
publicly accessible database exists.
Required to be recorded on deed of
property.
Brownfield Program is Free.
VRP has $1000 application fee. Cost
recovery of oversight and time for
participants in VRP. Municipalities are
exempt from application fee of VRP.
Yes, December 1995
Yes
IFA is a quasi governmental authority that
houses all financial mechanisms for the
brownfield effort in Indiana.
IF A has some environmental components
to it.
Governor's office issues the CNTS.
VRP and RCRA are both in Office of Land
Quality of IDEM.

INDIANA RCRA
RCRA Program Information
Base Program: RCRA Authorized
Yes
State?
Number of key RCRA rules authorized? 11112
RCRA Corrective Action?
Yes
30f3
RCRA Land Disposal Restrictions?
Yes
RCRA Closure Standards
RCRA Remediation Waste Management Yes
Requirements?
7644
Number of RCRA regulated facilities
(March 2007)
1283
Absolute number of facilities with
inspections
16.78%
Percentage of facilities with inspections
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Absolute number of NOV!Informal
enforcements
Percentage of Facilities with Informal
EnforcementslNOV
Number of Facilities with inspections
and informal enforcements
Percentage of inspected facilities with
informal enforcements
Absolute Number of Formal
Enforcements
Number of formal enforcements in
facilities with inspections

488

Percentage of inspected facilities with
formal enforcements
Percentage of facilities with formal
enforcements
Number of facilities in SNC
Percentage of facilities in SNC
Number of NOV done by EPA
Percentage of NOV done by EPA
Total LQG facilities
Inspections at LQG
Percentage of LQG with inspections

9.50%

TotalSQG
Inspections at SQG
Percentage of SQG with inspections
Number of CESQG
Inspections at CESQG
Percentage of CESQG with inspections
Number of TSD
Inspections at TSD
Percentage of TSD with inspections
Number of Transporters
Inspections at Transporters
Percentage of Inspections at
Transporters
PPAforRCRA

6.4%
478
37.25%
136
122

1.77%
28
0.366%
2
0.41%
552
420
76%
1108
389
35%
5363
356
7%
96
65
68%
525
53
10%
Yes
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FLORIDA
Brownfield Programs Specific
1997
Year Initial Legislation Passed
Administrative Organization
Department of Environmental
Protection~ Regulatory Branch~ Division
of Waste Management~ Bureau of Waste

Cleanup

Citizens Ideology Measure of Program
Inception Year
Government Ideology Measure of
Program
Inception Year
Citizen Measure of Ideology Most recent
Year
Government Measure of Ideology Most
recent year
Employees in Overall Agency
Employees in Program(s)
Status of Head of Agency
Name ofProgram(s)
Additional Names?
# of Liability Provisions
CNTS
NFA
COC
Otherl3rd Party Liability

# of Spinoff Programs

55.268
44.602

46
7

3599
3 in the central Tallahassee office; 14+
across regions.
Secretary Appointed by Governor
Brownfields Redevelopment Program
Voluntary Cleanup Tax Credit (VCTC)
1
No
Yes
No
rd
No 3 Party Liability Protections.
Participants must have a brownfield area
designated by the local government before
accessing any liability protections or
financial benefits of the program.
3

EPA Approved UST Program?
Non-approved UST Program

No

Drycleaner Program

Yes. Drycleaner Solvent Cleanup
Program.
Cattle Dip Vat program

Others
# of Financial Incentives
Grants

-Types

Yes

2
Not grant money specific in the
environmental department. However the
Office of Tourism, Trade, and Economic
Development has a brownfield specific
grant program.
1. Environmental department will provide
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grants~in~services

-Notes
Loans
-Types
Tax Incentives
-Types

PRP Participate?
Restrictions on PRP Participation?

to eligible nonprofit or
public entities. Usually in the fonD. of soil
removal or assessment using state and EPA
funds.
2. Office of Tourism, Trade, and Economic
Development has a brownfield bonus. This
brownfield bonus is designed to work with
other job creation programs and provide an
additional $2,500 per job created over the
other job programs minimum requirements.
It was expanded in 2000 to allow
brownfield sites to get the $2,500 per job
bonus even without participating in other
job creation programs. This is a refund on
taxes paid and only 25% can be taken each
year.
State does not offer any typical cleanup
grants or grants in money to entities.
Yes
Loan Guarantees. State revolving loan
funds.
Yes.
1. The brownfield Program itself has a
Voluntary Cleanup Tax Credit program
(VCTC). This was initially created for and
used by the drycleaners program.
However, the brownfield program has
utilized the program more routinely and
has become the primary user. The VCTC
is only good for corporate income tax and
provides up to a $500,000 credit on
corporate income tax. This is allowed to be
rolled over to following years.
2. The Governor's Office of Trade,
Tourism, and Economic Development has
a number of incentives that are noted as
being for brownfields (among others).
Notable brownfield relevant tax incentives
are: Sales tax refund, target industry tax
refund, and job tax credits.
3. Department of revenue has sales tax
exemption on building materials for
brownfield redevelopment.
Yes
In order for a responsible party to
participate the contamination must have
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Re-Openers
128a Funding most previous year
128a Funding Cumulative
RBCA?
Other Risk Based Standards?

Institutional Controls?
Tracking System?

Costs to enter program?

VCPMOA?

Works with other agencies in state?
Economic Development

Environmental

Other

Location relative to RCRA?

occurred before 1997 to be eligible. Any
person responsible for contamination after
1997 cannot participate.
Technically yes. However, it is reserved
for fraud in most cases.
Approximately $1.2 million
$3,491,000
Similar
Has set of risk based priciples written in
statute and in administrative code. Will
allow them in most cleanups.
Yes
The program has an extensive tracking
system. It is online and publicly available.
http://ca.dep.state.fl.us/imfl?focus=icr
Brownfield Program is Free.
Tax credit requires an annual fee of$250 to
apply.
December 1999; Revised in November
2005 to expand eligibility including RCRA
cleanup sites.
Yes
Governor's Office of Tourism, Trade, and
Economic Development houses a number
of brownfield related grants, loans, and tax
incentives.
RCRA is allowed to do cleanups under The
Brownfield Redevelopment Program--both are in the D EP, but in different
bureaus within that agency.
Department of Revenue administers the
sales tax refund and exemption.
Both are in the Department of
Environmental Protection-~ Regulatory
Branch-~ Division of Waste
Management.. However, RCRA Is the
Bureau of Solid and Hazardous Waste;
Brownfield Program is in the Bureau of
Waste Cleanup

FLORIDA RCRA
RCRA Program Information
Base Program: RCRA Authorized
Yes
State?
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Number of key RCRA rules authorized?
RCRA Corrective Action?
RCRA Land Disposal Restrictions?
RCRA Closure Standards
RCRA Remediation Waste Management
Requirements?
Number of RCRA regulated facilities
(March 2007)
Absolute number of facilities with
inspections
Percentage of facilities with inspections
Absolute number of NOV/Informal
enforcements
Percentage of Facilities with Informal
EnforcementslNOV
Number of Facilities with inspections
and informal enforcements
Percentage of inspected facilities with
informal enforcements
Absolute Number of Formal
Enforcements
Number of formal enforcements in
facilities with inspections
Percentage of inspected facilities with
formal enforcements
Percentage of facilities with formal
enforcements
Number of facilities in SNC
Percentage of facilities in SNC

12/12

Yes
30f3
Yes
Yes
26,272
2106
8.01%
916
3.5%
879
41.7%
301
244
11.6%
1.14%
43
0.l6%

o

Number of NOV done by EPA
Percentage of NOV done by EPA
Total LQG facilities
Inspections at LQG
Percentage of LQG with inspections

0%
422
214
50.7%

TotalSQG

15,148

Inspections at SQG
Percentage of SQG with inspections
Number of CESQG
Inspections at CESQG
Percentage of CESQG with inspections
Number of TSD

419
2.8%
10,351
1324
12.8%
79

Inspections at TSD
Percentage of TSD with inspections

74
94%
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Number of Transporters
Inspections at Transporters
Percentage of Inspections at
Transporters
PPAforRCRA

272
75
27.6%

No

NEVADA

Brownfield Programs Specific
Year Initial Legislation Passed
1999
Administrative Organization
Division of Environmental Protection~
Bureau of Corrective Actions
Citizens Ideology Measure of Program
46.63
Inception Year
Government Ideology Measure of
57.26
Program
Inception Year
Citizen Ideology most recent year
46
Government Ideology most recent year
37
Employees in Overall Agency
207
Employees in Program(s)
1 in Land Recycling Program; 2 in VCP; 4
total in environmental cleanups.
Status of Head of Agency
Governor appointed Administrator
Name of Program(s)
Land Recycling Program (LRP)
Voluntary Cleanup Program
Additional Names?
LRP also called Brownfields Program
# of Liability Provisions
1
CNTS
No
NFA
Yes-can only receive this through VCP.
COC
No
Otherl3,d Party Liability
No 3rd Party Liability Protections.

# of Spinoff Programs
EPA Approved UST Program,'
Non-approved UST Program

1
Yes- 1998
NA

Drycleaner Program
Others

1. Environmental assistance program
that provides outreach to rural
communities concerning emergency
responses to accidents or leaks or
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contamination.
2. MTBE (Methyl Tertiary Butyl
Ether) corrective action guidance.

# of Financial Incentives

Grants
-Types
-Notes
Loans
-Types
Tax Incentives
-Types
PRP Participate?
Restrictions on PRP Participation?
Re-Openers
128a Funding most previous year
128a Funding Cumulative
RBCA?
Other Risk Based Standards?
Institutional Controls?
Tracking System?
Costs to enter program?

2
Yes
CERCLA 128a Funds are granted to public
entities for all aspects of brownfield
remediation from assessments to cleanups.
No private entity funding available.
Yes
Revolving Loan Fund
No
NA
Yes
No
Yes, however no one has completed the
VCP-so unsure about how this would
actually apply in real situations
$600,000
Approximately $1.8 million
Similar
State specified end use appropriate cleanup
levels are used.
No
No

VCPMOA?
Works with other agencies in state?

Brownfield Program is Free.
VCP has oversight costs determined on a
case by case basis.
No
No

Economic Development
Environmental

NA
NA

Other
Location relative to RCRA?

NA
Both are in the Division of Environmental
Protection. RCRA Is in the Bureau of
Waste Management. Was in the same
bureau many years ago-but were
separated into two different bureaus.
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NEVADARCRA
RCRA Program Information
Base Program: RCRA Authorized
Yes
State?
Number of key RCRA rules authorized? 12/12
RCRA Corrective Action?
Yes
RCRA Land Disposal Restrictions?
30f3
RCRA Closure Standards
Yes
RCRA Remediation Waste Management Yes
Requirements?
Number of RCRA regulated facilities
1950
(MARCH 2007)
Absolute number of facilities with
1212
inspections
Percentage of facilities with inspections
62%
Absolute number of NOV/Informal
enforcements
Percentage of Facilities with Informal
EnforcementslNOV
Number of Facilities with inspections
and informal enforcements
Percentage of inspected facilities with
informal enforcements
Absolute Number of Formal
Enforcements
Number of formal enforcements in
facilities with inspections
Percentage of inspected facilities with
formal enforcements
Percentage of facilities with formal
enforcements
Number of facilities in SNC
Percentage of facilities in SNC
Number of NOV done by EPA
Percentage of NOV done by EPA
Total LQG facilities
Inspections at LQG
Percentage of LQG with inspections
TotalSQG
Inspections at SQG
Percentage of SQG with inspections
Number ofCESQG

254
13%
253
21%
39
37
3.1%
2%
0
0

12
4.7%
91
84
92%
486
409
84%
1246
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Inspections at CESQG
Percentage of CESQG with inspections
Number ofTSD
Inspections at TSD
Percentage of TSD with inspections
Number of Transporters
Inspections at Transporters
Percentage of Inspections at
Transporters
PPA for RCRA

687
55%
11
10
91 %
116
22
19%
No
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